

Mr. PHILBIN. Yes; the House bill called for 150 short tons to be disposed of from the stockpile. In the conference, we considered the Senate bill which provided for 225,000 tons and we compromised at 200,000 tons.

The Senate had previously considered 300,000 tons, the original GSA measure. That figure was reduced during the hearings in the House after we had GSA conduct industry conferences, as is the custom of our committee.

So, Mr. Speaker, we feel that the compromise reached with the other body was an excellent one.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, did this represent a cut or an increase in the disposal?

Mr. PHILBIN. It represented an increase in the disposal amount.

Mr. GROSS. In the total amount to be disposed of?

Mr. PHILBIN. Yes, but not in the total amount as originally provided. There was a considerable reduction, a reduction of 100,000 tons, from the original proposal requested by the General Services Administration. But there was an increase of 50,000 tons in the amount as contained in the House bill.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PHILBIN. I am glad to yield to the able, distinguished gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I merely want to say to the chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. PHILBIN], that I believe that in the instance of these two bills the gentleman from Massachusetts has done an exceptionally fine job. I have had the pleasure of working with the gentleman and consulting with him about these matters. These bills should be immediately expedited. They are meritorious, they are desirable and needed.

Again, Mr. Speaker, I compliment the gentleman for his effective efforts in connection with these matters.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Illinois for his kind remarks and also for his very valuable assistance to the committee in these and in all matters.

And I thank the able committee, my esteemed, distinguished chairman, Mr. RIVERS, and the Members of the House for their helpful counsel, support, and assistance.

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PHILBIN. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Idaho.

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Speaker, I too want to compliment the gentleman from Massachusetts for the excellent job which he has done in handling the stockpile disposals, not only in this instance, but in prior instances.

However, Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of the Members of the House that the gentleman and his committee stands between the consumers and the producers, and having the worldwide shortage of zinc that we have today and because of the lack of production in

certain areas of the United States, it is necessary to firm up supply with these disposals. I want the Congress at all times to be cognizant of the fact that the stock of zinc and other metals hangs over the zinc market and the market of other metals such as nickel and lead.

Mr. Speaker, as we have said here at other times, we should supply this stock of material to its most judicious use, and I want to compliment the gentleman from Massachusetts on his integrity in this area. Because of programed disposals, we have not had a break in the market and have had a continuing stable price for both zinc and lead.

Mr. Speaker, I believe this is the important consideration that both the zinc producers and zinc consumers need, a base on which they can project their prices and operations in the future.

Further, Mr. Speaker, I want to say the gentleman from Massachusetts has done an excellent job in this area and I shall be watching for further developments as stockpile disposals are carried out in the future.

(Mr. WHITE of Idaho asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the conference report.

The conference report was agreed to. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

AUTHORIZING THE DISPOSAL OF NICKEL FROM THE NATIONAL STOCKPILE

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 10305) to authorize the disposal, without regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting period, of approximately 124,200,000 pounds of nickel from the national stockpile, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the managers on the part of the House be read in lieu of the report.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the statement.

(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of October 21, 1965.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PHILBIN. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Iowa and do so very gladly.

Mr. GROSS. I thank my friend from Massachusetts. Apparently there has been a rather substantial cut in the stockpile disposal of nickel of about 50 million pounds; is that correct?

Mr. PHILBIN. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. GROSS. Does the gentleman think with that cut there will be sufficient nickel to take care of all of the "funny money" coins that this administration is going to have in circulation around Christmas time this year?

Mr. PHILBIN. I hope that this will make some little contribution to the well-being of the financial picture of our country and the budgetary situation.

Mr. GROSS. If the gentleman will yield further, I just want to be sure that the public is not shortchanged on "funny money" when it comes time to do some Christmas shopping.

Mr. PHILBIN. I hope the gentleman is right in his apprehension.

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PHILBIN. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman from Idaho.

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Speaker, I do not like to belabor a point that we discussed at some length some time ago with respect to coinage, but at that time we were talking about the coinage, we were told that we would need imported silver with which to make silver coins, even of a reduced content.

Mr. Speaker, it seems rather interesting to me that we are going to have to import nickel to make—I shall not say "funny money"—but the cupronickel "hamburger" coins that we are going to have with us from now on.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

[Mr. EDMONDSON addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the conference report.

The conference report was agreed to. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 days in which to extend their remarks on the conference report just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

ANNOUNCEMENT

(Mr. BALDWIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BALDWIN. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably absent during rollcall No. 318 on September 22, and during rollcall Nos. 324 and 325 on September 24. Had I been present, I would have voted "nay" on rollcall No. 318, "nay" on rollcall No. 324, and "yea" on rollcall No. 325.

AMENDING WATERSHED PROTECTION AND FLOOD PREVENTION ACT, AS AMENDED

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's desk the bill (S. 2679) to amend the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, as amended, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. EDMONDSON). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, were there any

amendments adopted in conference on this bill?

Mr. POAGE. This is not a conference report.

Mr. GROSS. I beg the gentleman's pardon.

Mr. POAGE. This is a Senate bill. The House had reported a similar bill. The Senate passed this bill. This is a bill that originated in the Senate. This bill increases the watershed authority to build dams so that they can build dams ranging up to 12,500 acre-feet instead of 5,000 acre-feet. This is an old matter about which there has been considerable disagreement over the years. But now there has been an agreement between the Army Engineers and the Department of Agriculture and we know of nobody who is objecting to it.

Mr. GROSS. In other words, this bill is confined strictly to the subject that the gentleman has just explained?

Mr. POAGE. This bill does absolutely nothing except to change the figure 5,000 acre-feet to 12,500 acre-feet.

(Mr. REDLIN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point.)

Mr. REDLIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my appreciation to my committee chairman, Mr. COOLEY, and to my committee vice chairman, Mr. POAGE, for their excellent work in bringing this legislation to the floor of the House in time for action this session.

The untiring and dedicated work of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. POAGE], in the field of watershed development is recognized and saluted all over the Nation and particularly in an area like my State of North Dakota where the small watershed program is used extensively.

S. 2679 is identical to my bill, H.R. 5149, and to Mr. COOLEY's bill, H.R. 9141, reported out by the House Agriculture Committee.

The Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act now limits the size of dams to a floodwater detention capacity of 5,000 acre-feet, forming an impediment to multipurpose development in many small watersheds—a good number of them in North Dakota. Corrective legislation has been strongly endorsed by the North Dakota Association of Soil Conservation Districts.

This amendment, by increasing flood-detention capacity to 12,500 acre-feet, would allow North Dakota and many other areas in the Nation to do a better job of providing a water supply for towns, irrigation, recreation and fish and wildlife development.

I urge my colleagues to support S. 2679.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman.

(Mr. COOLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

[Mr. COOLEY addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. POAGE]?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill as follows:

S. 2679

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 2 of the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act (68 Stat. 666), as amended, is amended by striking out "more than five thousand acre-feet of floodwater detention capacity" and inserting in lieu thereof "more than twelve thousand five hundred acre-feet of floodwater detention capacity".

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

A similar House bill was laid on the table.

VALOR IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(Mr. MARSH asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, before this session of the Congress adjourns, I would like to call to the attention of the House an incident involving the son of Cleveland Tucker, one of the Official Reporters of debates of the House. His son, 2d Lt. Phillip E. Tucker, a member of the U.S. Marine Corps, was first captain of the Corps of Cadets of Virginia Military Institute in 1963 and 1964. This well-known military institution is located at Lexington, Va., in my Congressional District. Lieutenant Tucker had an outstanding record at VMI, both militarily and academically, and was cited as a distinguished academic student.

Upon graduation from VMI, Lieutenant Tucker became a regular officer in the Marine Corps. Recently in the name of the President, the Bronze Star Medal was awarded to 2d Lt. Phillip E. Tucker, USMC, for his heroic services as a platoon leader during operations of the U.S. Marines in defense of the Embassy of the United States in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

I felt that the Members of the House would like to be aware that the son of one of the reporters of debates commanded one of the first units ashore in the Dominican Republic and played such a key role in defending the U.S. Embassy there. I am sure all of us are proud and grateful for this young man's courageous and heroic service to his country.

I ask unanimous consent that Lieutenant Tucker's Bronze Star citation, submitted to the commanding general, 2d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, by the commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, be inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this point.

BRONZE STAR CITATION

For heroic achievement in connection with operations in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, while serving with friendly foreign forces, engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States was not a belligerent party. During

the period April 28 to April 30, 1965, Second Lieutenant Tucker, platoon leader, 2d Platoon, Company "L", 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, organized and defended the U.S. Embassy from hostile forces. On the evening of April 28, 1965, he made a complete and detailed reconnaissance, and established a defensive perimeter despite intensive hostile fire. For the next 2 days he continuously inspected each man and his position to insure his well-being and alertness. Whenever sniper fire was directed at his positions, he personally went to the area receiving fire to organize and control the return fire. This was accomplished with considerable risk to his own life. When the hostile fire continued from houses located outside the established international safety zone, he organized and led each house clearing detail. He continued this action until the sniper fire was eliminated. Second Lieutenant Tucker's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.

ZAMBIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY

(Mr. O'HARA of Illinois asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, this coming Sunday will be the first anniversary of the independence of the Republic of Zambia and I am reminded of the very pleasant and profitable hours the members of the African Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs passed with the Honorable Kenneth Kaunda, then the president of the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia, now the President of the Republic of Zambia, on April 18, 1961, when he was on a visit to the United States. The long acquaintance and warm friendship of members of our subcommittee, extending over the years of historic events, with many of the great statesmen of the developing nations, has built a bridge of personal understanding and enduring interest uniting the United States of America with the new nations of Africa. The visit of President Kaunda over 4 years ago stands out in our memory.

Zambia, the former British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, is a high plateau country with an elevation of 3,000 to 4,000 feet above sea level. It is located inland in south-central Africa, bordered on the north by the Republic of the Congo, on the east by Tanzania and Malawi, on the south by Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, and southwest Africa, and on the west by Angola. With a total area of 290,000 square miles, Zambia is about twice the size of the State of Colorado.

Zambia has many rivers; most of them flow south into the Zambezi. The Zambezi rises in the northwest corner and flows into Southern Rhodesia, through Mozambique and into the Indian Ocean. The Chambezi flows south into the great swamps of Bangweulu. These two rivers are broken by many waterfalls. Victoria Falls on the Zambezi is one of the most important waterfalls in Africa and one of the great wonders of the world.

The estimated population of Zambia is 3,587,000, comprised of about 3.5 million

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contain allegations that the applicant is not otherwise registered to vote.

(b) Any person whom the examiner finds, in accordance with instructions received under section 9(b), to have the qualifications prescribed by State law not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States shall promptly be placed on a list of eligible voters. A challenge to such listing may be made in accordance with section 9(a) and shall not be the basis for a prosecution under section 12 of this Act. The examiner shall certify and transmit such list, and any supplements as appropriate, at least once a month, to the offices of the appropriate election officials, with copies to the Attorney General and the attorney general of the State, and any such lists and supplements thereto transmitted during the month shall be available for public inspection on the last business day of the month and in any event not later than the forty-fifth day prior to any election. The appropriate State or local election official shall place such names on the official voting list. Any person whose name appears on the examiner's list shall be entitled and allowed to vote in the election district of his residence unless and until the appropriate election officials shall have been notified that such person has been removed from such list in accordance with subsection (d): *Provided*, That no person shall be entitled to vote in any election by virtue of this Act unless his name shall have been certified and transmitted on such a list to the offices of the appropriate election officials at least forty-five days prior to such election.

(c) The examiner shall issue to each person whose name appears on such a list a certificate evidencing his eligibility to vote.

(d) A person whose name appears on such a list shall be removed therefrom by an examiner if (1) such person has been successfully challenged in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 9, or (2) he has been determined by an examiner to have lost his eligibility to vote under State law not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.

Sec. 8. Whenever an examiner is serving under this Act in any political subdivision, the Civil Service Commission may assign, at the request of the Attorney General, one or more persons, who may be officers of the United States, (1) to enter and attend at any place for holding an election in such subdivision for the purpose of observing whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote, and (2) to enter and attend at any place for tabulating the votes cast at any election held in such subdivision for the purpose of observing whether votes cast by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated. Such persons so assigned shall report to an examiner appointed for such political subdivision, to the Attorney General, and if the appointment of examiners has been authorized pursuant to section 3(a), to the court.

Sec. 9. (a) Any challenge to a listing on an eligibility list prepared by an examiner shall be heard and determined by a hearing officer appointed by and responsible to the Civil Service Commission and under such rules as the Commission shall by regulation prescribe. Such challenge shall be entertained only if filed at such office within the State as the Civil Service Commission shall by regulation designate, and within ten days after the listing of the challenged person is made available for public inspection, and if supported by (1) the affidavits of at least two persons having personal knowledge of the facts constituting grounds for the challenge, and (2) a certification that a copy of the challenge and affidavits have been served by mail or in person upon the person challenged at his place of residence set out in the application. Such challenge shall be determined within fifteen days after it has been

filed. A petition for review of the decision of the hearing officer may be filed in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the person challenged resides within fifteen days after service of such decision by mail on the person petitioning for review but no decision of a hearing officer shall be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Any person listed shall be entitled and allowed to vote pending final determination by the hearing officer and by the court.

(b) The times, places, procedures, and form for application and listing pursuant to this Act and removals from the eligibility lists shall be prescribed by regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission and the Commission shall, after consultation with the Attorney General, instruct examiners concerning applicable State law not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to (1) the qualifications required for listing, and (2) loss of eligibility to vote.

(c) Upon the request of the applicant or the challenger or on its own motion the Civil Service Commission shall have the power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence relating to any matter pending before it under the authority of this section. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena, any district court of the United States or the United States court of any territory or possession, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or is domiciled or transacts business, or has appointed an agent for receipt of service of process, upon application by the Attorney General of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Commission or a hearing officer, there to produce pertinent, relevant, and nonprivileged documentary evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.

Sec. 10. (a) The Congress finds that the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting (1) precludes persons of limited means from voting or imposes unreasonable financial hardship upon such persons as a precondition to their exercise of the franchise, (2) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any legitimate State interest in the conduct of elections, and (3) in some areas has the purpose or effect of denying persons the right to vote because of race or color. Upon the basis of these findings, Congress declares that the constitutional right of citizens to vote is denied or abridged in some areas by the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting.

(b) In the exercise of the powers of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment and section 2 of the fifteenth amendment, the Attorney General is authorized and directed to institute forthwith in the name of the United States such actions, including actions against States or political subdivisions, for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief against the enforcement of any requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting, or substitute therefor enacted after November 1, 1964, as will be necessary to implement the declaration of subsection (a) and the purposes of this section.

(c) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of such actions which shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. It shall be the duty of the judges designated to hear the case to

assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.

(d) During the pendency of such actions, and thereafter if the courts, notwithstanding this action by the Congress, should declare the requirement of the payment of a poll tax to be constitutional, no citizen of the United States who is a resident of a State or political subdivision with respect to which determinations have been made under subsection 4(b) and a declaratory judgment has not been entered under subsection 4(a), during the first year he becomes otherwise entitled to vote by reason of registration by State or local officials or listing by an examiner, shall be denied the right to vote for failure to pay a poll tax if he tenders payment of such tax for the current year to an examiner or to the appropriate State or local official at least forty-five days prior to election, whether or not such tender would be timely or adequate under State law. An examiner shall have authority to accept such payment from any person authorized by this Act to make an application for listing, and shall issue a receipt for such payment. The examiner shall transmit promptly any such poll tax payment to the office of the State or local official authorized to receive such payment under State law, together with the name and address of the applicant.

SEC. 11. (a) No person acting under color of law shall fail or refuse to permit any person to vote who is entitled to vote under any provision of this Act or is otherwise qualified to vote, or willfully fail or refuse to tabulate, count, and report such person's vote.

(b) No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting, or attempting to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for exercising any powers or duties under section 3(a), 6, 8, 9, 10, or 12(e).

(c) Whoever knowingly or willfully gives false information as to his name, address, or period of residence in the voting district for the purpose of establishing his eligibility to register or vote, or conspires with another individual for the purpose of encouraging his false registration to vote or illegal voting, or pays or offers to pay or accepts payment either for registration to vote or for voting shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both: *Provided, however*, That this provision shall be applicable only to general, special, or primary elections held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the United States Senate, Member of the United States House of Representatives, or Delegates or Commissioners from the territories or possessions, or Resident Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(d) Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of an examiner or hearing officer knowingly and willfully falsifies or conceals a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

SEC. 12. (a) Whoever shall deprive or attempt to deprive any person of any right secured by section 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, or 10 or shall violate section 11 (a) or (b), shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(b) Whoever, within a year following an election in a political subdivision in which an examiner has been appointed (1) destroys,

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defaces, mutilates, or otherwise alters the marking of a paper ballot which has been cast in such election, or (2) alters any official record of voting in such election tabulated from a voting machine or otherwise, shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(c) Whoever conspires to violate the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section, or interferes with any right secured by section 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, or 11 (a) or (b) shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(d) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, or subsection (b) of this section, the Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United States, an action for preventive relief, including an application for a temporary or permanent injunction, restraining order, or other order, and including an order directed to the State and State or local election officials to require them (1) to permit persons listed under this Act to vote and (2) to count such votes.

(e) Whenever in any political subdivision in which there are examiners appointed pursuant to this Act any persons alleged to such an examiner within forty-eight hours after the closing of the polls that notwithstanding (1) their listing under this Act or registration by an appropriate election official and (2) their eligibility to vote, they have not been permitted to vote in such election, the examiner shall forthwith notify the Attorney General if such allegations in his opinion appear to be well founded. Upon receipt of such notification, the Attorney General may forthwith file with the district court an application for an order providing for the marking, casting, and counting of the ballots of such persons and requiring the inclusion of their votes in the total vote before the results of such election shall be deemed final and any force or effect given thereto. The district court shall hear and determine such matters immediately after the filing of such application. The remedy provided in this subsection shall not preclude any remedy available under State or Federal law.

(f) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section and shall exercise the same without regard to whether a person asserting rights under the provisions of this Act shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law.

Sec. 13. Listing procedures shall be terminated in any political subdivision of any State (a) with respect to examiners appointed pursuant to clause (b) of section 6 whenever the Attorney General notifies the Civil Service Commission, or whenever the District Court for the District of Columbia determines in an action for declaratory judgment brought by an political subdivision with respect to which the Director of the Census has determined that more than 50 per centum of the nonwhite persons of voting age residing therein are registered to vote, (1) that all persons listed by an examiner for such subdivision have been placed on the appropriate voting registration roll, and (2) that there is no longer reasonable cause to believe that persons will be deprived of or denied the right to vote on account of race or color in such subdivision, and (b), with respect to examiners appointed pursuant to section 3(a), upon order of the authorizing court. A political subdivision may petition the Attorney General for the termination of listing procedures under clause (a) of this section, and may petition the Attorney General to request the Director of the Census to take such survey or census as may be appropriate for the making of the determination provided for in this section. The Dis-

trict Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction to require such survey or census to be made by the Director of the Census and it shall require him to do so if it deems the Attorney General's refusal to request such survey or census to be arbitrary or unreasonable.

Sec. 14. (a) All cases of criminal contempt arising under the provisions of this Act shall be governed by section 151 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (42 U.S.C. 1995).

(b) No court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia or a court of appeals in any proceeding under section 9 shall have jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to section 4 or section 5 or any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction against the executor or enforcement of any provision of this Act or any action of any Federal officer or employee pursuant hereto.

(c) (1) The terms "vote" or "voting" shall include all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to this Act, or other action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are received in an election.

(2) The term "political subdivision" shall mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.

(d) In any action for a declaratory judgment brought pursuant to section 4 or section 5 of this Act, subpoenas for witnesses who are required to attend the District Court for the District of Columbia may be served in any judicial district of the United States: *Provided*, That no writ of subpoena shall issue for witnesses without the District of Columbia at a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place of holding court without the permission of the District Court for the District of Columbia being first had upon proper application and cause shown.

Sec. 15. Section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1971), as amended by section 131 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (71 Stat. 637), and amended by section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (74 Stat. 90), and as further amended by section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 241), is further amended as follows:

(a) Delete the word "Federal" wherever it appears in subsections (a) and (e);

(b) Repeal subsection (f) and designate the present subsections (g) and (h) as (f) and (g), respectively.

Sec. 16. The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, jointly, shall make a full and complete study to determine whether, under the laws or practices of any State or States, there are preconditions to voting, which might tend to result in discrimination against citizens serving in the Armed Forces of the United States seeking to vote. Such officials shall, jointly, make a report to the Congress not later than June 30, 1966, containing the results of such study, together with a list of any States in which such preconditions exist, and shall include in such report such recommendations for legislation as they deem advisable to prevent discrimination in voting against citizens serving in the Armed Forces of the United States.

Sec. 17. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to deny, impair, or otherwise adversely affect the right to vote of any person registered to vote under the law of any State or political subdivision.

Sec. 18. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 19. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of the provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Approved August 6, 1965.)

COMMENTS ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I have followed with interest the comments made by my colleagues, by the press, and by private individuals after my speech of September 15 regarding the Dominican Republic. I have also followed with interest events in the other body that may have been related to my speech.

Much of the discussion, I have noted to my surprise, has been about me rather than about the Dominican Republic and Latin America. Some of these personal comments have been complimentary, and to those who made them I express my thanks. Others have been uncomplimentary, and to those who made them I can only say that our country is still strong enough to survive an occasional dissenting view even though the consensus is virtually unanimous.

There has been a good deal of discussion as to whether it is proper for the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to make a speech critical of an administration of his own party which he generally supports. There is something to be said on both sides of this question and it is certainly one which I considered with care before deciding to make my speech on the Dominican Republic. I concluded, after hearing the testimony of administration witnesses in the Committee on Foreign Relations, that I could do more to encourage carefully considered policies in the future by initiating a public discussion than by acquiescing silently in a policy I believed to be mistaken. It seemed to me, therefore, that, despite any controversy and annoyance to individuals, I was performing a service to the administration by stating my views publicly.

I do not like taking a public position criticizing a Democratic administration which in most respects I strongly support; I do not like it at all. Neither do I like being told, as I have been told, that my statement was "irresponsible" or that it has given aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States. I am quite prepared to examine evidence suggesting that my statement contained errors of fact or judgment; I am not prepared to accept the charge that a statement following upon many hours of listening to testimony in the Foreign Relations Committee and many more hours of examining and evaluating relevant documents was irresponsible. Nor do I take kindly to the charge that I gave aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States. If that accusation is to be pressed—and I should hope it would not be—an interesting discussion could be developed as to whether it is my criti-

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cisms of U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic or the policy itself which has given aid and comfort to our enemies.

A Senator has a duty to support his President and his party, but he also has a duty to express his views on major issues. In the case of the Dominican crisis I felt that, however reluctant I might be to criticize the administration—and I was very reluctant—it was nonetheless my responsibility to do so, for two principal reasons.

First, I believe that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations has a special obligation to offer the best advice he can on matters of foreign policy; it is an obligation, I believe, which is inherent in the chairmanship, which takes precedence over party loyalty, and which has nothing to do with whether the chairman's views are solicited or desired by people in the executive branch.

Second, I thought it my responsibility to comment on U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic because the political opposition, whose function it is to criticize, was simply not doing so. It did not because it obviously approved of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and presumably, had it been in office, would have done the same thing. The result of this peculiar situation was that a highly controversial policy was being carried out without controversy—without debate, without review, without that necessary calling to account which is a vital part of the democratic process. Again and again, in the weeks following the committee hearing I noted the absence of any challenge to statements appearing in the press and elsewhere which clearly contradicted evidence available to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Under these circumstances I am not impressed with suggestions that I had no right to speak as I did on Santo Domingo. The real question, it seems to me, is whether I had the right not to speak.

Insofar as it represents a genuine reconciliation of differences, a consensus is a fine thing; insofar as it represents the concealment of differences, it is a miscarriage of democratic procedure. I think we Americans tend to put too high a value on unanimity—on bipartisanship in foreign policy, on politics stopping at the water's edge, on turning a single face to the world—as if there were something dangerous and illegitimate about honest differences of opinion honestly expressed by honest men. Probably because we have been united about so many things for so long, including the basic values of our free society, we tend to be mistrustful of intellectual dissent, confusing it with personal hostility and political disloyalty.

As the distinguished commentator, Marquis Childs, recently noted, we tend in America toward a tyranny of the majority. More than a century ago, Alexis de Tocqueville took note of that tendency in these words:

I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America. Profound changes have occurred since democracy in America first appeared and yet it may be asked whether recognition of the right of dissent has gained substantially in practice as well as in theory.

Tocqueville was a friend and admirer of the United States but he regarded the tyranny of the majority as the greatest of dangers in a democracy.

The smallest reproach—

He wrote—

irritates its sensibility and the slightest joke that has any foundation in truth renders it indignant; from the forms of its language up to the solid virtues of its character, everything must be made the subject of encomium. No writer, whatever be his eminence, can escape paying this tribute of adulation to his fellow citizens.

A recent Harris survey, showing strong public disapproval of nonconformist opinions, tends to sustain Tocqueville's view of tyranny by the majority. In an article in the Washington Post dated September 27, 1965, Mr. Harris writes:

America has long prided itself as a nation of rugged individualists where the pioneer tradition allows a man to hold his own views and go his own way. However, the latest Harris survey reveals widespread misgivings among many Americans over present-day examples of social, political or intellectual nonconformity.

The man who stands apart from the crowd—because he does not believe in God, because he pickets against the war in Vietnam, because he demonstrates for civil rights—is regarded as harmful to the American way of life by two out of three of his fellow citizens, a survey of a carefully drawn cross-section of the adult public shows.

Far from being the danger many of us make it out to be, responsible dissent is one of the great strengths of democracy. France, for example, is unquestionably in a stronger position today in her relations with the emerging nations of Asia and Africa because during the years of her colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria a large and articulate minority refused to acquiesce in what was being done and, by speaking out, pointed the way to the enlightened policies of the Fifth Republic. The British Labor Party, to take another example, not only protested the Suez invasion in 1956 but did so while the invasion was being carried out; by so doing, the opposition performed the patriotic service of helping Britain to recover its good name in the wake of a disastrous adventure, starting to repair the damage while the damage was still being done.

It seems to me a manifestation of the tyranny of the majority that there has been so much talk about when it is proper for a Senator to make a speech and so little about the subject matter involved, which was the Dominican Republic and Latin America. It was my intention on September 15 to start a discussion about these and not about myself. There is a very great deal to be said about U.S. policy in Latin America—about political and economic reform and the Alliance for Progress, about collective security and the Organization of American States, about social revolutions and the interests of the United States. I should like very much to hear the views of my colleagues on these and other matters, including the suggestion tentatively put forth in my statement of September 15 that an inter-American partnership of equals in the long run might be advanced by a loosening of ties in the short run.

I would especially like to hear the views of my colleagues on the proposition put forth by President Johnson in his address of August 17 to the Latin American Ambassadors to the effect that the United States hopes to see Latin Americans achieve the same kinds of reform through the Alliance for Progress that we seek for ourselves through the Great Society. Starting with this premise, there is much to be said about how the United States can aid and support the true friends of social reform in Latin America—men like President Belaunde Terry of Peru and President Frei of Chile, whose programs for social justice are also, and for that reason, antidotes to communism.

A general discussion of the Latin American policies of the United States would be interesting and rewarding, far more so than personal recriminations about tolerance of communism and infatuation with revolutions. I myself am too old to change, but there is still hope for the United States and Latin America.

Mr. President, in the weeks since I made my speech on the Dominican Republic I have received over 1,500 letters commenting on it. Approximately 90 percent of these letters expressed concern about the way in which the United States intervened in Santo Domingo. This public reaction suggests that a large sector of the American public shares my concern about the Latin American policy of the United States. Many of the letters I received expressed concern about the role of the Department of Defense and the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the conduct of American foreign policy. Many, I am pleased to note, expressed the conviction that the United States should abide by its obligations of multilateralism and nonintervention under the Charter of the Organization of American States, and a great many expressed the view, in one way or another, that the foreign policy they desired for the United States was one which was true to its own democratic values.

There has been a great deal of press and periodical commentary on my speech of September 15, much of it favorable, much of it unfavorable. I have selected comments, pro and con, which I judge to be representative and which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point. For the benefit of those who may not have seen the entire text of my speech, and to provide a point of reference, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my speech be inserted just prior to these insertions in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech and material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Senate, Sept. 15, 1965]

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the formation of a provisional government in Santo Domingo under the leadership of Dr. Hector Garcia-Goody is good news. It provides reason for cautious optimism as to the future and testifies as well to the arduous and patient efforts of the OAS mediating team. I wish to pay tribute especially to Ambassador Bunker for his wisdom and patience in han-

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ding this difficult affair. The formation of a provisional government is not the end of the Dominican crisis, but it does bring to an end a tragic and dangerous phase of the crisis. Many problems remain, particularly the problem of establishing the authority of a democratic government over the Dominican military. Nonetheless, the situation now seems to be moving into a less dangerous and more hopeful phase. At this time of relative calm it is appropriate, desirable and, I think, necessary to review events in the Dominican Republic, and the U.S. role in those events. The purpose of such a review—and its only purpose—is to develop guidelines for wise and effective policies in the future.

I was in doubt about the advisability of making a statement on the Dominican affair until some of my colleagues made public statements on the floor. Their views on the way in which the committee proceedings were conducted and, indeed, on the Dominican crisis as a whole, are so diametrically opposed to my own that I now consider it my duty to express my personal conclusions drawn from the hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The suggestions that have been made that the committee was prejudiced in its approach against the administration's policies are, in my opinion, without merit. The committee was impartial and fair in giving a full and detailed hearing to the administration's point of view, so much so, in fact, that it heard only one witness from outside the Government.

U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis was characterized initially by overtimidity and subsequently by overreaction. Throughout the whole affair, it has also been characterized by a lack of candor.

These are general conclusions I have reached from a painstaking review of the salient features of the extremely complex situation. These judgments are made, of course, with the benefit of hindsight and, in fairness, it must be conceded there were no easy choices available to the United States in the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, it is the task of diplomacy to make wise decisions when they need to be made and U.S. diplomacy failed to do so in the Dominican crisis.

It cannot be said with assurance that the United States could have changed the course of events by acting differently. What can be said with assurance is that the United States did not take advantage of several opportunities in which it might have changed the course of events. The reason appears to be that, very close to the beginning of the revolution, U.S. policymakers decided that it should not be allowed to succeed. This decision seems to me to have been based on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement in the initial stages and on distaste for the return to power of Juan Bosch or of a government controlled by Bosch's party, the PRD—Dominican Revolutionary Party.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is of critical importance and I shall comment on it later. The essential point, however, is that the United States, on the basis of ambiguous evidence, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist dominated, or would certainly become so. It apparently never occurred to anyone that the United States could also attempt to influence the course which the revolution took. We misread prevailing tendencies in Latin America by overlooking or ignoring the fact that any reform movement is likely to attract Communist support. We thus failed to perceive that if we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement, making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries who wish to preserve the status quo—and the status quo in many countries is not good enough.

The principal reason for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo was faulty advice given to the President by his representatives in the Dominican Republic at the time of acute crisis. Much of this advice was based on misjudgment of the facts of the situation; some of it appears to have been based on inadequate evidence or, in some cases, simply inaccurate information. On the basis of the information and counsel he received, the President could hardly have acted other than he did.

I am hopeful, and reasonably confident, that the mistakes made by the United States in the Dominican Republic can be retrieved and that it will be possible to avoid repeating them in the future. These purposes can be served, however, only if the shortcomings of U.S. policy are thoroughly reviewed and analyzed. I make my remarks today in the hope of contributing to that process.

The development of the Dominican crisis, beginning on April 24, 1965, provides a classic study of policymaking in a fast-changing situation in which each decision reduces the range of options available for future decisions so that errors are compounded and finally, indeed, there are few if any options except to follow through on an ill-conceived course of action. Beyond a certain point the Dominican story acquired some of the inevitability of a Greek tragedy.

Another theme that emerges from the Dominican crisis is the occurrence of a striking change in U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic and the possibility—not a certainty, because the signs are ambiguous, but only the possibility—of a major change as well in the general Latin American policies of the United States. Obviously, an important change in the official outlook on Dominican affairs occurred between September 1963, when the United States was vigorously opposed to the overthrow of Juan Bosch, and April 1965, when the United States was either unenthusiastic or actually opposed to his return.

What happened in that period to change the assessment of Bosch from favorable to unfavorable? It is quite true that Bosch as President did not distinguish himself as an administrator, but that was well known in 1963. It is also true, however, and much more to the point as far as the legitimate interests of the United States are concerned, that Bosch had received 58 percent of the votes in a free and honest election and that he was presiding over a reform-minded government in tune with the Alliance for Progress. This is a great deal more than can be said for any other President of the Dominican Republic.

The question therefore remains as to how and why the attitude of the U.S. Government changed so strikingly between September 1963 and April 1965. And the question inevitably arises whether this shift in the administration's attitude toward the Dominican Republic is part of a broader shift in its attitude toward other Latin American countries, whether, to be specific, the U.S. Government now views the vigorous reform movements of Latin America—such as Christian Democracy in Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, APRA in Peru and Accion Democratica in Venezuela—as threatening to the interests of the United States. And if this is the case, what kind of Latin American political movements would now be regarded as friendly to the United States and beneficial to its interests?

I should like to make it very clear that I am raising a question not offering an answer. I am frankly puzzled as to the current attitude of the U.S. Government toward reformist movements in Latin America. On the one hand, President Johnson's deep personal commitment to the philosophy and aims of the Alliance for Progress is clear; it was convincingly expressed, for example, in his speech to the Latin American Ambassadors on the fourth anniversary of the All-

iance for Progress—a statement in which the President compared the Alliance for Progress with his own enlightened program for a Great Society at home. On the other hand, one notes a general tendency on the part of our policymakers not to look beyond a Latin American politician's anticommunism. One also notes in certain Government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, a preoccupation with counterinsurgency, which is to say, with the prospect of revolutions and means of suppressing them. This preoccupation is manifested in dubious and costly research projects, such as the recently discredited Camelot; these studies claim to be scientific but beneath their almost unbelievably opaque language lies an unmistakable military and reactionary bias.

It is of great importance that the uncertainty as to U.S. aims in Latin America be resolved. We cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy and at the same time align ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies; yet that is what we seem to be trying to do. The direction of the Alliance for Progress is toward social revolution in Latin America; the direction of our Dominican intervention is toward the suppression of revolutionary movements which are supported by Communists or suspected of being influenced by Communists. The prospect of an election in 9 months which may conceivably produce a strong democratic government is certainly reassuring on this score, but the fact remains that the reaction of the United States at the time of acute crisis was to intervene forcibly and illegally against a revolution which, had we sought to influence it instead of suppressing it, might have produced a strong popular government without foreign military intervention. Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere.

We simply cannot have it both ways; we must choose between the Alliance for Progress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the status quo in Latin America. The choice which we are to make is the principal unanswered question arising out of the unhappy events to the Dominican Republic and, indeed, the principal unanswered question for the future of our relations with Latin America.

It is not surprising that we Americans are not drawn toward the uncouth revolutionaries of the non-Communist left. We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth. We are sober and satisfied and comfortable and rich; our institutions are stable and old and even venerable, and our Revolution of 1776, for that matter, was not much of an upheaval compared to the French and Russian revolutions and to current and impending revolutions in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Our heritage of stability and conservatism is a great blessing, but it also has the effect of limiting our understanding of the character of social revolution and sometimes as well of the injustices which spawn them. Our understanding of revolutions and their causes is imperfect not because of any failures of mind or character but because of our good fortune since the Civil War in never having experienced sustained social injustice without hope of legal or more or less peaceful remedy. We are called upon, therefore, to give our understanding and our sympathy and support to movements which are alien to our experience and jarring to our preferences and prejudices.

We must try to understand social revolution and the injustices that give it rise be-

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cause they are the heart and core of the experience of the great majority of people now living in the world. In Latin America we may prefer to associate with the well-bred, well-dressed businessmen who often hold positions of power, but Latin American reformers regard such men as aliens in their own countries who neither identify with their own people nor even sympathize with their aspirations. Such leaders are regarded by educated young Latin Americans as a "consular bourgeoisie," by which they mean business-oriented conservatives who more nearly represent the interests of foreign businessmen than the interests of their own people. Men like Donald Reid—who is one of the better of this category of leaders—may have their merits, but they are not the force of the future in Latin America.

It is the revolutionaries of the non-Communist left who have most of the popular support in Latin America. The Radical Party in Chile, for example, is full of 19th century libertarians whom many North Americans would find highly congenial, but it was recently crushed in national elections by a group of rambunctious, leftist Christian Democrats. It may be argued that the Christian Democrats are anti-United States, and to a considerable extent some of them are—more so now, it may be noted, than prior to the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic—but they are not Communists and they have popular support. They have also come to terms with the American copper companies in Chile; that is something which the predecessor conservative government was unable to do and something which a Communist government would have been unwilling to do.

The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution. The question is whether it is to be Communist or democratic revolution and the choice which the Latin Americans make will depend in part on how the United States uses its great influence. It should be very clear that the choice is not between social revolution and conservative oligarchy but whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro in Chile.

In my Senate speech of March 25, 1964, I commented as follows on the prospect of revolution:

"I am not predicting violent resolutions in Latin America or elsewhere. Still less am I advocating them. I wish only to suggest that violent social revolutions are a possibility in countries where feudal oligarchies resist all meaningful change by peaceful means. We must not, in our preference for the democratic procedures envisioned by the Charter of Punta del Este, close our minds to the possibility that democratic procedures may fail in certain countries and that where democracy does fall violent social convulsions may occur."

I think that in the case of the Dominican Republic we did close our minds to the causes and to the essential legitimacy of revolution in a country in which democratic procedures had failed. That, I think, is the central fact concerning the participation of the United States in the Dominican revolution and, possibly as well, its major lesson for the future. I turn now to comment on some of the events which began last April 24 in Santo Domingo.

When the Dominican revolution began on Saturday, April 24, the United States had three options available. First, it could have supported the Reid Cabral government; second, it could have supported the revolutionary forces; and third, it could do nothing.

The administration chose the last course. When Donald Reid Cabral asked for U.S. intervention on Sunday morning, April 25, he was given no encouragement. He then resigned, and considerable disagreement ensued over the nature of the government to succeed him. The party of Juan Bosch, the PRD, or Dominican Revolutionary Party, asked for a "U.S. presence" at the transfer of government power but was given no encouragement. Thus, there began at that time a chaotic situation which amounted to civil war in a country without an effective government.

What happened in essence was that the Dominican military refused to support Reid and were equally opposed to Bosch or other PRD leaders as his successor. The PRD, which had the support of some military officers, announced that Rafael Molina Urena, who had been president of the senate during the Bosch regime, would govern as provisional president pending Bosch's return. At this point, the military leaders delivered an ultimatum, which the rebels ignored, and at about 4:30 on the afternoon of April 25 the air force and navy began firing at the National Palace. Later in the day, PRD leaders asked the U.S. Embassy to use its influence to persuade the air force to stop the attacks. The Embassy made it clear it would not intervene on behalf of the rebels, although on the following day, Monday, April 26, the Embassy did persuade the military to stop air attacks for a limited time.

This was the first crucial point in the crisis. If the United States thought that Reid was giving the Dominican Republic the best government it had had or was likely to get, why did the United States not react more vigorously to support him? On the other hand, if the Reid government was thought to be beyond salvation, why did not the United States offer positive encouragement to the moderate forces involved in the coup, if not by providing the "U.S. presence" requested by the PRD, then at least by letting it be known that the United States was not opposed to the prospective change of regimes or by encouraging the return of Juan Bosch to the Dominican Republic? In fact, according to available evidence, the U.S. Government made no effort to contact Bosch in the initial days of the crisis.

The United States was thus at the outset unwilling to support Reid and unwilling to support if not positively opposed to Bosch.

Events of the days following April 24 demonstrated that Reid had so little popular support that it can reasonably be argued that there was nothing the United States could have done, short of armed intervention, to save his regime. The more interesting question is why the United States was so reluctant to see Bosch returned to power. This is part of the larger question of why U.S. attitudes had changed so much since 1963 when Bosch, then in power, was warmly and repeatedly embraced and supported as few if any Latin American presidents have ever been supported by the United States.

The next crucial point in the Dominican story came on Tuesday, April 27, when rebel leaders, including Molina Urena and Caamaño Dena, called at the U.S. Embassy seeking mediation and negotiations. At that time the military situation looked very bad for the rebel, or constitutionalist, forces. Ambassador Bennett, who had been instructed four times to work for a cease-fire and for the formation of a military junta, felt he did not have authority to mediate; mediation, in his view, would have been "intervention." Mediation at that point might have been accomplished quietly and without massive military intervention. Twenty-four hours later the Ambassador was pleading for the Marines, and as we know some 20,000 soldiers were landed—American soldiers.

On the afternoon of April 27 Gen. Wessin y Wessin's tanks seemed about to cross the Duarte bridge into the city of Santo Domingo and the rebel cause appeared hopeless. When the rebels felt themselves rebuffed at the American Embassy, some of their leaders, including Molina Urena, sought asylum in Latin American embassies in Santo Domingo. The administration has interpreted this as evidence that the non-Communist rebels recognized growing Communist influence in their movement and were consequently abandoning the revolution. Molina Urena has said simply that he sought asylum because he thought the revolutionary cause hopeless.

An opportunity was lost on April 27. Ambassador Bennett was in a position to bring possibly decisive mediating power to bear for a democratic solution, but he chose not to do so on the ground that the exercise of his good offices at that point would have constituted intervention. In the words of Washington Post writer Murrey Marder—one of the press people who, to the best of my knowledge, has not been assailed as prejudiced:

"It can be argued with considerable weight that late Tuesday, April 27, the United States threw away a fateful opportunity to try to prevent the sequence that produced the American intervention. It allowed the relatively leaderless revolt to pass into hands which it was to allege were Communist."

The overriding reason for this mistake was the conviction of U.S. officials, on the basis of evidence which was fragmentary at best, that the rebels were dominated by Communists. A related and perhaps equally important reason for the U.S. Embassy's refusal to mediate on April 27 was the desire for and, at that point, expectation of an antirebel victory. They therefore passed up an important opportunity to reduce or even eliminate Communist influence by encouraging the moderate elements among the rebels and mediating for a democratic solution.

Owing to a degree of disorganization and timidity on the part of the antirebel forces which no one, including the U.S. Embassy and the rebels themselves, anticipated, the rebels were still fighting on the morning of Wednesday, April 28. Ambassador Bennett thereupon urgently recommended that the antirebels under Air Force General de los Santos be furnished 50 walkie-talkies from U.S. Defense Department stocks in Puerto Rico. Repeating this recommendation later in the day, Bennett said that the issue was one between Castroism and its opponents. The antirebels themselves asked for armed U.S. intervention on their side; this request was refused at that time.

During the day, however, the situation deteriorated rapidly, from the point of view of public order in general and of the antirebels in particular. In midafternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again, this time in writing, for U.S. troops on the ground that this was the only way to prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the junta's inability to protect American lives. This request was denied in Washington, and Benoit was thereupon told that the United States would not intervene unless he said he could not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus told in effect that if he said American lives were in danger the United States would intervene. And that is precisely what happened.

It was at this point, on April 28, that events acquired something of the predestiny of a Greek tragedy. Subsequent events—the failure of the missions of John Bartlow Martin and McGeorge Bundy, the conversion of the

¹ Washington Post, June 27, 1965, p. E3.

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U.S. force into an inter-American force, the enforced stalemate between the rebels under Caamaño Deno and the Imbert junta, the OAS mediation and the tortuous negotiations for a provisional government—have all been widely reported and were not fully explored in the committee hearings. In any case, the general direction of events was largely determined by the fateful decision of April 28. Once the marines landed on that day, and especially after they were heavily reinforced in the days immediately following, the die was cast and the United States found itself deeply involved in the Dominican civil conflict, with no visible way to extricate itself, and with its hemisphere relations complicated in a way that few could have foreseen and no one could have desired.

The danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention that began on the evening of April 28. In fact, no American lives were lost in Santo Domingo until the marines began exchanging fire with the rebels after April 28; reports of widespread shooting that endangered American lives turned out to be exaggerated.

Nevertheless, there can be no question that Santo Domingo was not a particularly safe place to be in the last days of April 1965. There was fighting in the streets, aircraft were strafing parts of the city, and there was indiscriminate shooting. I think that the United States would have been justified in landing a small force for the express purpose of removing U.S. citizens and other foreigners from the island. Had such a force been landed and then promptly withdrawn when it had completed its mission, I do not think that any fairminded observer at home or abroad would have considered the United States to have exceeded its rights and responsibilities.

The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary force which was judged to be Communist dominated. On the basis of Ambassador Bennett's messages to Washington, there is no doubt that the threat of communism rather than danger to American lives was his primary reason for recommending military intervention.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is therefore crucial, but it cannot be answered with certainty. The weight of the evidence is that Communists did not participate in planning the revolution—indeed, there is some indication that it took them by surprise—but that they very rapidly began to try to take advantage of it and to seize control of it. The evidence does not establish that the Communists at any time actually had control of the revolution. There is little doubt that they had influence within the revolutionary movement, but the degree of that influence remains a matter of speculation.

The administration, however, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist dominated, or would certainly become so, and that nothing short of forcible opposition could prevent a Communist takeover. In their apprehension lest the Dominican Republic become another Cuba, some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some Communist support, that there is an important difference between Communist support and Communist control of a political movement, that it is quite possible to compete with the Communists for influence in a reform movement rather than abandon it to them and, most important of all, that economic development and social justice are themselves the primary and most reliable security against Communist subversion.

It is, perhaps, understandable that administration officials should have felt some sense of panic; after all, the Foreign Service officer

who had the misfortune to be assigned to the Cuban desk at the time of Castro's rise to power has had his career ruined by congressional committees. Furthermore, even without this consideration, the decisions regarding the Dominican Republic had to be made under great pressure and on the basis of inconclusive information. In charity, this can be accepted as a reason why the decisions were mistaken; but it does not change the conclusion that they were mistaken.

The point I am making is not—emphatically not—that there was no Communist participation in the Dominican crisis, but simply that the administration acted on the premise that the revolution was controlled by Communists—a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has not established since. The issue is not whether there was Communist influence in the Dominican revolution but its degree, which is something on which reasonable men can differ. The burden of proof, however, is on those who take action, and the administration has not proven its assertion of Communist control.

Intervention on the basis of Communist participation as distinguished from control of the Dominican revolution was a mistake in my opinion which also reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics. Communists are present in all Latin American countries, and they are going to inject themselves into almost any Latin American revolution and try to seize control of it. If any group or any movement with which the Communists associate themselves is going to be automatically condemned in the eyes of the United States, then we have indeed given up all hope of guiding or influencing even to a marginal degree the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America. Worse, if that is our view, then we have made ourselves the prisoners of the Latin American oligarchs who are engaged in a vain attempt to preserve the status quo—reactionaries who habitually use the term "Communist" very loosely, in part out of emotional predilection and in part in a calculated effort to scare the United States into supporting their selfish and discredited aims.

If the United States had really been intervening to save American lives, as it had a moral if not a strictly legal right to do, it could have done so promptly and then withdrawn and the incident would soon have been forgotten. But the United States did not intervene primarily to save American lives; it intervened to prevent what it conceived to be, a Communist takeover. That meant, in the terms in which the United States defined the situation, that it was intervening against the rebels, who, however heavy they might or might not have been infiltrated by Communists, were also the advocates of the restoration of a freely elected constitutional government which had been forcibly overthrown. It also meant that the United States was intervening for the military and the oligarchy—to the detriment of the Dominican people and to the bitter disappointment of those throughout Latin America who had placed their hopes in the United States and the Alliance for Progress.

On the basis of the record, there is ample justification for concluding that, at least from the time Reid resigned, U.S. policy was directed toward construction of a military junta which hopefully would restore peace and conduct free elections. That is to say that U.S. policy was directed against the return of Bosch and against the success of the rebel movement.

In this connection it is interesting to recall U.S. policy toward Bosch when he was in power in the Dominican Republic between February and September of 1963. He had been elected, as I have already mentioned, in the only free and honest election ever held

in the Dominican Republic, in December 1962, with 58 percent of the votes cast.

The United States placed such importance on his success that President Kennedy sent the then Vice President Johnson and Senator Humphrey, among others, to attend his inauguration in February 1963. In September 1963, when he was overthrown in a military coup, the United States made strenuous efforts—which stopped just short of sending the marines—to keep him in power, and thereafter the United States waited almost 3 months before recognizing the successor government. Recognition came, by the way, only after the successor government had conducted military operations against a band of alleged Communist guerrillas in the mountains, and there is a suspicion that the extent of the guerrilla activities was exaggerated by the successor government in order to secure U.S. recognition.

It may be granted that Bosch was no great success as President of the Dominican Republic but, when all his faults have been listed, the fact remains that Bosch has been the only freely elected President in Dominican history, the only President who had ever tried, however ineptly, to give the country a decent government, and the only President who was unquestionably in tune with the Alliance for Progress.

Despite these considerations, the United States was at the very least unenthusiastic or, more probably, opposed to Bosch's return to power in April 1965. Bosch himself was apparently not eager to return—he vacillated in the very early stages and some well-informed persons contend that he positively refused to return to the Dominican Republic. In any case, he missed a critical opportunity. But the United States was equally adamant against a return to power of Bosch's party, the PRD, which is the nearest thing to a mass-based, well-organized party that has ever existed in the Dominican Republic. The stated reason was that a PRD government would be Communist dominated.

This might conceivably have happened, but the evidence by no means supports the conclusion that it would have happened. We based our policy on a possibility rather than on anything approaching a likelihood. Obviously, if we based all our policies on the mere possibility of communism, then we would have to set ourselves against just about every progressive political movement in the world, because almost all such movements are subject to at least the theoretical danger of Communist takeover. This approach is not in the national interest; foreign policy must be based on prospects that seem probable, hopeful and susceptible to constructive influence rather than on merely possible dangers.

One is led, therefore, to the conclusion that U.S. policymakers were unduly timid and alarmist in refusing to gamble on the forces of reform and social change. The bitter irony of such timidity is that by casting its lot with the forces of the status quo, in the probably vain hope that these forces could be induced to permit at least some reform and social change, the United States almost certainly helped the Communists to acquire converts whom they otherwise could not have won.

How vain the hopes of U.S. policymakers were is amply demonstrated by events since April 28. The junta led by Gen. Antonio Imbert, which succeeded the junta led by Colonel Benoit, proved quite intractable and indeed filled the airwaves daily with denunciations of the United States and the Organization of American States for preventing it from wiping out the Communist rebels. These are the same military forces which on April 28 were refusing to fight the rebels and begging for U.S. intervention. Our aim apparently was to use Imbert as a counterpoise

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to Caamano Deno in the ill-founded hope that non-Communist liberals would be drawn away from the rebel side.

In practice, instead of Imbert becoming our tractable instrument, we, to a certain extent, became his: he clung tenaciously to the power we gave him and was at least as intransigent as the rebels in the protracted negotiations for a provisional government.

The resignation of Imbert and his junta provides grounds for hope that a strong popular government may come to power in the Dominican Republic, but that hope must be tempered by the fact that the military continues to wield great power in Dominican politics—power which it probably would not now have if the United States had not intervened to save it from defeat last April 28. Even with a provisional government installed in Santo Domingo, and with the prospect of an election in 9 months, there remains the basic problem of a deep and widespread demand for social change. The prospect for such social change is circumscribed by the fact that the military has not surrendered and cannot be expected voluntarily to surrender its entrenched position of privilege and outrageous corruption.

The United States has grossly underestimated the symbolism of the Bosch constitution of 1963. It can be argued that this contains unrealistic promises, but it has stirred the hopes and idealism of the Dominican people. The real objections to it, the part of conservative Dominicans, seem to be that it provides for separation of church and state and that it provides that Dominican citizens have the right to live in the Dominican Republic if they so desire—that is, that Dominican citizens who happen also to be Communists cannot be deported. In passing, one may note a similarity to the U.S. Constitution on both of these points.

The United States has also misread the dedication of the Dominican military to the status quo and to its own powers and privileges. It may be said that the United States has overestimated its ability to influence the military while failing to use to the fullest the influence it does have.

The act of United States massive military intervention in the Dominican Republic was a grievous mistake, but if one is going to cross the bridge of intervention, with all of the historical ghosts which it calls forth throughout Latin America, then one might as well cross all the way and not stop in the middle. It is too late for the United States to refrain from intervention; it is not too late to try to redeem some permanent benefit from that intervention. Specifically, I think that the influence of the United States and the Organization of American States should be used to help the Dominican people free themselves from the oppressive weight of a corrupt and privileged military establishment. It is entirely possible, if not likely, that if the military is allowed to retain its power it will overthrow any future government that displeases it just as it has done in the past. The OAS mediating team made a contribution by bringing about the installation of a provisional government; the OAS can still make a solid contribution to Dominican democracy by urging or insisting that as part of a permanent solution the Dominican military establishment be substantially reduced in size and some of the more irresponsible generals be pensioned off or sent on lengthy diplomatic holidays abroad. If the United States and the OAS are going to impose a solution in the Dominican Republic, they might as well impose a good solution as a bad one.

Since preparing these remarks, I note in this morning's press that General Wessin has been induced to leave the Dominican Republic. This, I believe, is a step in the right direction.

The Foreign Relations Committee's study of the Dominican crisis leads me to draw

certain specific conclusions regarding American policy in the Dominican Republic and also suggests some broader considerations regarding relations between the United States and Latin America. My specific conclusions regarding the crisis in Santo Domingo are as follows:

First. The United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican Republic in the last week of April 1965 not primarily to save American lives, as was then contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement which was judged to be Communist-dominated. The decision to land thousands of marines on April 28 was based primarily on the fear of "another Cuba" in Santo Domingo.

Second. This fear was based on fragmentary and inadequate evidence. There is no doubt that Communists participated in the Dominican revolution on the rebel side, probably to a greater extent after than before the landing of U.S. marines on April 28, but just as it cannot be proved that the Communists would not have taken over the revolution neither can it be proved that they would have. There is little basis in the evidence offered the committee for the assertion that the rebels were Communist-dominated or certain to become so; on the contrary, the evidence suggests a chaotic situation in which no single faction was dominant at the outset and in which everybody, including the United States, had opportunities to influence the shape and course of the rebellion.

Third. The United States let pass its best opportunities to influence the course of events. The best opportunities were on April 25, when Juan Bosch's party, the PRD, requested a "United States presence," and on April 27, when the rebels, believing themselves defeated, requested United States mediation for a negotiated settlement. Both requests were rejected, in the first instance for reasons that are not entirely clear but probably because of United States hostility to the PRD, in the second instance because the U.S. Government anticipated and desired a victory of the antirebel forces.

Fourth. U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic shifted markedly to the right between September 1963 and April 1965. In 1963, the United States strongly supported Bosch and the PRD as enlightened reformers; in 1965 the United States opposed their return to power on the unsubstantiated ground that a Bosch or PRD government would certainly, or almost certainly, become Communist dominated. Thus the United States turned its back on social revolution in Santo Domingo and associated itself with a corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy.

Fifth. U.S. policy was marred by a lack of candor and by misinformation. The former is illustrated by official assertions that U.S. military intervention was primarily for the purpose of saving American lives; the latter is illustrated by exaggerated reports of massacres and atrocities by the rebels—reports which no one has been able to verify. It was officially asserted, for example—by the President in a press conference on June 17 according to an official State Department bulletin—that "some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off." There is no evidence to support this statement. A sober examination of such evidence as is available indicates that the Imbert junta was guilty of at least as many atrocities as the rebels.

Sixth. Responsibility for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo lies primarily with those who advised the President. In the critical days between April 25 and April 28, these officials sent the President exaggerated reports of the danger of a Communist takeover in Santo Domingo and, on the basis of these, recommended U.S. massive military intervention. It is not at all difficult to understand why, on the basis of

such advice, the President made the decisions that he made.

Seventh. Underlying the bad advice and unwise actions of the United States was the fear of another Cuba. The specter of a second Communist state in the Western Hemisphere—and its probable repercussions within the United States and possible effects on the careers of those who might be held responsible—seems to have been the most important single factor in distorting the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men.

I turn now to some broader and long-term implications of the Dominican tragedy, first to some considerations relating to the Organization of American States and its charter, then to the problem of reaction and revolution in Latin America, finally to a suggestion for a freer and, I believe, healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America.

Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States says that:

"No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state."

Article 17 states that:

"The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever."

These clauses are not ambiguous. They mean that, with one exception to be noted, all forms of forcible intervention are absolutely prohibited among the American States. It may be that we should never have accepted this commitment at Bogota in 1948; it is obvious from all the talk one hears these days about the obsolescence of the principle of nonintervention that some U.S. officials regret our commitment to it. The fact remains that we are committed to it, not partially or temporarily or insofar as we find it compatible with our vital interests but almost absolutely. It represents our word and our bond and our willingness to honor the solemn commitments embodied in a treaty which was ratified by the Senate on August 28, 1950.

There are those who might concede the point of law who would also argue that such considerations have to do with our ideals rather than our interests and are therefore of secondary importance. I do not believe that is true. We are currently fighting a war in Vietnam, largely, we are told, because it would be a disaster if the United States failed to honor its word and its commitment; the matter, we are told, is one of vital national interest. I do not see why it is any less a matter of vital interest to honor a clear and explicit treaty obligation in the Americas than it is to honor the much more ambiguous and less formal promises we have made to the South Vietnamese.

The sole exception to the prohibitions of articles 15 and 17 is spelled out in article 19 of the OAS Charter, which states that "measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in articles 15 and 17." Article 6 of the Rio Treaty states:

"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extracontinental or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense

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and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent."

The United States thus had legal recourse when the Dominican crisis broke on April 24, 1965. We could have called an urgent session of the Council of the OAS for the purpose of invoking article 8 of the Rio Treaty. But we did not do so. The administration has argued that there was no time to consult the OAS, although there was time to consult—or inform—the congressional leadership. The United States thus intervened in the Dominican Republic unilaterally—and illegally.

Advising the Latin American countries of our action after the fact did not constitute compliance with the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty; nor, indeed, would advising them before the fact have constituted compliance. One does not comply with the law by notifying interested parties in advance of one's intent to violate it. Inter-American law requires consultation for the purpose of shaping a collective decision. Only on the basis of advance consultation and agreement could we have undertaken a legal intervention in the Dominican Republic.

It is possible, had we undertaken such consultations, that our Latin American partners would have delayed a decision; it is possible that they would have refused to authorize collective intervention. My own feeling is that the situation in any case did not justify military intervention except for the limited purpose of evacuating U.S. citizens and other foreigners, but even if it seemed to us that it did, we should not have undertaken it without the advance consent of our Latin American allies. We should not have done so because the word and the honor of the United States were at stake just as much—at least as much—in the Dominican crisis as they are in Vietnam and Korea and Berlin and all the places around the globe which we have committed ourselves to defend.

There is another important reason for compliance with the law. The United States is a conservative power in the world in the sense that most of its vital interests are served by stability and order. Law is the essential foundation of stability and order both within societies and in international relations. A great conference is taking place here in Washington this week on the subject, World Peace Through Law. As a conservative power the United States has a vital interest in upholding and expanding the reign of law in international relations. Insofar as international law is observed, it provides us with stability and order and with a means of predicting the behavior of those with whom we have reciprocal legal obligations. When we violate the law ourselves, whatever short-term advantage may be gained, we are obviously encouraging others to violate the law; we thus encourage disorder and instability and thereby do incalculable damage to our own long-term interests.

There are those who defend U.S. unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic on the ground that the principle of nonintervention as spelled out in the OAS Charter is obsolete. The argument is unfortunate on two grounds. First, the contention of obsolescence justifies an effort to bring about changes in the OAS Charter by due process of law, but it does not justify violation of the charter. Second, the view that the principle of nonintervention is obsolete is one held by certain U.S. officials; most Latin Americans would argue that, far from being obsolete, the principle of nonintervention was and remains the heart and core of the inter-American system. Insofar as it is honored, it provided them with something that many in the United States find it hard to believe they could suppose they need: protection from the United States.

Many North Americans seem to believe that, while the United States does indeed participate in Latin American affairs from time to time, sometimes by force, it is done, with the best of intentions, usually indeed to protect the Latin Americans from intervention by somebody else, and therefore cannot really be considered intervention. The trouble with this point of view is that it is not shared by our neighbors to the south. Most of them do think they need protection from the United States and the history of the Monroe Doctrine and the "Roosevelt corollary" suggest that their fears are not entirely without foundation. "Good intentions" are not a very sound basis for judging the fulfillment of contractual obligations. Just about everybody, including the Communists, believes in his own "good intentions." It is a highly subjective criterion of national behavior and has no more than a chance relationship to good results. With whatever justice or lack of it, many Latin Americans are afraid of the United States; however much it may hurt our feelings, they prefer to have their security based on some more objective standard than the good intentions of the United States.

The standard on which they rely most heavily is the principle of nonintervention; however obsolete it may seem to certain U.S. officials, it remains vital and pertinent in Latin America. When we violate it, we are not overriding the mere letter of the law; we are violating what to Latin Americans is its vital heart and core.

The inter-American system is rooted in an implicit contract between the Latin American countries and the United States. In return for our promise not to interfere in their internal affairs they have accepted a role as members of our "sphere" and to support, or at least not to obstruct, our global policies. In the Dominican Republic we violated our part of the bargain; it remains to be seen whether Latin Americans will now feel free to violate theirs.

In the eyes of educated, energetic, and patriotic young Latin Americans—which is to say, the generation that will make or break the Alliance for Progress—the United States committed a worse offense in the Dominican Republic than just intervention; it intervened against social revolution and in support, at least temporarily, of a corrupt, reactionary military oligarchy.

It is not possible at present to assess the depth and extent of disillusion with the United States on the part of democrats and reformers in Latin America. I myself think that it is deep and widespread. Nor am I reassured by assertions on the part of administration officials that a number of Latin American governments have secretly expressed sympathy for our actions in the Dominican Republic while explaining that of course they could not be expected to support us openly. Why cannot they support us openly, unless it is because their sympathy does not represent the views of their own people and they do not dare to express it openly? In fact, real enthusiasm for our Dominican venture has been confined largely to military dictators and ruling oligarchies.

The tragedy of Santo Domingo is that a policy that purported to defeat communism in the short run is more likely to have the effect of promoting it in the long run. Intervention in the Dominican Republic has alienated—temporarily or permanently, depending on our future policies—our real friends in Latin America. These, broadly, are the people of the democratic left—the Christian and social democrats in a number of countries, the APRA Party in Peru, the Accion Democratica Party in Venezuela, and their kindred spirits throughout the hemisphere. By our intervention on the side of a corrupt military oligarchy in the Dominican Republic, we have embarrassed before their own people the democratic reformers

who have counseled trust and partnership with the United States. We have lent credence to the idea that the United States is the enemy of social revolution in Latin America and that the only choice Latin Americans have is between communism and reaction.

If those are the available alternatives, if there is no democratic left as a third option, then there is no doubt of the choice that honest and patriotic Latin Americans will make: they will choose communism, not because they want it but because U.S. policy will have foreclosed all other avenues of social revolution and, indeed, all other possibilities except the perpetuation of rule by military juntas and economic oligarchies.

The dominant force in Latin America is the aspiration of increasing numbers of people to personal and national dignity. In the minds of the rising generation there are two principle threats to that aspiration—reaction at home and domination from abroad. As a result of its Dominican actions the United States has allowed itself to become associated with both. We have thereby offended the dignity and self-respect of young and idealistic Latin Americans who must now wonder whether the United States will one day intervene against social revolutions in their own countries, whether one day they will find themselves facing U.S. Marines across barricades in their own home towns.

I, myself, am sure, as I know President Johnson and, indeed, most U.S. citizens are sure, that our country is not now and will not become the enemy of social revolution in Latin America. We have made a mistake in the Dominican Republic, as we did at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, but a single misjudgment does not constitute a doctrine for the conduct of future policy and we remain dedicated to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

We know this ourselves but it remains to convince our true friends in Latin America that their social revolutions will have our sympathy and support. It will not be easy to do so, because our intervention in Santo Domingo shook if it did not shatter a confidence in the United States that had been built up over 30 years since the liquidation of the Caribbean protectorates and the initiation of the "good neighbor policy."

It will be difficult but it can be done. President Johnson took a positive step on the long road back in his statement of re-dedication to the Alliance for Progress to the Latin American Ambassadors on August 17. It remains for us to eliminate the ambiguity between the antirevolutionary approach symbolized by Project Camelot and the preoccupation with problems of counter-insurgency on the one hand and the creative approach of the Alliance for Progress on the other. If we do this—and I am both sure that we can and reasonably hopeful that we will—then I think that the Dominican affair will be relegated in history to the status of a single unhappy episode on the long road toward the forging of a new and creative and dignified relationship between the United States and Latin America.

In conclusion, I suggest that a new and healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America must be a freer relationship than that of the past.

The United States is a world power with world responsibilities and to it the inter-American system represents a sensible way of maintaining law and order in the region closest to the United States. To the extent that it functions as we want it to function, one of the inter-American system's important advantages is that it stabilizes relations within the Western Hemisphere and thus frees the United States to act on its worldwide responsibilities.

To Latin Americans, on the other hand, the inter-American system is politically and psychologically confining. It has the effect,

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so to speak, of cooping them up in the Western Hemisphere, giving them the feeling that there is no way to break out of the usually well-intentioned but often stifling embrace of the United States. In their hearts, I have no doubt, most Latin Americans would like to be free of us, just as a son or daughter coming of age wishes to be free of an overprotective parent. A great many of those Latin Americans for whom Castro still has some appeal—and there are now more, I would guess, than before last April 28—are attracted not, I feel, because they are infatuated with communism, but because Cuba, albeit at the price of almost complete dependency on the Soviet Union, has broken out of the orbit of the United States.

It is the nature of things that small nations do not live comfortably in the shadow of large and powerful nations, regardless of whether the latter are benevolent or overbearing. Belgium has always been uncomfortable about Germany and France; Ireland has never been able to work up much affection for Great Britain. And in recent years some of the Eastern European governments have demonstrated that, despite the Communist ideology which they share with the Soviet Union, they still wish to free themselves as much as they can and as much as they dare from the overbearing power of Russia. It is natural and inevitable that Latin American countries should have some of the same feelings toward the United States.

Perhaps, then, the foremost immediate requirement for a new and more friendly relationship between Latin America and the United States in the long run is not closer ties and new institutional bonds but a loosening of existing ties and institutional bonds. It is an established psychological principle—or, for that matter, just commonsense—that the strongest and most viable personal bonds are those which are voluntary, a voluntary bond being, by definition, an arrangement which one is free to enter or not to enter. I do not see why the same principle should not operate in relations between nations. If it does, it would follow that the first step toward stronger ties between Latin America and the United States would be the creation of a situation in which Latin American countries would be free, and would feel free, to maintain or sever existing ties as they see fit and, perhaps more important, to establish new arrangements, both among themselves and with nations outside the hemisphere, in which the United States would not participate.

President Frei of Chile has taken an initiative to this end. He has visited European leaders and apparently indicated that his Christian Democratic Government is interested in establishing new political, economic, and cultural links with European countries. For the reasons suggested, I think this is an intelligent and constructive step.

I think further that it would be a fine thing if Latin American countries were to undertake a program of their own for "building bridges" to the world beyond the Western Hemisphere—to Europe and Asia and Africa, and to the Communist countries if they wish. Such relationships, to be sure, would involve a loosening of ties to the United States in the immediate future, but in the long run, I feel sure, they would make for both happier and stronger bonds with the United States—happier because they would be free, stronger because they would be dignified and self-respecting as they never had been before.

FAVORABLE COMMENTS

[From the Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 20, 1965]
THE LASTING FRIENDSHIPS ATTAINED BY EQUALS

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT's address to the Senate last week drew first attention as an emphatic dissent, which it certainly was, to

the administration's view of the intervention in the Dominican Republic. But the larger importance in the address may very well have lain in FULBRIGHT's treatment of the broad context of relations between the United States and Latin America.

The Senator surveyed with thorough candor the way Latin American countries look upon the United States, and what he found was not particularly gratifying. He compared Latin America to a son or daughter coming of age and wanting to be free of an overprotective parent; he said the inter-American system coops the Latin countries up in the Western Hemisphere and gives them the feeling that there "is no way to break out of the usually well-intentioned but often stifling embrace of the United States."

What FULBRIGHT was engaged in was the introspective practice of seeing ourselves as others see us, and it is not always a comfortable exercise. The truth of what he said, nevertheless, is really beyond question. Our power and wealth are respected in Latin America, but there is not much love for us, because of the very restiveness, the very sense of dependence, that FULBRIGHT has cited.

It is hardly coincidence that the best relationship the United States has in Latin America may very well be with Mexico, a country that is solidly independent in determining its national policies. Mexico has made great progress in mastering the enormous economic, social, and political ills common to Latin America. Mexico, in the memory of two wars, has more reason than any country except Panama to feel bitterness toward the Colossus del Norte, yet Mexico and the United States have a strength of understanding that would hardly have been attained if Mexico did not have a feeling of confidence, independence, and self-respect.

What FULBRIGHT suggested for the Latin American future was in sharp departure from the most hallowed of past U.S. doctrines.

Historically our Government has sought a sort of hemispheric isolation, at least for Latin countries if not necessarily for the United States. President Monroe told European powers to stay out, period. In recent decades the appeal has been somewhat different, pitched to hemispheric solidarity. But FULBRIGHT has now argued that Latin American nations should seek to build bridges of their own to Europe and Africa and Asia—even to Communist countries if they wished. Immediately, he said, the ties with the United States would be loosened but in the longer run the bonds between Latin Americans and the United States would become stronger than ever.

It is an interesting, provocative suggestion that FULBRIGHT advances. With certain reservations (and surely FULBRIGHT himself has reservations) it warrants the close attention of the President and of the movers and shakers in the State Department. We consider the Organization of American States a nearly indispensable agency in Latin America's development and in inter-American affairs. We cannot dismiss out of hand the eventualities of United States intervention in Latin America in emergency circumstances. Yet the truth remains that big brotherliness has been as evident as good neighborliness in hemispheric affairs and in the sweep of history the most enduring friendships are attained by nations that regard each other as equals.

L.B.J. AND BEAUREGARD

Of all the snap responses made to Senator FULBRIGHT's studiously delayed response to the precipitate nature of our intervention in the Dominican Republic, the most unfortunate, in its way, may have been that of Senator LONG of Louisiana:

"Whatever anybody says about Lyndon Johnson, he's a mover. He moves. The South would be an independent nation today—I'm not saying it ought to be—but it would

if Gen. P. T. Beauregard of my own Louisiana hadn't waited for the smoke to settle at the battle of Shiloh in Tennessee. I'd rather have a man who moves than one who waits."

One guess as to who had been in command of the Confederate shore batteries at Charleston Harbor the year before.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 18, 1965]

FULBRIGHT ON THE DOMINICAN CRISIS

Senator FULBRIGHT often speaks as the conscience of the United States in foreign affairs. This makes him a disturbing person, but he plays a valuable and salutary, if often a thankless, role. He has now said a number of things about U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic that needed saying on the Senate floor.

The New York Times and a few other publications had, as the story unfolded editorially, made every argument that Senator FULBRIGHT now makes; but the dominant voices were those of President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, Under Secretary Mann, and Ambassador Tapley Bennett, of Santo Domingo. The latter's unfortunate role is properly and devastatingly described by the Arkansas Democrat.

The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee waited until a 2-month series of hearings on the Dominican crisis was over and until a hopeful settlement of the conflict was beginning to shape up. For Senator FULBRIGHT, the evidence of Communist participation was "fragmentary" and "not persuasive"; the advice given to President Johnson was "faulty"; and the real reason for the intervention was not to save American lives but the dread of "another Cuba." As he points out, the fear of communism leads the United States into opposition to all revolutions and hence makes us "the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

These ideas led Senator Dodd to accuse Mr. FULBRIGHT of a "tolerance of communism." In reality, Senator FULBRIGHT is an infinitely more effective anti-Communist than the heavy-handed Senator Dodd. There is no doubt that the latter, and not Mr. FULBRIGHT, speaks for the Johnson administration. This means that the same errors can be repeated if there are other crises in Latin America.

"The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution," Mr. FULBRIGHT said. He does not mean the Communist type. The United States can crush any revolution by military force, but only at the price of supporting reaction, militarism, oligarchy and the status quo.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 18, 1965]

THE FULBRIGHT SPEECH

It will be a great pity if Senator FULBRIGHT's Senate speech on the handling of the Dominican crisis leads simply to a fierce public argument about the past. As he himself says, analysis of the past is useful only if it helps to avoid mistakes in the future.

There is validity in Mr. FULBRIGHT's charges of initial "overtimidity" and subsequent "overreaction." But he is careful to say that his assessments are made with the advantage of hindsight. Yet even if one concedes that there were mistakes during those early weeks of the upheaval, we believe that the U.S. Government has since done a good job in trying to pick up the pieces which it perhaps helped to shatter—albeit involuntarily.

Only the first wobbly steps have been made toward normalcy in Santo Domingo. But Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, tireless and resourceful, would never have been able to encourage those steps if he had not had Washington's backing. It has been a little bit like Macmillan furiously repairing the damage done by Eden at Suez, protesting all

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the time that no damage had been done. But over the Dominican Republic, the Macmillan and Eden roles are combined in one man—and he wears a Texas hat.

As we have already said, however, we think that what is important now is to eschew the same kind of mistake in the future. Senator FULBRIGHT uttered a few home truths, among them:

"The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution and the choice which the Latin Americans make will depend in part on how the United States uses its great influence.

"Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere.

"It should be very clear that the choice is not between social revolution and conservative oligarchy; but whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro."

Admittedly all this is easier to preach than to practice. To begin with, effective communication has to be established with that rising generation—and their confidence won. Their language will differ from ours in many ways. But most of them want for themselves what we have won and want—and the overwhelming majority of them would still prefer not to turn outside the American hemisphere or to alien tyrannies to try to get it.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1965]

STEMWINDER

Those who admire the analytical powers of Senator FULBRIGHT have come to expect penetrating truths from the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that cut through the veneers of cant and illusion. He has done it again with his incisive speech about the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic. What he says about initial overtimidity, later overreaction and lack of candor throughout is sure to lacerate a lot of feelings. But essentially his point is that with the information available to him President Johnson could have taken no other course.

The pertinent question, of course, is why the advice to the President was so bad. Beyond this the Senator asks several ancillary questions: Why, for example, did the United States veer so far from its general support for Juan Bosch, the elected President ousted by a military coup in 1963, as to oppose his return? Was this part of a more ominous shift against reform movements in Latin America out of fear that the Communists would dominate them? Do we lack confidence in our own ability to influence the course of revolution?

For social revolution, Mr. FULBRIGHT contends, is the course of the future in Latin America, and by seeming to oppose it blindly we only drive those who are dissatisfied with the oligarchical status quo into the arms of the Communists. His characterization of this country's role is acid:

"We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary Nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary Nation on earth. We are sober and satisfied and comfortable and rich."

In another reproach, Mr. FULBRIGHT contends that the administration broke international law and damaged its own reputation in not seeking a collective decision by

the Organization of American States before its own unilateral action. His point is well taken, but he might well have addressed himself further to the fundamental need for improved machinery in view of the utter inability of the OAS to reach a decision quickly in emergency.

Happily, the situation in the Dominican Republic now seems to be turning out better than might have been expected from the sorry beginning, and for this recovery the administration deserves a share of credit. In any effort to derive lessons from the experience, however, Mr. FULBRIGHT's questions deserve some frank answers, not merely anguished screams from wounded policymakers.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1965]

PANIC BUTTON

Senator Dodd's reply to Senator FULBRIGHT's critique of the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic is essentially to try to depict Mr. FULBRIGHT as soft on communism. This tawdry if familiar tactic does Mr. Dodd no credit. There is legitimate ground for disagreement with Mr. FULBRIGHT's analysis, which had the benefit of 4 months of hindsight, without attempting to smear his motives.

That there were, and are, Communists in the Dominican Republic no one disputes; here Mr. Dodd is tilting at the wrong windmill. What is disputed is whether they were in a position to capture the revolution that the United States in effect halted when representatives of the American Embassy induced the administration to push the panic button. Some influential anti-Communist Dominicans think they were not.

Nowhere does Mr. Dodd deal with several basic questions raised by Mr. FULBRIGHT: Did the United States fully use the resources available to it without sending in the Marines—and was the administration candid with the public? Obviously the United States must be alert to Castroite maneuvers, including efforts to take over and direct local grievances. But if we allow American policy to be dominated and even paralyzed by fear of another Cuba, we shall soon find ourselves sending Marines around the hemisphere losing friends and alienating people.

Mr. Dodd contends, and some in the administration agree with him, that Mr. FULBRIGHT's speech damaged the country because the criticism will be picked up abroad. On the contrary the intervention, whether or not it was necessary, is what started the process. One of the strengths of America in the eyes of other peoples—and a point that can belie Mr. FULBRIGHT's complaint that the United States appears unsympathetic to demands for social justice abroad (by contrast with the social revolution taking place at home) is that we can debate issues publicly and seek to learn from experience. But to argue that all's well that ends well in the Dominican Republic is like insisting that because a broken leg ultimately heals it somehow is good for you.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Oct. 13, 1965]

MANN REBUTS FULBRIGHT'S ATTACK ON DOMINICAN ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES

(By Richard Dudman)

WASHINGTON, October 13.—Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann struck back last night at Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT in defense of the U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Without mentioning FULBRIGHT's name, Mann delivered a point-by-point rebuttal of FULBRIGHT's September 15 attack on the intervention and on current Latin American policy generally.

He issued a warning to underdeveloped nations against the "grave dangers of toler-

ating Communist popular front activity."

Mann chose a friendly audience, the annual meeting of the Inter-American Press Association at San Diego, Calif. The association has been dominated by writers and publishers who favor a Latin American policy based mainly on opposition to communism.

ADVOCATE OF INTERVENTION

Mann gained a reputation for similar views as Ambassador to Mexico and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. He was known to be a chief advocate of unilateral American intervention in the Dominican Republic in the revolution that broke out April 24. FULBRIGHT's speech last month was thus in part an attack on Mann.

Promising to "clarify a number of misconceptions," Mann went on to quote and contradict the principal points made by FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

FULBRIGHT had charged that the United States had intervened illegally, "not to save American lives as was then contended but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement that was judged to be Communist dominated."

Mann said, "One misconception is that danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for U.S. action. This is demonstrably incorrect."

IMMINENT PERIL

Mann asserted that the original intent in sending United States troops to Santo Domingo was to pull them out as soon as American civilians were evacuated. He said that it was not until the day after the April 28 landing by 500 marines that the United States decided that "the Communist elements in the rebel camp presented a clear and imminent peril to the freedom of the Dominican nation."

FULBRIGHT had charged that those who advised President Lyndon B. Johnson between April 25 and April 28 had "exaggerated reports of the danger of a Communist takeover in Santo Domingo, and on the basis of these recommended U.S. military intervention."

Mann said, "It is charged that from the beginning that the revolution was Communist dominated and that it should therefore be opposed by military force."

He asserted that although the United States had been concerned about Communist influences in the Dominican Republic for a long time, it did not decide until the evening of April 29 that there was "clear and imminent peril" and that additional troops should be landed.

MISJUDGMENT CHARGED

FULBRIGHT had charged that much of the advice given Mr. Johnson about the danger of a Communist takeover was based on misjudgment of the facts, inadequate evidence or, in some cases, false information.

Mann said, "The degree of Communist influence in the rebel movement has been especially questioned." He said that facts already obtained would fill a volume and that each passing day was bringing more facts to light.

"The danger will soon become apparent even to the most skeptical," he said. "In a very real sense the danger still exists."

"All those in our Government who had full access to official information were convinced that the landing of additional troops was necessary in view of the clear and present danger of the forcible seizure of power by the Communists."

"The evidence we have indicates that at that stage the paramilitary forces under the control of known Communists exceeded in military strength the forces controlled by the non-Communist elements within the rebel movement. Equally important is the fact that these non-Communist elements

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were working hand in glove with the Communists."

ALLY OF OLIGARCHIES

FULBRIGHT had contended that "just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning." He had warned that "the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolution and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

Mann said, "Next, it is said that the United States overlooked the fact that reform movements are likely to attract Communist support; that the United States failed to perceive that if it is automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, it is likely to end up opposing every reform movement and, in the process, make itself a prisoner of reactionaries."

He contended that this theory assumes that Communists and the non-Communist left are natural allies, essentially the same as the Marxian theory that Communists are in the vanguard of all truly revolutionary movements.

NEED FOR A DISTINCTION

"The need to distinguish between a reform movement allied with the Communists and a movement dedicated to reform in freedom should be emphasized over and over again," he said. "Indeed, it is precisely the failure to make this distinction, the tendency of some to lump all 'reformers' together and to evaluate them solely on the basis of their rhetoric, that causes a great deal of the confusion."

He went on to warn what he termed the world's immature underdeveloped nations against the "grave dangers of tolerating Communist popular front activity."

"Popular front movements," he said, "are almost always dangerous for those countries that tolerate them. Their principal objective is political power. They are often formed by those who want the Communist vote in order to get elected."

He said that at times popular fronts are formed "because the help of disciplined Communists is needed to overthrow a government. They are sometimes formed by politicians already in power to 'buy their peace.'"

FRONTS SERVE RED ENDS

"Moreover," he said, "popular fronts serve Communist ends. Communists gain from them a respectability they do not deserve. They use this respectability to infiltrate their partisans into the educational system, organize worker and farm groups, the mass media and, of course, the government itself."

"In participating in popular fronts, politicians usually have in mind a short term, personal, political, selfish gain. On the other hand, Communists are content to work today in order to prepare for tomorrow."

"The United States," Mann said, "does not have to choose between reaction and leftist extremism." He said "that there was a large and growing number of persons in Latin America who were dedicated to rapid and far-reaching reform."

He said the Latin American military, for example, contain in their ranks many able and dedicated men who do not deserve to be smeared with the brush that ought to be reserved for the few."

Mann disputed also what he called suggestions that nonintervention was now an obsolete doctrine.

"On the contrary," he said, "the United States believes that unilateral intervention by one American state in the political affairs of another is illegal under the charter of the Organization of American States and that nonintervention is keystone of the structure of the inter-American system."

SUPPORTED NEITHER SIDE

Thus, Mann said, the United States refrained from supporting either contending faction in the first days of violence and since has avoided "proposing political solutions with a made in U.S.A. label on them."

He said that there was confusion over the response that could be made by an American state or the OAS as a whole to a case of intervention.

"When, in other words, a Communist state has intervened in the internal affairs of an American state by training, directing, financing, and organizing indigenous Communist elements to take control of the government of an American state by force and violence, should other American states be powerless to lend assistance?" he asked.

"Are Communists free to intervene while democratic states are powerless to frustrate that intervention?"

"This is not so much a question of intervention as one of whether weak and fragile states should be helped to maintain their independence when they are under attack by subversive elements responding to direction from abroad."

[From the St. Louis Post Dispatch, Oct. 14, 1965]

LAME REBUTTAL

The Johnson administration would do well to stop trying to defend its intervention in the Dominican Republic, and start developing a hemisphere policy based on something more substantial than confused and frantic anticommunism. That is the conclusion we draw from Under Secretary of State Mann's lame reply to the Fulbright critique of the Dominican adventure.

Mr. Mann did not rebut, he confirmed the main points of Senator Fulbright's analysis, one of which was that President Johnson in this case was the victim of bad advice, poor judgment, and immature understanding. The Under Secretary exhibits symptoms of all three.

Senator Fulbright concluded, from a careful study of the facts, that President Johnson's advisers exaggerated the danger of a Communist takeover of the revolt in Santo Domingo last April. He offered evidence to support his view. "Tain't so, replies Mr. Mann; but the evidence he offers is simply that all the President's advisers were convinced that a danger was clear and present."

There is no argument that the advisers were convinced. The question is whether they were correct, and we suspect that Juan Bosch will have the last word on that. He has declared that American intervention created more Communists than ever were involved in the attempt to restore his constitutional government, and we expect that history will bear him out.

The basic issue, however, is not the extent of Communist involvement, but Mr. Mann's implicit assumption that Communist involvement somehow gives the United States an automatic license to put down a Latin American revolt by the unilateral use of American armed force. How can any such doctrine possibly be squared with the principle, which Mr. Mann himself claims to support, that unilateral intervention is illegal under the OAS Charter and that nonintervention is the keystone of the inter-American structure?

The administration appears to contend that any Communist activity in Latin America must by definition represent intervention by a Communist state. But no evidence has been presented of any substantial involvement in Santo Domingo of Cuba, China, Russia, or any other Communist government. If such evidence had existed, the proper response would have been collective action under the OAS Charter and not unilateral

action by the United States. Our Government simply does not have the right to set itself up as the sole judge of what kind of revolution or reform our Latin American neighbors shall be permitted. Attempts to play this role can only alienate us steadily from the peoples of the hemisphere.

Senator Fulbright was profoundly right in saying that the policy followed in Santo Domingo, consistently pursued, would make the United States "the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere." When will our leaders learn that, quite apart from international law and the treaty obligations that argue against such a policy, pursuing it in an age of social revolution means deliberately choosing the losing side? There are going to be social revolutions in Latin America and elsewhere, whether we like it or not, and the surest way to encourage Communist capture of them is to align American armed power everywhere on the side of the status quo.

[From the Toledo (Ohio) Blade]
Sept. 24, 1965]

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S CRIME

Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT criticized the administration on the grounds that it did not take advantage of several opportunities in which it might have changed the course of events in the Dominican crisis. He alleged that there was overreaction on the basis of exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement, and that our choices for action were too swiftly narrowed. For speaking his piece, the Senator has drawn upon himself a veritable torrent of abuse from administration echoers, apologists for the State Department establishment, and cold war hardliners generally.

It particularly pains them that this criticism comes from the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a position that carries great prestige and suggests knowledge on the part of the person who occupies it. Those with a vested interest in the infallibility of our early Dominican decisions are now implying, by way of rebuttal, that the foreign relations chairman is soft in the head if not soft on communism. They picture him as a woolly minded character who would timidly sit back and let the Reds set up another Cuba.

The clamor of the attack upon him, generally irrelevant to what he had to say or his manner and spirit in the saying, has all but drowned out what the Senator was really getting at.

The very nub of the Fulbright commentary is the attitude the United States is going to take toward future troubles in Latin America, a region that seems destined to be in the throes of social revolution for many years to come. And the choice for America, to Senator Fulbright, is whether this country is going to support reform that bolsters the non-Communist left and leads in democracy's direction or, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, force Latin Americans striving to change their way of life into the arms of the Communists.

There were Communists involved in the Dominican rising. There are Communists throughout Latin America. The Communists will inject themselves into revolutions and try to seize control of them. But it is Senator Fulbright's assertion that "if any group or any movement with which the Communists associate themselves is going to be automatically condemned in the eyes of the United States, then we have indeed given up all hope of guiding or influencing even to a marginal degree the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America." We will have made ourselves the prisoners

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of the reactionaries who are trying vainly to preserve the status quo and, who habitually cry Communist, partly to scare the United States into supporting them.

There is no assurance, we think, that supporting the "non-Communist left" will keep from power in Latin America regimes that are far too radical for our taste or even hostile to us. There is no assurance either that dedication to the aims of the Alliance for Progress—for which Senator Fulbright, incidentally, praised President Johnson—will in fact produce the kind of political and economic change we hope it will.

But Senator Fulbright at least is right to the extent that we should not, by seeming to align ourselves with reactionaries against all revolutions, forfeit any chance of influencing Latin American development along lines favorable to our interests.

We are a conservative, rich, and stable nation. We are far removed in time from our own uncomplicated revolutionary struggle and far removed in spirit from the kind of ferment that is in progress in Latin America. We need to ask ourselves if Senator Fulbright may not have been right in suggesting that, as such a great conservative power, it is in our interest to uphold the law in international relations rather than break it by armed intervention contrary to American treaty obligations.

Agree with WILLIAM FULBRIGHT or not, it is plain that his real crime has been to think, and to ask the American people and their Government to think, about the fundamental direction of our policy in Latin America. He himself thinks in terms far more sophisticated than the clichés favored by our cold—and hot—warriors. And that in itself is an offense to those who would prefer not to think at all.

At some future time in our history, Mr. Fulbright may qualify for a posthumous profile in courage for so thinking and speaking. Just now he is getting a verbal bum's rush. But is the U.S. Senate always going to consent rather than advise?

[From the Bennington (Vt.) Banner, Sept. 20, 1965]

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S UNPLEASANT TRUTHS

It will be surprising if Senator Fulbright's blockbusting statement of last week on U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic doesn't produce a profound chill in his relations with the White House.

Senator Fulbright, to be sure, was careful to blame what he considers gross mishandling of the Dominican crisis on the President's advisers. Yet it is hardly flattering to President Johnson to say that he was pushed by his subordinates into an unjustified military adventure, and into misrepresenting the facts to the American people.

The burden of the Senate foreign policy chairman's argument is that the marines were sent into Santo Domingo last April not, as the President claimed, to save American lives but to prevent "a return to power of Juan Bosch or of a government controlled by Bosch's party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party."

He contends further that estimates of Communist influence in the revolutionary movement were "grossly exaggerated" and that evidence doesn't verify the administration's assertion that the revolution was in danger of being taken over by Communist elements when we intervened.

Senator Fulbright also raised other important questions that our Latin American policymakers would do well to ponder before they advise the President to intervene in another revolution. Most important, Senator Fulbright asks whether the administration's reaction to the Dominican crisis "is part of a broader shift in its attitudes toward Latin American countries."

He makes it clear that social revolution is inevitable in Latin America, and that the United States can use its power to influence the choice the Latin Americans make. This choice, more often than not, will be between corrupt military dictatorships and social revolutionary parties.

"Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning," the Senator declared, "the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

The United States must decide, he suggested, "whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left, or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro."

Predictably, the words had hardly left Senator Fulbright's mouth before he was accused of being soft on communism, but these charges in no way detract from the importance of the issues he has raised. Intervention in the affairs of another nation, as the United States often loudly proclaims, is an extreme and not easily justified course of action. The lessons learned in the Dominican Republic should make us think twice before trying it again.

Under normal circumstances, one might perhaps question the propriety of such a frontal attack by the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee on the policies of a Democratic President. But the circumstances in this case are not normal, first, because the Republican leadership in Congress is too illiberal to make the point that Fulbright has made, and second, because the issue raised by our Dominican adventure is far too important to be stifled by a senseless consensus.

It can be argued, perhaps, that the Senator does not make sufficient allowances for the political dilemma which the Johnson administration faced in the Dominican crisis. Obviously the President and his advisers were strongly motivated by a morbid fear of what would happen to the Democrats' political fortunes if they permitted the establishment of "another Cuba." No doubt they reasoned that even in a 1-in-20 chance of a Communist takeover was a risk to be avoided at any cost.

But this is a pretty poor excuse for a decision that aligned us with the enemies of reform, violated our solemn treaty obligations, and rendered our Latin American aims deeply suspect among liberals everywhere. Fulbright is right when he says the Johnson administration should have had the sense and the courage to take the minimal risk entailed in casting our lot with the forces of social justice.

[From the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal, Sept. 17, 1965]

WISE COUNSEL AND PLAIN TALK AGAIN FROM SENATOR FULBRIGHT

It is possible that if there were no Senator Fulbright in the Senate he might have to be invented. Time and again he expresses the opinions of moderation—of what he likes to call flexibility—against all the zigs and zags of a foreign policy that seems to him to respond too much to mood and not enough to reason.

Senator Fulbright's observations on our intervention in the Dominican Republic could hardly be expected to bring the open approval of President Johnson. But if the President is willing to listen to counsels of moderation, and recent events indicate this willingness in increasing proportion, he must

acknowledge the wisdom and justice of the Senator's criticism.

Mr. Fulbright attributes what he calls the failure of our Dominican intervention to faulty advice given the President. And in particular he warned against the tendency in this country to over-react against any suspicion of communism in Latin American efforts for social change. This attitude, he feels, makes impossible any effective cooperation from this country in the social revolutions so necessary in nations to the south of us.

Mr. Fulbright, as he freely acknowledged, spoke from hindsight. But it was informed hindsight, gathered after 13 hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held in the past two months. If it can help re-chart our policies, not only in Latin America but toward the Western world, the Senator's warning will have great value. What he is trying to tell us, after all, is that the word Communist no longer sums up one monolithic evil to which we must react by instinct. The currents and divergences of Communism are as great in their way as the differences between democracies. All of them are not potentially deadly to us and many of the people who have been labelled Communist in struggling Latin American republics are home-grown revolutionaries struggling to right their own home-grown injustices.

If we are to intervene in every such situation because people the CIA calls Communists are in the forefront of rebel movements, we have already lost touch with the needs and the desperation which are pushing all Latin America toward change.

[From the Providence (R.I.) Journal, Sept. 17, 1965]

BLUNT TRUTHS ABOUT OUR DOMINICAN BLUNDER

Senator Fulbright, the Jimmy Cricket of American foreign policy, has spoken some blunt truths about the American intervention in the Dominican Republic and about U.S. relations with Latin America in general; truths that badly needed saying by some responsible public figure.

The Senator contends the United States committed an illegal, monumental blunder in its Dominican intervention and that we are following contradictory policies in Latin America, one phase of which—that represented by the U.S. role in the Dominican affair—alienates the United States from the social revolution that is the "movement of the future" in the southern hemisphere.

These are not light charges and they are not given lightly. Senator Fulbright responsibly waited until he had weighed extensive evidence presented in lengthy hearings of his Foreign Relations Committee on the Dominican intervention and until the primary crisis in the Dominican Republic was resolved before he stated his thoughtful case for a reappraisal of U.S. Latin American policy.

It is painful to acknowledge that one's country was wrong, but it would be dangerous for Americans to ignore the disturbing conclusions this intelligent and conscientious Senator has reached after a painstaking sifting of available evidence; namely:

1. That the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic not to save American lives, as was officially contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement that was judged to be Communist dominated.

2. That the fear of a Communist take-over was based on fragmentary and inadequate evidence.

3. That the United States let pass its best opportunities to influence events because U.S. officials were hostile to the party of Juan Bosch, which sought a return to con-

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stitutional government, and preferred instead the victory of antirebel forces.

4. That even before the revolution, the United States had "turned its back on social revolution in Santo Domingo and associated itself with a corrupt and reactionary oligarchy."

5. That U.S. officials, including the President, issued "wildly exaggerated reports" of rebel atrocities—reports that cannot be supported by evidence.

6. That the President acted in good faith on the basis of exaggerated reports of the danger of a Communist take-over from American officials on the scene.

7. That the fear of another Cuba and its effect on their careers distorted the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men.

Senator FULBRIGHT observed that when the American government chooses the "safe" course of supporting corrupt and reactionary strong-man regimes, clinging to the status quo in Latin American countries, it contradicts the spirit of our Alliance for Progress and the peaceful social revolution it was fashioned to support.

"We cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy and at the same time ally ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies. . . . We simply cannot have it both ways; we must choose . . .," the Senator concludes.

In the Dominican Republic, if the ouster last week of General Wessin y Wessin is any indication, we are beginning to make the right choice—for popular democracy. Will we now have the wisdom to apply the lessons of the Dominican Republic, as they were so clearly detailed by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to the rest of hemisphere where American policy remains spotty, at best?

[From the San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 17, 1965]

A DEVASTATING POLICY BLAST

After having conducted a 2-month inquest into the Dominican Republic affair, Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT has delivered in the Senate a devastating arraignment of the Johnson administration's course of action.

It is a highly effective example of the duty of a Senator to criticize and lay bare the follies of Government policy when he profoundly disagrees with it.

We sent troops into Santo Domingo last April, he said, from "overtimidity and overreaction." Throughout the episode, which is not yet ended, the administration acted with a "lack of candor."

The intervention arose from a decision that the revolution launched by the Dominican rebel movement "should not be allowed to succeed."

It rested on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence on the rebels and it failed to perceive that if we automatically oppose any reform movement the Communists adhere to, we shall end up opposing every reform movement, "making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries."

Senator FULBRIGHT let the President down easy by saying he had been given faulty advice which exaggerated the Communist danger. That is true, for the President does have to base decisions on advice, yet it remains a fact—though FULBRIGHT politely refrained from saying so—that basing foreign policy too much on the advice of CIA and FBI agents, as the President did, can be fatal to the proper ends of that policy.

As the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FULBRIGHT has not only struck a very hard blow at the President's excuses for "forgibly and illegally" invading Santo Domingo, but he has also raised the ultimate question about American policy toward Latin America. His words were:

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"The direction of the Alliance for Progress is toward social revolution in Latin America; the direction of our Dominican intervention is toward the suppression of revolutionary movements which are supported by Communists or suspected of being influenced by Communists"

"We simply cannot have it both ways: we must choose between the Alliance for Progress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the status quo in Latin America."

This needed to be said. As Senator FULBRIGHT remarked after dropping his bomb: "I think maybe they'll stop and think a bit before rushing into more military interventions."

[From the New York Post, Sept. 16, 1965]

FULBRIGHT'S HISTORY LESSON

Senator FULBRIGHT's review of U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis deserves study by responsible Americans. It is as certain as anything in the area of foreign affairs can be certain that last April's revolution in Santo Domingo is not the last of such upheavals in Latin America. Unless there is careful, courageous analysis of where our policy failed, such as Mr. FULBRIGHT presented to the Senate yesterday, the mistakes will be repeated.

FULBRIGHT, perhaps too generously, absolved President Johnson. U.S. failures in Santo Domingo were principally the result of the faulty advice given the President by U.S. representatives on the spot, FULBRIGHT said. But Ambassador Tapley Bennett, Jr., it should be noted, is still at his post in Santo Domingo.

The danger to American lives was "more a pretext," FULBRIGHT concluded on the basis of his committee's inquiry, than a reason for our intervention. It was the threat of communism rather than the danger to American lives that produced the massive landings, he asserted.

"In their panic lest the Dominican Republic become another Cuba," continued FULBRIGHT in the most significant part of his commentary, "some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some Communist support, that there is an important difference between Communist support and Communist control of a political movement, that it is quite possible to compete with the Communists for influence in a reform movement rather than abandon it to them, and, most important of all, that economic development and social justice are themselves the primary and most reliable security against Communist subversion."

The FULBRIGHT formula lacks the simplicity and he-man quality of landing the Marines. But it is based on a more accurate reading of Latin American realities. It is sound counsel for the explosive future.

[From the New York Post, Sept. 21, 1965]

AFTER FULBRIGHT'S SPEECH: BLASTS AND SILENCES

Chairman FULBRIGHT of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently delivered a carefully documented, thoughtful critique of our intervention last April in Santo Domingo.

He faced the hard questions. Did we act wisely? If not, why not, and more important, where do we go from here?

In undertaking this assignment, Senator FULBRIGHT knew he was risking the displeasure of the President, even though he portrayed Mr. Johnson as the victim of faulty counsel. In view of the shambles in which our intervention had left three decades of good neighbor policy and the ensuing rise in anti-Americanism, FULBRIGHT rightly argued that self-critical analysis of the experience was as indispensable as the Bay of Pigs post mortem ordered by President Kennedy.

In the aftermath of his indictment, FULBRIGHT's view was promptly and predictably denounced by Senators DODD, LONG, SMATHERS, LAUSCHE, and MUNDT. DODD even intimated that the chairman's dissents from administration policy reflected a lamentable softness on communism.

If these responses could have been foretold, what has been disconcerting has been the general silence of the Senate liberals. Except for Senators JOSEPH CLARK and maverick WAYNE MORSE, liberal Senators have risen neither to defend nor develop the views set forth by FULBRIGHT.

FULBRIGHT asked disturbing questions. They merit public debate and scrutiny. They should not be swept under the rug because, for the moment, things are going a little better in Latin America.

FULBRIGHT's central point was that obsessive, panicky fear of a Castroite takeover led U.S. representatives to rebuff the democratic non-Communist left and to ally themselves with the military oligarchs in Santo Domingo. When the revolution broke out on April 24 under the leadership of the moderate Bosch party, Ambassador William Tapley Bennett, Jr., refused its request for an "American presence," FULBRIGHT reports. Again, 2 days later, when the constitutionalists, fearing themselves defeated by the military, appealed to Bennett for U.S. mediation, he turned them down on the grounds that such mediation would constitute intervention.

But a few hours later, when the tide of battle turned against the military junta and the latter begged for help, Bennett said, "I can't get away with bringing Americans in on that ground"—of preventing an alleged Communist takeover. He hereupon cynically advised the junta to ask American intervention under the slogan of protecting American lives. This was done and the Marines were sent in. Soon thereafter the Red cry was raised.

Since the Bosch forces are characteristic of the non-Communist reform movements hitherto backed by the United States in Latin America, FULBRIGHT asked whether the Dominican Republic policy (whose architect, said Senator CLARK, was Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann) represented a "broader shift" in attitude toward Latin America. Were we turning away from the "revolutionaries of the non-Communist left" to the "military dictators and ruling oligarchies"?

"I suggest," Senator CLARK observed, "that Under Secretary of State Mann and Assistant Secretary of State Jack Vaughn would be well advised, and I hope they will be, if they devote their best efforts from here on in to patching up our damaged relationships with those men in Latin America and the countries they represent who are our real friends: the democratic, the liberal and, if you will, the slightly left-of-center leaders, not the military juntas or the oligarchical landowners, who are cheering what we did in the Dominican Republic."

Why did most Senate liberals shrink from the public discussion FULBRIGHT and CLARK were striving to promote? Why did they stand by mutely when the counterattack was unleashed by DODD and Company?

[From the Charleston (W. Va.) Gazette, Oct. 12, 1965]

HOUSE RESOLUTION IGNORES SCHOLARLY FULBRIGHT TALK

On September 15 the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, delivered a major speech on U.S. foreign policy. It was a long speech. It was also a sensible speech, knowledgeable, comprehensive, dispassionate, pertinent to and questioning of United States handling of the Dominican Republic affair in particular and of all South American countries in general.

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Five days later, the House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin (312 to 52) adopted a resolution urging precisely the sort of irresponsible reaction toward provocations in South America Senator FULBRIGHT had warned against. The United States, said the resolution, should immediately intrude anywhere in the hemisphere to prevent Communist takeovers. The resolution, thereby, not only defended the Johnson administration's response to last spring's revolution in the Dominican Republic but encouraged a similar response in the future throughout South America, should the circumstances warrant.

Two reasons dictate why such policy, as endorsed and recommended by the House, is idiocy compounded:

Most important is the solemn pledge the United States took when its Government with Senate approval signed the charter of the Organization of American States. Article 15 of the charter flatly declares: "No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state." Article 17 reinforces article 15: "The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever."

The language of these clauses isn't obscure. It is language that should be evident to anyone who possesses even a rudimentary understanding of words. The language doesn't say it is permissible for Organization countries to interfere in the affairs of a neighbor in the event of a Communist revolution. It says exactly the opposite. There is to be no interference regardless of what type of revolution occurs. "The territory of a state is inviolable."

At Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948 the United States agreed to the terms of this language; later, on August 28, 1950, the U.S. Senate ratified the Charter of the Organization of American States, and the treaty became operable.

(It should be noted the treaty does provide for specific steps to be followed to thwart external or internal aggression arising from Communist or other sources. The victim of aggression can receive relief, if the Organization of American States in concert subscribes to the measures to be applied in the former's behalf. The controlling factor, however, is orderly procedure and action by all, not the absence of procedure and action by one member or a minority of members.)

Of lesser importance why the House resolution was reckless and ridiculous is that the United States has had an unending history of overreaction to incidents that have erupted in South America. And, of late our paternalistic interference has been equated with selfish motivations.

Thus, prevailing opinion among the oppressed majority in most South American countries is the United States has used the threat of communism to excuse its meddling in situations that have very little to do with this alien ideology.

In his speech Senator FULBRIGHT made clear that not all rebellions are Communist inspired or dominated. Many are merely the logical consequence of deplorable living standards, evil public officials, and a much-too-stratified society. Instead of siding with the afflicted, the United States too frequently has jumped too quickly to the aid of the privileged under the guise of stamping out communism. It is these hasty, ill-considered moves that frighten Senator FULBRIGHT and cause him to wonder aloud about the sense of American foreign policy.

The United States is fortunate to have a man of FULBRIGHT's qualifications who is willing to speak out on sensitive issues and bring to the attention of those who would

listen the inconsistency of American foreign policy. Regrettably, many in complete accord with FULBRIGHT have remained silent lest they be dubbed "pinkos" or commie dupes.

As for the House of Representatives and the silly resolution bearing its name, obviously the 312 Members voting for that resolution either didn't read FULBRIGHT's speech or failed to understand its contents. Otherwise, how is it possible to justify the extraordinary injunction of the resolution that the United States should disregard utterly a treaty obligation to which it affixed its signature and to which it gave its golden vow? Assuredly those Members aren't advocating the United States do what the United States has charged the Soviet Union with doing time and again. Or are they?

[From the Greenwich (Conn.) Time, Sept. 21, 1965]

MAKES POINT

Senator FULBRIGHT's criticism of how our Government handled the Dominican Republic crisis cannot be shrugged off as unwarranted sniping at the administration. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is a thoughtful, responsible critic of the conduct of foreign affairs. His remarks cannot fairly be dismissed with such shallow judgments as that voiced by Senator LONG, of Louisiana, who referred to what he called the "Fulbright doctrine: Don't intervene; you might be criticized." That is not what FULBRIGHT said, nor what he meant.

What he did say was that our intervention was based on poor intelligence, which led the President to overreact to an exaggerated threat of Communist control of the rebel movement. And what FULBRIGHT is concerned about is that this mistake, based partly on misunderstanding of the vital differences between Communist participation and Communist control, not be repeated elsewhere in Latin America.

"One is led to the conclusion," FULBRIGHT said, "that U.S. policymakers were unduly timid and alarmist in refusing to gamble on the forces of reform and social change." And he added: "The bitter irony of such timidity is that by casting its lot with the forces of status quo . . . the United States almost certainly helped the Communists to acquire converts whom they otherwise could not have won."

It is an important point. A policy of maintaining the status quo at all costs simply would not jibe with the more enlightened philosophy that undergirds the Alliance for Progress. Social progress and stalemate are incompatible.

[From the Little Rock (Ark.) University Forum, Sept. 23, 1965]

FULBRIGHT TELLS IT—THE WAY IT IS

Those of us who are appalled by many aspects of President Johnson's foreign policy, and especially by the President's use of armed intervention in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam, found last week that we have a new ally, if not on Vietnam, at least on the Caribbean issue; none other than one of the most powerful and respected liberal Democrats in Washington, Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The irony of the situation is that FULBRIGHT's charges against the administration's handling of the affair are virtually the same charges the student left and the radical press have been making all summer in print at teach-ins, on the picket lines.

According to FULBRIGHT, the military intervention aimed not at saving American lives, which was the official reason given, but aimed at preventing the victory of a revolution which was thought at the time to be Communist-dominated. The Senator pointed out that Communist influence on

the rebels was vastly overestimated by the President's advisers and by the U.S. intelligence and diplomatic services in the Dominican Republic, and that the use of troops was an overhysterical reaction to the fear of another Cuba, a direct result of the kind of blindly fanatic anticommunism characteristic until recently of only a minority on the radical right.

"The tragedy of Santo Domingo," said FULBRIGHT, "is that a policy that purported to defeat communism in the short run is more likely to have the effect of promoting it in the long run." Later in his speech, FULBRIGHT called for a Latin American policy which would allow the nations of that area free and autonomous development of individual domestic and foreign policies. The Senator asserted that U.S. support of "corrupt and reactionary military oligarchies" frustrates "the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America," and that continuation of such a policy might gravely endanger the U.S. position in the Western Hemisphere.

Senator FULBRIGHT was careful to lay the blame for the "grievous mistake" on Johnson's diplomatic and intelligence advisers, and not on the President himself. Whatever the individual burden of guilt, the administration can no longer dismiss all critics of its foreign policy as politically naive intellectuals or as irresponsible, attention-seeking radicals. The prompt White House denial of FULBRIGHT's conclusions was ostensibly supported by much of the Congress, but such acid condemnation by such a high-ranking official is almost certain to have wide repercussions.

The Senator's comments are no cause for heady optimism, but they are a hopeful sign that change may be on the way. There is now at least a crack in the monolithic wall.

Thank you, Senator FULBRIGHT, for having the guts to "tell it the way it is."—B.P.

[From the Harvard Crimson]

FULBRIGHT AT THE CROSSROADS

The hunt is on for the scalp of WILLIAM FULBRIGHT. Senator DODD has attacked him. Senator LONG has attacked him. Senator LAUSCHE has attacked him. Senator RUSSELL has attacked him. The House has voted a resolution which indirectly censures his critique of military intervention in the Dominican Republic. And, according to Joseph Kraft's column in Monday's Globe, a piqued administration is doing nothing to shield the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee from rightwing flak: "On the contrary, the administration is itself holding the anti-Communist issue in reserve as a rod to dissident members of its majority."

Senator FULBRIGHT is being carefully isolated, and he may soon suffer a fate that not too many years ago befell a man who resembles him in many ways, Adlai Stevenson. No man of prominence in America represents the Stevenson tradition more faithfully than Senator FULBRIGHT. He speaks out infrequently, and when he does, it appears to pain him greatly. He chooses his phrases carefully, balancing and moderating his assertions as would a conscientious logician. A politician in name only, he seems more the lonely statesman, agonizing over his place in history.

Like Stevenson, FULBRIGHT clearly abhors the role of crusader. He fears the consequences of discord in a time of crisis. Now all about him the big guns of the Senate are firing, determined to demonstrate just how noisy and distasteful such discord can be. They realize just how dangerous—to them—a man like FULBRIGHT might be.

In the last month, the Senator has made a major congressional address and written a searingly critical article in the St. Louis

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Post-Dispatch. Now he stands at the crossroads. He can continue to speak and, by his very eloquence and persistence, force the administration and its policymakers to recognize the spirit and intelligence he represents. Or, like Stevenson before him, this man—who foresaw the cataclysm of the Bay of Pigs, who foresaw the neutralism of Tito, who now foresees more Santo Domingos—can fall silent and allow the consensus to engulf and encyst him.

On FULBRIGHT's answer hangs far more than the career of one man. As Louis Hartz perceives, in his "Liberal Tradition in America," the answer will be of sweeping significance:

"Will the insight of a Willkie or a Stevenson offset the end of insight a McCarthy inspires? This is the largest challenge the American liberal world has faced, and the payment for meeting it effectively is more than mere survival in an age of world turmoil. It holds out the hope of an inward enrichment of culture and perspective, a 'coming of age' . . . which in its own right is well worth fighting for."

[From Christianity and Crisis, Sept. 28, 1965]

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S ACHIEVEMENT

Senator FULBRIGHT's speech in the Senate on our policy in the Dominican Republic is significant both in form and content. In form it is a critical challenge by the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee to the administration's policy of Marine landings. It must be hailed by all thoughtful observers because it questioned the actions of a powerful Chief Executive who has immense prestige, drawn partly from his tremendous achievements in domestic policy and partly from the strength of anti-Communist sentiment in the American public. Such an act required considerable courage. The President's power is so great that it approaches General de Gaulle's authority in the Fifth French Republic—not, of course, in terms of the Constitution but in terms of political realities.

The content of the speech took on special significance because it reflected the proceedings of the Foreign Relations Committee in its weeks of testimony from various experts on the Dominican crisis. It was, therefore, more than a mere personal opinion.

In brief, FULBRIGHT's criticism was that the administration mistakenly relied on dubious advice in ordering the Marines to the Dominican Republic, ostensibly to protect American lives but actually to frustrate a Communist takeover in Santo Domingo. The Arkansan said:

"Responsibility for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo lies primarily with those who advised the President. In the critical days between April 25 and April 28 these officials sent the President exaggerated reports of the danger of a Communist takeover. . . . Underlying the bad advice and unwise actions of the United States was the fear of 'another Cuba.' The specter of a second Communist state in the Western Hemisphere—and its probable political repercussions within the United States and possible effects on the careers of those who might be held responsible—seems to have been the most important single factor in distorting the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men."

The rigor of this criticism, particularly the hazardous speculation about the personal motives of those generally unidentified advisers of the President, was bound to create violent reactions.

The Senator also gave a comprehensive analysis of the relation of North American democracy to the democratic movements in Latin America. He distinguished between the gradualist democratic movements, which the Alliance for Progress hoped to promote

and of which the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana in Peru and Betancourt's party in Venezuela are examples, and the "uncouth" revolutionary movements.

FULBRIGHT is quite right in suggesting that the social structure of most Latin nations includes political movements in which leftist elements are bound to be present. It is difficult to determine whether these revolutionary elements contain the seeds of Communist totalitarianism. Hence extreme caution is necessary in defining our attitude toward them. He is probably right also in suggesting that we are under the illusion that our revolutionary past gives us an affinity with these movements when, as a matter of fact, "We are the most unrevolutionary nation in the world."

In short, FULBRIGHT has the distinction of raising all the significant issues about the relation of an essentially bourgeois democracy to the nations in which democratic institutions are at best imposed in various ways on a feudal tradition.

The official patriots in the Democratic Party made heavyhanded accusations against Chairman FULBRIGHT's loyalty to our tradition and insinuated that he was enamored of revolutionary zeal. Efforts of the United States and OAS to superimpose democracy in Santo Domingo might be striking evidence of the pertinence of the Senator's position because they prove that superimposed democracy cannot give a democratic solution. There a provisional government has difficulty in providing an atmosphere of democratic give-and-take between the revolutionary and the conservative factions—without which the promised elections will give no peace. On the other hand, the presence of three Communist parties is regarded by FULBRIGHT's critics as a refutation of his position. But these parties might also be seen as the inevitable fruit of our ill-conceived military intervention.

[From the Nation, Oct. 4, 1965]

SENATOR FULBRIGHT DISSENTS

Any American who says a critical word about U.S. military or paramilitary operations anywhere on the globe is assured of a generally bad press in his own land, and Senator FULBRIGHT is no exception. It avails him nothing that he is the Senate's leading scholar on foreign affairs, that the Fulbright scholarships are a landmark in creative statesmanship, that he is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. When, as in his speech on U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, he presumes to criticize our policy in the Caribbean and in Latin America generally, he is rebuked by most of the commentators. In the Senate, MORSE and CLARK spoke up in defense of their colleague, but Senators DODD, SMATHERS, LAUSCHE, LONG, and others laid down the predictable barrage. As Newsweek observed, Senator FULBRIGHT had knowingly staked out a lonely position.

But perhaps his position is not as lonely as it appears to be. Any number of Senators who are known to agree with Senator FULBRIGHT maintained a discreet silence for fear of incurring the displeasure of the White House. At about the same time that Senator FULBRIGHT was speaking, Dr. Wolfgang Friedmann, an international law expert from Columbia University, voiced much the same criticism of the President's handling of the Dominican crisis before the world peace through law conference in Washington. Dr. Friedmann took the position that the unilateral use of force signals a major weakening of the United Nations. "We are faced," he said, "with the threat of a collapse of the painstaking efforts of nearly half a century, and especially the last 20 years, to build up a system of organized international control of the use of force." U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, without a showing of

outside direction of the rebellion, "cannot be justified by any canons of international law."

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, which Senator FULBRIGHT also opposed, President Kennedy lamented: "How can I have been so stupid?" But his successor will not abide criticism nor acknowledge mistakes. Asked how he felt about the decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic, he replied: "I would do it all over again, only we'd have done it earlier and tougher." At the last moment, the President put in an unexpected appearance at the World Peace Through Law Conference to voice a few platitudes about the U.N. while carefully avoiding any reference to the Dominican Republic. The distinguished array of 3,000 Supreme Court Justices and international law experts heard him out, but his remarks drew only "a tepid response."

In the wake of the Fulbright speech the House proceeded to adopt a resolution endorsing the unilateral use of force by the United States or by any other Western Hemisphere country to prevent a Communist take-over anywhere in the hemisphere. The resolution was approved by a vote of 312 to 52. The administration had not asked for the resolution but it did not oppose it. Many Members, though made uneasy, said that they couldn't oppose a resolution that seemed to be intended to serve as an ex post facto endorsement of the President's Dominican policy. Some of these same Members also criticized the State Department for "lack of backbone" in not taking a stand against the resolution. While the resolution is without legal effect, it will be read as a blanket endorsement of the unilateral use of force and will add to the criticism of American policy in South America. Representative JOHN BRADEMAS said that he had gone all the way up to Secretary Dean Rusk and had been unable to get anyone to say whether the Department was for or against the resolution. In brief, there is no indication in Washington of a willingness to learn from experience or to listen to critics.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 27, 1965]

TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY IN UNITED STATES
(By Marquis Childs)

The Johnson consensus is so powerful that large areas of policy—normally in past years a subject for debate—are now off limits. The zeal of a majority President, who by temperament and conviction draws the line against dissenters, underscores the fears of a time of troubles when revolutionary regimes threaten all order and stability.

Add to this an expanding Federal Government dispensing money in old ways—the House just passed a \$1.7 billion pork barrel rivers and harbors bill—and new ways such as huge defense and research contracts. The sum total in the view of pessimistic observers is a new America with little resemblance to the give and take democracy of the past.

A case in point is what happened to Chairman J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Waiting until after a provisional government had been established in the Dominican Republic, FULBRIGHT in a Senate speech delivered a carefully reasoned criticism of how the Dominican crisis had been handled. This was based on an inquiry before the Foreign Relations Committee with 13 sessions at which all the principals testified.

Immediately the full force of administration spokesmen big and little was leveled against him. The voices turned up high did not so much seek to refute the criticism as to discredit the critic. At the lowest level, as represented by Senator RUSSELL LONG of Louisiana, the majority whip, the suggestion was that if you didn't believe Communists

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were about to take over in the Dominican Republic then you must have more sympathy for communism than you knew.

On careful rereading of the Fulbright speech it is hard to discover why the reaction was as though it had been an offense against majesty. He was saying that aspects of America's policy in the Dominican Republic compounded these faults. The example of a Senator soundly birched for faulting the administration raises a troubling question: Is any dialog at all possible on the great issues of foreign policy?

To put it another way: Must the power of the Executive be so absolute in view of the threat to America's security that critics should keep silent? An American war in Vietnam is rapidly expanding with reports of 200,000 troops to be committed by the year's end and yet scarcely a doubt is expressed publicly over the authority of the Commander in Chief to direct an undeclared war.

Granted the stakes are awesome and the power of the Executive great in conducting policy with proper secrecy as in the India-Pakistan crisis. Granted, too, that nothing succeeds like the Johnson successes.

Nevertheless, the domination of the majority is so all-encompassing that a fundamental distortion of the American system seems for the time being at least to have resulted. More than a century ago Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most searching and at the same time sympathetic foreign critics, wrote in his "Democracy in America" of the danger of the "tyranny of the majority." Of the tyranny this French aristocrat considered the main evil of democratic institutions he wrote:

"The smallest reproach irritates its sensibility and the slightest joke that has any foundation in truth renders it indignant; from the forms of its language up to the solid virtues of its character, everything must be made the subject of encomium. No writer, whatever be his eminence, can escape paying this tribute of adulation to his fellow citizens."

De Tocqueville was writing of the majority itself but his words today might be applied to the master of the majority.

"I know of no country," De Tocqueville wrote, "in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America. Profound changes have occurred since democracy in America first appeared and yet it may be asked whether recognition of the right of dissent has gained substantially in practice as well as in theory."

Senator FULBRIGHT discovered in 1957 what it meant to go against the majority. He opposed the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine embodied in a resolution giving the President power to use "the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary" in the Middle East and to spend \$200 million as he saw fit without congressional restrictions. The Senate majority leader then was Lyndon B. Johnson. He urged FULBRIGHT to back Eisenhower as he himself had.

Johnson has triple-starred consensus in the political lexicon. But, defined as "tyranny of the majority," consensus has another look.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 27, 1965]

THE FULBRIGHT SPEECH

The September 20 Evans and Novak attack on Senator FULBRIGHT's Dominican speech makes the preposterous assertion that the speech will be certain to lift the chances of the most anti-Yankee candidate in the field.

It is extremely unlikely that one Dominican in a thousand knows who Senator FULBRIGHT is and it is even less likely that many Dominicans know he made the speech.

Undoubtedly, one dominant theme in the elections will be the pros and cons of the

U.S. intervention. The attitudes of the Dominicans will be determined by their and their friends' immediate experiences with the revolution, not with Senator FULBRIGHT's indictment which should influence the policymakers in the executive branch to whom it was addressed.

One might ask the columnists why the Dominican crisis was such a dangerous confrontation. Was it a crisis involving a threat to the security of the United States, or, rather, a tragic confrontation between the United States, international law, and the inevitable, and hopefully democratic, social revolution in Latin America?

JONATHAN F. GALLOWAY.

WASHINGTON.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 18, 1965]

THE NEED FOR CRITICS

(By Erwin D. Canham)

You can take it for granted that Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, of Arkansas, though a Democrat, a close and old friend of President Johnson, and longtime chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, will not be the next Secretary of State. He has burned his bridges. His recent outspoken criticisms of administration policy in Santo Domingo, on top of several other recent dissents, has undoubtedly disturbed the President if it has not angered him.

It is by no means certain that Senator FULBRIGHT ever wanted to be Secretary of State. He is no administrator. He hasn't administered anything since he was president of the University of Arkansas in 1939-41. He has been in Congress since 1943. The legislative life suits him fine. And he may well believe he can be of more help in criticizing American foreign policy as a sovereign Senator and chairman of his powerful committee, than if he were working for a President as Secretary of State.

WHY COMMENTS

For some time, Senator FULBRIGHT has been rather frustrated. He does not think the President or the State Department pay much attention to his ideas. He comments on the situation wryly. His latest statement puts him further out of line than ever.

But Senator FULBRIGHT may be the voice of honest, critical perception, and of commonsense. What he says about the mis-evaluation of the situation in Santo Domingo is confirmed by most responsible correspondents who were on the spot and tried to unangle the facts.

The Arkansas Senator may be in advance of American public opinion on many issues. But American policy is badly in need of critical examination. It has been rigid and defensive for many months. Secretary of Defense McNamara may have been making foreign policy more than Secretary of State Rusk. Mr. McNamara is a powerful personality. He has a sharper cutting edge than Mr. Rusk, although the Secretary of State's quiet intellectual power and character should not be underestimated.

ORIGINAL VIEW

Senator FULBRIGHT always comes with a fresh and original mind, and an experienced political touch, to problems that are jaded and frozen. His analysis is just what the administration needs, whether he is always right or not. It should not be resented.

Senator FULBRIGHT's speech in Vienna in May, outlining ways for easing the central Europe situation and opening wider doors through the formerly Iron Curtain, was attentively studied in Budapest and Prague. I know, because officials in the Hungarian and Czech foreign offices told me so. Senator FULBRIGHT said: "I only wish they studied it as attentively in Washington."

Senator FULBRIGHT's name will be remembered for the most massive international scholarship program the world has ever seen.

His was almost a lone voice arguing behind the scenes against the Bay of Pigs misadventure. (But he was in favor of invading Cuba at the time of the missile crisis, writes President Kennedy's assistant, Theodore C. Sorensen.)

DISSENSION EXISTS

The senatorial group of Democrats which is unhappy about foreign policy, for sometimes conflicting reasons, is impressive. The Senate leader, Senator MANSFIELD is discreetly but definitely in disagreement on aspects of the Vietnam problem. Senator CHURCH has long been off the reservation, and Senator MORSE, as usual, is a violent dissenter. There are several others. This is a far cry from the little band of obdurate men who blocked Woodrow Wilson's hopes for an organized peace. But it is a faction which might some day coalesce, though not necessarily behind Senator FULBRIGHT.

It would be interesting to know Vice President HUMPHREY's ideas on the necessity of a reevaluation of foreign policy methods and goals. He has long been an imaginative critic of set policies, but now his lips are sealed.

Long-established policies have a way of gaining a life of their own, riding juggernaut-like over the humans who administer them. Now and then somebody throws a brick at the juggernaut and it turns out to be of paper. It is time to challenge the juggernaut now, to call for candid rethinking. Senator FULBRIGHT may have made a beginning, frank and provocative.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 25, 1965]

INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK—FULBRIGHT AND HIS CRITICS

(By Joseph Kraft)

The doubts raised by Senator FULBRIGHT with respect to this country's policy in Latin America have been intensified by the cries of his critics.

Basically, the Senator was only posing a good question. He was asking whether this country had reverted to the policy of direct military intervention in South America.

With the Dominican case before him, he sensed a new disposition to identify all social protest with Communist subversion, and a connected tendency to shoot first and think later. He pointed out that there were important distinctions between protests backed by the Communists and protests under their control. He suggested that when trouble south of the border developed next, it might be appropriate for this country to think first and shoot next.

A reasonable, and I believe honest, response to Senator FULBRIGHT's question was available to the administration. It would have emphasized that there was no basic change in American policy; that there were matters open for debate in the Dominican record; but that the Dominican case, because of the special impact of the Trujillo dictatorship, was a special one without general application to Latin America.

The actual reaction was not unlike the stoning reserved by the high priests of primitive communities for those who question the efficacy of blood sacrifice.

For a starter there was Senator THOMAS DODD, of Connecticut, with his usual tactic of crying soft on communism. Dodd charged that FULBRIGHT "suffers from an indiscriminating infatuation with revolutions of all kinds, national, democratic, or Communist."

Short remarks in similar vein were made by Senators FRANK LAUSCHE and RUSSELL LONG—a member of Senator FULBRIGHT's Foreign Relations Committee who had not even bothered to attend the committee's recent hearings on the Dominican Republic. Then, in defense of the American Ambassador in the Dominican Republic, Tapley Bennett, there boomed the big gun of the Senate, RICHARD RUSSELL, of Georgia.

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RUSSELL had known Ambassador Bennett "as a small boy." He had known "his father and his mother." He had known "both of his grandfathers." Only last year he had had a meal "with Ambassador Bennett's father and mother on their Franklin County farm in the rolling red clay hills of northeast Georgia." With that pedigree, and that solid rural background, how could anyone even begin to have doubts?

A day earlier, the House had expressed its reaction to Senator Fulbright. It passed by an overwhelming vote a resolution that, in effect, endorsed direct military intervention by the United States in Latin America to prevent "subversive action or the threat of it."

By themselves, neither the House resolution nor the Senate statements have any practical force. But precisely because they are free of real content, they provide a good measure of the play of domestic and bureaucratic politics on foreign affairs.

At the base, plainly, there are politics with self-interested motives for raising anew the issue of softness on communism. The original author of the House resolution, ARMISTEAD SELDEN, of Alabama, for instance, comes from a district that is being changed by reapportionment, by Federal registration of voters, and by possible action on the poll tax. With Negro voters due to figure in the Alabama primary next May, SELDEN can no longer fall back on the usual theme of protecting white supremacy. Instead, he is wrapping himself in the mantle of anticommunism.

Politicians with such an obvious interest in raising the Communist issue are, to be sure, limited in number. But their strength is as the strength of 10 because the administration is doing nothing to organize resistance against them.

On the contrary, the administration has promoted inside the State Department a group of regular Foreign Service officers, heading up in Under Secretary Thomas Mann and Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Douglas MacArthur II, who made their way in the era of unsophisticated, monolithic anticommunism. Their ideas, indeed their careers and reputations, are tied up with that era. Not surprisingly, they practically invited the Selden resolution.

Lastly, the White House itself seems to be holding anticommunism in reserve as a rod to discipline its congressional majority. Where there is a jingoist issue working, in other words, the President wants it working on his side. He has gone soft on Goldwaterism. And while he maintains that stance, it remains a question whether this country will be able to move in harmony with the vast social changes that are sweeping Latin America, Africa and Asia, too.

[From the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal, Sept. 26, 1965]

FULBRIGHT'S "UNTHINKABLE THOUGHTS" STING THE SENATE (By Ben Reeves)

WASHINGTON.—JAMES WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Arkansas Democrat, has been in the U.S. Senate nearly 21 years, and the Senate still doesn't know quite what to make of him.

By ordinary standards, he ought to be a Member of the Senate establishment, the tightly knit inner core that runs the show.

He is a southerner, he is a Protestant, he is a member of an important standing committee, and he is a proven votegetter with the folks back home. He is one of the few Members who have won election to as many as four full Senate terms. But there is a maverick streak about BILL FULBRIGHT that defies predictability.

When he arose from his place in the Senate on the early afternoon of September 15 with a sheaf of papers in his hand—in the midst of discussion of the highway beautification bill—the few Members on the floor had no

inkling that one of the sharpest fusses of the 1965 session was about to begin. There was no objection when the rule of germaneness was waived to permit Fulbright to speak on a subject other than that officially before the chamber.

THE ONLY PURPOSE

In his dry, monotonous, non-spine-tingling manner, he addressed himself to "the situation in the Dominican Republic." The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations felt that "at this time of relative calm it is appropriate, desirable, and I think, necessary to review events in the Dominican Republic and the U.S. role in those events. The purpose of such a review, and its only purpose, is to develop guidelines for wise and effective policies in the future."

Then, in an unemotional and unhurried way (9,500 words in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD), FULBRIGHT contended that United States handling of the Dominican crisis last April was "characterized initially by overtimidity and subsequently by overreaction. Throughout the whole affair, it has also been characterized by a lack of candor."

FULBRIGHT's villain of the afternoon was not President Lyndon B. Johnson or Secretary of State Dean Rusk, but the U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, W. Tapley Bennett.

Bennett, the Senator said, had muffed an opportunity to "bring possibly decisive mediating power to bear for a democratic solution" on April 27, the most critical day in the rebellion against the Dominican Government.

REASON FOR MISTAKE

"The overriding reason for this mistake was the conviction of U.S. officials, on the basis of evidence which was fragmentary at best, that the rebels were dominated by Communists. A related and perhaps equally important reason for the U.S. Embassy's refusal to mediate on April 27 was the desire for and, at that point, expectation of an antirebel victory. They therefore passed up an important opportunity to reduce or even eliminate Communist influence by encouraging the moderate elements among the rebels and mediating for a democratic solution," FULBRIGHT said.

He called unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic a grievous mistake that has alienated our real friends in Latin America: broadly speaking, the people of the democratic left.

FULBRIGHT said he wanted to make it clear he was not saying that no Communist participated in the crisis, "but simply that the administration acted on the premise that the revolution was controlled by Communists, a premise which it failed to establish and has not established since."

President Johnson's decision to intervene with armed force was based on bad information and worse advice, the Senator contended.

NO EASY CHOICES

Almost completely overlooked by FULBRIGHT's attackers was the fifth paragraph of his speech in which he said his judgments were made with the benefit of hindsight, "and in fairness it must be conceded there were no easy choices available to the United States in the Dominican Republic."

He tried to make it clear that he was more concerned with long-term lessons deriving from our experience in the Dominican crisis than with profitless digging into past mistakes.

But in the Senate, as elsewhere, reasonableness is always upstaged by dramatic action. In this case the spectacle of the Foreign Relations Committee chairman attacking American policy.

FULBRIGHT had not taken his seat before two of his fellow Democrats were on their feet to belabor him for attacking the President and the American course of action.

RUSSELL LONG, of Louisiana, the Democrats' pudgy whip, came out shaking his jaws and declaring: "I thank the merciful Lord that our President possesses a sense of urgency and that he possesses initiative." GEORGE SMATHERS, of Florida, angrily demanded: "What is wrong with trying to save a country from communism? We had already lost Cuba to Castro. It has been admitted that there were only about 12 known Communist leaders in Cuba with Castro when he started his revolution."

THE USUAL FUMING

There was the customary fuming in the cloakrooms and in the corridors that accompanies just about every one of FULBRIGHT's "significant" speeches. What was he up to? What was he trying to accomplish?

The next day, Connecticut's white-haired Senator THOMAS DODD took to the floor to denounce the Fulbright speech and defend the action of the administration, and to say bitterly that "it seems to me that he suffers from an indiscriminating infatuation with revolutions of all kinds, national, democratic, or Communist."

It was a full week later that another big Senate gun was brought to bear on FULBRIGHT. Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, of Georgia, came onto the floor to say that Ambassador Tapley Bennett was a Georgia boy who comes from stock that does not panic or frighten easily. FULBRIGHT had done Bennett a grave disservice, the Georgian said.

In the interval, the White House took time to issue a statement saying that it could find no one who thought FULBRIGHT's views were justified. And other Members got in their licks, too.

But the Arkansas Senator was not entirely alone on the Dominican matter. Senator JOSEPH CLARK, of Pennsylvania, told the Senate he was in complete accord with FULBRIGHT's views. He called the speech overdue, sound, and wise.

During the past week, Senator STEPHEN M. YOUNG, of Ohio, backed FULBRIGHT, and also criticized Bennett's handling of the crisis in his ambassadorial role.

FULBRIGHT also gathered perhaps unexpected support from the editorials of some of the country's leading newspapers.

UNTHINKABLE THOUGHTS

There are more than a few in the Senate who privately agree with FULBRIGHT's main point in the argument. In the future, we must try to be on the side of democratic social revolution in Latin America and elsewhere, and not let our anticommunism panic us into supporting rightwing dictatorships. But they doubt his wisdom in bringing the argument into the forum of the Senate, where its main points become oversimplified by necessarily abbreviated news reports and he is exposed to unnecessary attack.

This is the same WILLIAM FULBRIGHT who, on March 25, 1964, made a Senate speech entitled "Old Myths and New Realities," which has been widely hailed as an air clearer in the field of foreign policy. In it he challenged the country to think "unthinkable thoughts" about such subjects as the cold war, the two Chinas, our role in Latin America, and the future of Vietnam.

Neither the President nor the State Department was happy to have such a speech come from so high-ranking a figure in the governmental mill that grinds out foreign policy. But 18 months later, even his severest critics would agree that it has helped create an atmosphere in which negotiations can be undertaken between our side and the Communist world.

STUBBORNNESS ADMIRER

This is the same FULBRIGHT who, after the Republican congressional victory of 1946, publicly urged President Harry Truman to appoint a leading Republican as Secretary of State and then resign, thus turning the Presidency over to the party that had scored

so handsomely in the congressional elections. Truman never forgave him for that, and a good many "regular" Democrats have always regarded him with a certain suspicion because of it.

The idea no doubt stemmed from his experiences as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University in 1928.

Both friends and foes have to admire his stubbornness in refusing to vote for the foreign aid bill Thursday night, hoping by his strategic protest to force a new look at the whole foreign aid system next year.

FULBRIGHT was born in Missouri 60 years ago last April, but his family took him to Arkansas when he was only a year old. He was graduated from the University of Arkansas, at Fayetteville, in 1925, and studied law at George Washington University in Washington after his return from England.

FULBRIGHT took his law degree in 1934, and went to work for the Justice Department's Antitrust Division in the early days of the New Deal. He taught law at George Washington in 1935, then became a law lecturer at the University of Arkansas in 1936. He was elected president of the university 3 years later.

FULBRIGHT was elected to the House of Representatives in 1942, and 2 years later successfully campaigned for the Senate seat that had been held by Hattie W. Carraway. He was reelected in 1950, 1956, and 1962. His prestige is such in Arkansas that even vote-fetching Gov. Orval Faubus decided against challenging him 3 years ago.

In the Senate, he is a reasonably consistent party man, but he is never found in anybody's pocket. He is jealous of his independence, and is not afraid to think for himself—even unthinkable thoughts. When he does think such thoughts, he becomes, as he did last week, a lonely man.

[From the Miami (Fla.) News, Sept. 28, 1965]

CRITIC

(By Bill Baggs)

A bitter smile must occupy the face belonging to JAMES WILLIAM FULBRIGHT as he listens to the rustic oratory of his colleagues.

For 20 years, as a resident of the Federal Senate, he has lawyered for new thinking to attend the related issues of world peace and the security of the United States.

Now, after a criticism of our policy in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, Senator FULBRIGHT has been backcapped by the indignant prose of other Senators to the extent you might think he were guilty of parliamentary treason.

The poet and diplomat, James Russell Lowell, handed down a slice of good sense when he wrote: "A wise skepticism is the first attribute of a good critic."

SKEPTICISM

If Senator FULBRIGHT were skeptical of our policies in the two countries, where we have made large military and diplomatic investments, and if he lived with his skepticism as a mute companion, he indeed would be a sorry Senator.

The beginning fact here is not whether the Senator is correct in his views. Rather, it is that the continuous absence of debate on serious business of Government can evolve into a kind of tyranny costumed as democracy. Every right we have is strengthened by our freedom to disagree and to refine our national decisions by such disagreement.

But what must put the rock in the Senator's shoe is that not only his good sense, but also his good intentions, appear challenged by some as he speaks as a critic of our Viet and Dominican policies.

Since the middle 1940's, Senator FULBRIGHT has been seeing quicker and clearer than most gentlemen in Congress. In 1943, he authored a resolution for a world organiza-

tion to keep the peace, once it had been won, and he was gracious enough to phrase his resolution in 55 words. Congress agreed, and 2 years later, the United Nations was born.

REFORMER

More than a decade before Bobby Baker's head bobbed to the surface, Senator FULBRIGHT pleaded with his colleagues to adopt a code of ethics. He had just completed washing some dirty linen when his own party occupied the White House.

Eloquently has he argued for less waste in foreign aid and for more funds in education, again long before any serious education bill was floated from a President to Congress and, in general, Senator FULBRIGHT has been a public servant willing to speak as a critic when the mood of the country washed high against his views.

The Prince de Ligne complained: "The Congress never runs. It waltzes." Today, with a persuasive President, our Congress is running. And a critic with courage and sense is needed to examine the legislation in a hurry. Thank goodness WILLIAM FULBRIGHT is there.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 28, 1965]

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

(By Walter Lippmann)

Last week the world had a fleeting but tantalizing glimpse of what might become possible if the cold war subsided. The U.S.S.R. and the United States of America, acting on their parallel interests in averting a war between Pakistan and India, made it possible for the United Nations to order a cease-fire. This show of unanimity discouraged the Chinese from intervening in the quarrel.

Parallelism is a long way short of positive cooperation, and there is no assurance that a settlement of the quarrel is in sight or even that the underlying hostility will not smolder on for a very long time. Nevertheless, the events of last week were a spectacular demonstration of how all hope and prospect of a reasonably peaceable world is tied up with an improvement in Soviet-American relations.

Is an improvement possible? What is there between us that now sets us against each other? It is, quite plainly, the conflict of ideology and interest, of emotion and of prejudice, over the revolutionary condition of the so-called third world—the world of the underdeveloped and emerging nations of the Southern Hemisphere—in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The revolutionary condition is an objective historical fact of this century, and it will continue to exist no matter what the Russians or we say or do about it.

The Soviet-American conflict is about this revolutionary condition. Thus, the conflict is no longer, as it was a generation ago, about what kind of social order is to exist in the highly developed countries of Europe and North America. As a matter of fact, in this whole area, which includes European Russia itself, the old argument between the Marxists and the laissez faire capitalists has been bypassed by events. For example, the economic philosophy of General Eisenhower and Senator Goldwater in America is as dead as the economic philosophy of Marx is among the European Socialists. In the whole developed, progressive, industrial world, the prevailing economic order is a mixture in varying degrees of planning and the incentive of profit, of fiscal management and social regulation.

It is in regard to the turbulence of this third world—which was not foreseen a generation ago—that the Soviet Union and the United States find themselves locked into what has the appearance of an irreconcilable conflict.

In its official ideology, the Soviet Union is committed to the support of the revolutionaries, to the incitement and supplying of "wars of national liberation."

In the American ideology, we are not absolutely opposed to wars of national liberation, provided they are not inspired or supported by Communists. We are very much disposed to feel, however, that all revolutions will be captured by the Communists who invariably participate in them.

Thus, Russia and America find themselves in a vicious circle. The Russians are disposed to intervene wherever there is a rebellion, and the United States is inclined to intervene to oppose as aggression the Communist intervention. In the Soviet Union there exists a prejudice in favor of rebellion as such, of rebellion against any established order. The Soviet Union is the product of a fairly recent revolution. In the United States, where the revolution occurred nearly two centuries ago, there is now a prejudice against revolution. The result is a vicious circle in which dogmatic communism and dogmatic anticommunism incite and exasperate each other.

The improvement of Soviet-American relations, which is prerequisite to an accommodation between the West and China, requires the breakup of this vicious circle. How? Essentially, I believe, by fostering the ascendancy of national interests over global ideology, by the reassertion in both countries of prudence and calculation against semi-religious fanaticism and frenzy.

We had a glimpse last week of how this can happen. The hostilities in Kashmir began with an infiltration of guerrilla troops (recruited as a matter of fact from the Pakistan Army though they wore different uniforms). The purpose of the guerrillas was to arouse the population and to liberate Moslem Kashmir from Hindu rule. Here was a war of national liberation which the Soviet Union, according to its theoretical doctrine, was bound to support. However, the fact of the matter is that it did not suit the Soviet Union that Pakistan, in cahoots with Red China, should defeat India, which is a tacit ally of the Soviet Union. So the Soviet Union acted in favor of peace, which is its real interest, rather than on behalf of an ideological prejudice.

At the same time, the United States, having learned something in recent months, resisted the temptation to take a lofty position against aggression, and instead, recently and prudently, chose to work quietly and behind the scenes.

This is the way that Soviet-American relations can be improved—by encouraging the prudent and the practical to predominate over the ideological and the hot. In this country, at least, the process will require the resumption of public debate—the kind of debate which Senator FULBRIGHT has once again opened up.

For the issue which he has posed in his remarkable speech is the essential issue in our attitude and policy toward the revolutionary condition of our time. The question he posed is how to tolerate rebellion, which is often necessary and desirable, without surrendering the control of the rebellion to the Communists who will always be part of it.

There is no rule or thumb for answering this question. But there has to be some kind of accommodation, such as the Soviet Union made about the Kashmir freedom fighters and such as we made about the Chinese threat of military aggression. The discussion of this serious and difficult problem cannot be monopolized by the assorted hangers-on, often more Johnsonian than Johnson himself, who are presuming to lay down the rule that only those who conform with the current political improvisations are altogether respectable and quite loyal.

October 22, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
October 4, 1965]CONGRESS: SOUL SEARCHING IN ORDER
(By Eric Sevareid)

Nothing better illustrates the diminished stature of individual Members of Congress—in terms of its "public image," not its practical accomplishments, the Congress as an institution—than the affair of Senator Fulbright and his negative finding on our Dominican intervention.

On the face of it one should conclude the opposite, that his courageous dissent demonstrates the indispensable importance of the modern Congressman's role and shows us that the institution designed to check and balance, among other functions, still checks and balances in the old style. But, on the contrary, the Fulbright speech was a drama simply because it was unique in this period of consensus and a homogenized Congress.

It was the exception that reveals and illustrates the rule. What was shocking was not his defiance of the President and official policy but the fact that so many people in Congress reacted with shock. Some of them not only repudiated his conclusions about the Dominican affair (this writer also happens to disagree with them) but they seemed to repudiate his right to announce his conclusions.

This is a sign that the soul of Congress is in disrepair and ought to be looked into. The honor and the wisdom of the United States, as well as its might, were deeply involved in the Dominican business. The evidence pro and con has always been considerably confused. Many very good men have reached flatly opposing estimates as to what would have happened in that island had we not intervened.

Of course, ex post facto investigation was not only proper, but necessary if we are to have any regard for keeping the historical record straight and if we are to learn any lessons for the future. The man from Arkansas did what his conscience instructed him to do, and yet other Congressmen reacted as if someone had belched in a prayer meeting.

"Consensus" has its immense practical advantages; it does permit a great leap forward, and, in the end, I imagine the country will be the better for this current period and its product. But a curious kind of intimidation also goes with this consensus and with the presence of an elemental force such as this President happens to be. In Franklin Roosevelt's first term, he too, was something of an elemental force; he, too, was a master politician and manipulator of men's ambitions and fears.

But big men in the Congress still behaved like big men and when one spoke his passionate mind there was neither shock nor the silence of the awed. Big men ran Cabinet departments and agencies then, too, but they frequently fought one another and even their President, and publicly. There was not only passion and courage present but a kind of gaiety; and an awful lot of business got done.

That unique climate may not return to Washington, because America is now a great power, with the heaviness that goes with fateful and grinding responsibilities and because there is nothing gay about the implications of this age, both revolutionary and nuclear. But Washington will change, nevertheless, and the Congress will change with it. It will not proceed, next session, at the frantic pace of this session. It will be too tired, and many second thoughts about its accomplishments, thoughts now dormant, are bound to rise to the top of its mind.

It must find the time and the courage for close examination, not only of administrative legislation, but of its own mechanisms. Unless more of the exterior world blows up next winter, the Congress might

take a long, hard look at a number of traditional institutions to see if they really serve us any longer and how they might be changed. Suggestions from students of government, are piling high; the field is wide open.

Congress might seriously consider, for example, the proposals of Senator WARREN MAGNUSON. He suggests that there be two distinct sessions of Congress each year, one from, say, the start of November to the end of December dealing entirely with Government finances. He suggests that the earlier or legislative session end, perforce, around late summer, the administration's budget having been submitted by mid-July.

As part of the whole package, he would change the Government's fiscal year to coincide with the calendar year, which is, after all, the basis for reporting the Government's income—our taxes—and he would revive the plan to divide the Federal budget in two, the second half of it amounting to a "capital budget," showing the Government's total assets and their current value.

The Federal Government, that is, the people, own tens of billions in land, buildings, minerals, supplies, but the public hasn't the faintest idea what it owns because no accounting of these possessions has ever been made to it.

An immense job lies ahead in adjusting our institutions and our practices to this new, overwhelming, rapidly changing America. The elected term of Members of the House simply must be lengthened. The whole judicial system of the country is staggering and floundering under its burdens and something like an additional system of courts to deal with "administrative laws" in this age of governmental regulations and baffled citizens ought to be seriously considered.

If it is in the present nature of things that the initiative for these great institutional changes must come from the executive branch, so be it—history will probably not object.

[From Newsweek, Oct. 4, 1965]

THE CONTAGION OF HOPE

(By Emmet John Hughes)

As the chorus of voices extolling or ex-coriating U.S. foreign policy has lately swelled, we seek for the sense in the din. The boldest cry has been Senator J. W. Fulbright's lament over U.S. conduct toward the whole social revolution in Latin America: "If we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end by opposing every reform movement." In Washington, Senator THOMAS J. DONN did more than snap back that such logic betrayed "an indiscriminate infatuation with revolution of all kinds"; he slashed at all signs of "conciliationism" in U.S. policy, feverishly comparing sale of wheat to the Soviets in the 1960's to sale of scrap to Japan in the 1930's. In New York, however, U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg has sounded stubbornly "conciliationist" in hailing Soviet-American action on the Kashmir crisis as "a very dramatic example of cooperation . . . without any evidence of cold war confrontation." But back from Washington has come the bellicose cry of more than 300 Congressmen in support of the preposterous Selden resolution—inviting any Western Hemisphere nation to take any military action against any Communist threat.

There is something to be learned from this babble. For quite independently, both Mr. Fulbright and Mr. Goldberg believe they discern three critical facts of world life to which many others seem blind.

1. The central hope and thrust of U.S. policy must be to encourage more confident relations with Moscow and more responsible behavior by Moscow. "Every important U.S. posture in the world today," a U.S. diplomat at the U.N. recently confessed, "has come to

depend on Soviet restraint and reason." To see the force of this truth, one need take only a bleak moment to envision the world of the last year inflamed by a Soviet policy of militant retaliation—pouring massive aid into North Vietnam, answering U.S. action in the Caribbean with Soviet action in Berlin, and rivaling Peiping with slogans and arms to goad Pakistan toward war.

2. Within the highest U.S. councils, however, this political view of relations with world communism suffers almost constant challenge from an essentially military view. In the lament of one high official often taking part in sessions of the National Security Council: "Every time a major policy decision arises, the soldiers outtalk the diplomats. Their targets are precise, their maps beautiful, their confidence complete. And any State Department rebuttal usually flounders in mere reticences or mild reservations." And it is a keen knowledge of this fact that impels men like Fulbright to warn against total faith in military solutions—from the Caribbean to southeast Asia.

3. Just as U.S. diplomacy toward sovereign Communist governments has had to heed differences among them, so U.S. policy—as it contends with upheaval in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—must learn now to distinguish among revolutionary forces even when they may be tinged with Communist influence. In the immediate postwar years, the tough-minded Secretary of State Dean Acheson knew that the United States must recognize and defend many a regime unpalatably rightist and militarist; and he warned U.S. liberals to stop demanding litmus-paper tests on all allies to assure their true-blue devotion to democracy. It took many liberals a while to accept such pragmatism. And it is now the turn of the conservatives to be tutored in the matching truth: If all the world's revolutionary forces are to be condemned unless their political purity is perfect and proven, all these forces finally will be pitted against America.

DEADLY PLAY

Precisely because these new truths jar old premises, a large band of leaders in both parties stoutly ignores them. This band still traffics in the stalest clichés of anti-communism. It regards Soviet-American relations with more horror than hope. And it thus stays a decade behind history in apprehending the still perilous balance of powers on which rests all chance of peace.

The Fulbrights and the Goldbergs nonetheless persist. They are wholly uninterested in the empty wordplay about "soft" and "hard" policies shouted around the Nation; they are fiercely concerned about the life-and-death play between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces surging around the world. They are unafraid of any fitting use of American firepower; they are afraid only of its feckless substitution for American brainpower.

And they doubt—above all—that the course of world politics can be turned by the antiseptic devices of quarantine or embargo or repression. For their sense of reality is wholly different. Their faith is in what Jefferson called "the disease of liberty." It can be spread and caught in improbable places and under intractable tyrannies. And it will require the most patient physicians—quite unafraid to deal, at times, with queer seeds and alien germs—to extend this subtle and splendid contagion.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 26, 1965]

WHY A FOREIGN RELATIONS CHAIRMAN SPEAKS OUT

(NOTE.—Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has been outspoken recently, as always, on American foreign policy, often at variance with

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the expressed or implied views of the Democratic administration. The following is a tape-recorded interview with the Senator by Washington Post Staff Writer Chalmers M. Roberts.)

ROBERTS. Senator, you recently made a speech about American intervention in the Dominican Republic which produced a lot of criticism. Some said your timing was bad. One critic said the speech was "a personal proclamation of a personal foreign policy." An editorial called it a "grossly irresponsible attack on the administration." And it was reported that President Johnson's reaction was that the speech would "embarrass the future course of U.S. diplomacy in the Dominican Republic."

Those are strong words to throw at the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. What do you think of such criticism?

FULBRIGHT. I think it's quite unusual that anyone should question the right and the duty of a Member of the Senate to express his views about an incident of great importance. I have always assumed that a Member of the Senate has the responsibility to tell the truth as he sees it. I don't pretend our judgments are infallible, but it is one of the functions of a Member of the Senate to raise these questions for public discussion, and out of this a sound foreign policy may be developed. If I am wrong, this still would clarify the issues involved in this case.

The purpose of this was not in any way to affect what's happened in the Dominican Republic. Obviously, it's much after the event. Its real purpose was to influence the course of events in future revolutions that are inevitable, I think, in Latin America, because it is in a process of change.

When I use the word revolution, I don't necessarily mean a violent one, but changes in their social structure, and I think the very basis of the Alliance for Progress is an assumption that changes in their social and economic structure are necessary—their land tenure, taxes, and so on. I've been a little surprised that they've questioned the propriety of a Senator speaking out on these matters.

SOME EXTRA STATUS

Question. Senator, I think that the criticism runs not to a Senator speaking out but to you speaking out because you are the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Perhaps it would be useful to discuss that role for a minute. Some names come to mind: Borah, Vandenberg, Connally, George, Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., all had great influence on American foreign policy one way or another.

In each of these cases, the Senator who was the chairman of the committee had some extra status. Now, as America's role in the world has increased, this status has increased. Do you draw any distinction between your right to speak as you just indicated as a Senator, and your role as chairman of this particular committee?

Answer. Well, it's my impression that the men you mention as my predecessors as chairman—take Lodge, for example, or Borah—often spoke out very vigorously in dissent to the current policy of the time; and Vandenberg exercised a great deal of influence, certainly much more than I or any other person recently.

I think there are several reasons for that. One, he individually was a powerful personality. In addition to that, the party division at that time was very close, and Vandenberg, by virtue of that fact, could exercise a decisive influence on the course of events in the Senate. Without his cooperation, the administration would have been in great difficulty, because during the period of his chairmanship his party had numerical control of the Senate and he had a special

position of power. He complained that he wanted to "be in on the takeoffs as well as the crash landings," and he was consulted to a much greater extent than I've ever been consulted in advance of actions taken.

During part of his tenure, at least, he could decisively influence the course of the action of the Senate versus the administration. I cannot do that, because the President at this time is clearly the dominant personality in our Government, and as this session has proved, he can get what he wants out of Congress with or without my support.

But that isn't important in this context. All I was trying to do in this case, as I have in others, was to give the Senate and the country the benefit of my best judgment on a matter of policy. And I also want to say that in this case, as in some of the other cases that have been mentioned, it was after the fact. I had no notice of what was going to happen in the Dominican Republic. The only way I could comment on it was after the fact.

A RARE RAPPROCHEMENT

Question. That's in some contrast to your relationship with President Kennedy before the Bay of Pigs affair, where you were called in and did have a chance to make known your opinion in advance.

Answer. That was a very unusual specific instance in which purely by chance I happened to be invited to go with him on a weekend at Easter. He didn't invite me for that purpose; he happened to be going the same place I was, and he said come along.

Question. You seized on the opportunity.

Answer. I seized upon the opportunity to present him with a memorandum and my advice. He didn't solicit it and didn't expect it, but he got it, and that's the way it developed.

He did call me in. That is almost unique; I think it was the only instance in which, prior to the event, I was thoroughly aware of what was up and had an opportunity to express my opinion.

In contrast, there was the Dominican case. We and other Members of Congress were advised, at about the time the marines were being landed, that they were being landed for the purpose of saving American lives. Now, no one would object to landing some marines to save American lives, assuming, of course, that the conditions were as described.

I've been asked: Why didn't you object then? Why, I didn't know anything about the events that were actually taking place other than what we were told at that meeting. Now we have had this review (of the Dominican case in the Foreign Relations Committee). I don't quite see why it is considered unusual to discuss an event of this significance with a view to influencing the attitude of our policymakers in future events of a similar nature which are very likely to take place.

EXTRA QUARTERBACK?

Question. Let's go back to the original question as to whether there is a special responsibility on the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as distinguished from other Senators. You yourself said on becoming chairman of the committee that "no football team can expect to win with every man his own quarterback. The Foreign Relations Committee is available to advise the President, but his is the primary responsibility." In effect, you've been charged here with being a quarterback, or at least a Monday morning quarterback. Is that a fair criticism?

Answer. Well, I think it's a fair observation. I am not quite prepared to say it is necessarily criticism, because under the circumstances here, I wasn't in on the takeoff, so to speak. I wasn't consulted as to whether or not—certainly with the background material and an opportunity to consider it—whether or not the intervention should take place.

Question. Are you taking the position that as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, you, or whoever else may hold that job, is entitled to speak his mind without reservation after the fact in the sense that you've described it here as long as he has not been in on the takeoff? On the Bay of Pigs affair, where you were in on the takeoff, you were careful or considerably less critical afterward, I think, because of that fact.

Answer. Well, another difference is that in the Bay of Pigs, the matters continued after that to be very critical, and as you know, a further event took place.

Question. The missile crisis?

Answer. Yes. This was still an active matter that was going on. After it was done, I don't know what further I could have said. We were consulted about the missile crisis, that is, the Senate leadership. But there again, when we were consulted, we were brought in about 5 o'clock on the day of the warning given to Khrushchev, and we were told what had been decided. Nothing we or any other Members—the senior Members such as Senator Russell and the leadership on both sides—I don't think anything they could have said at that moment would have changed the course at all.

There is the well-known custom that we are advised of what the administration is going to do. I often get a telephone call after 5 o'clock saying that there will be an announcement at 5:30 that such and such is going to take place. I don't complain about that. It isn't necessary for them to ask my advice unless they think my advice is worth something.

I have volunteered without being invited on two or three cases in the last 8 months on Vietnam. I have done it privately. I've submitted memorandums which I have never made public. But every now and then occasion arises when it seems to me that it develops public discussion and is good for the country to try to understand the points of view. I cannot quite see that under our system it is necessary that we all join in endorsing administration policy in every case.

I may say I don't think I'm the only one that has indulged in the expression of views contrary to whatever administration is in power. Normally, the opposition party in a government will take a lead in this. Under present conditions, the minority party is so much in accord with certain policies of the administration that it does not criticize them.

THE GROWING BRANCH

Question. Is part of this problem the fact that the way foreign policy is developed in the nuclear age, the Senate and the House have less and less power and authority? Could these remarks by yourself and others be almost a declaration of independence, to say that you still have some rights and prerogatives and, by gosh, you want to be heard?

Answer. I think it's inevitable, with the growing complexity of our international relations as influenced by nuclear power, the rapidity of communications and so on, that the Chief Executive will inevitably play an ever-increasing power. I don't think that this is a bad thing as such; I don't think that foreign relations are as well suited for congressional action as domestic matters.

Most of us do not in our everyday experiences have contact with foreign countries and none of us can claim to be real experts in this field. But under the Constitution, we are supposed to advise and consent, and we may from time to time offer suggestions out of our experience for the consideration of the Executive. They don't necessarily—in fact they rarely—seem to take it. But what harm does it do as an educational matter for the American people to discuss?

Question. When you have a strong President, he prefers consent to advice.

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Answer. This relationship is nearly altogether dependent upon the strength of the President. When he is a very strong and a very competent man, as I think we have in the President today, this naturally is going to overshadow the Congress.

Now, there has been complaint on the other hand that Congress hasn't developed any debate, not only on this matter but on other matters, Vietnam and domestic matters; that we are a rubberstamp Congress. Then when I make a speech, my God, it is a terrible thing; you spoke out in a way that was not entirely in accord with the accepted policy, and so you are criticized for starting a debate. I don't think you can have it both ways.

UNREVOLUTIONARY NATION

Question. Senator, I'd like to go back to a statement you made in the Dominican speech, one that kicked up considerable dust. You said, "We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth. We are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth."

The complaint I got on these sentences was that you were handing the opposition, whether they are Communists or nationalists, or just anti-Americans abroad, a handy weapon to beat us over the head by denying what we have already said that we were—not just a Senator denying it, but the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Answer. Well, it so happens I've uttered the sentence before in a little different context, because the nature of our Revolution in 1776, it seems to me, was entirely different from the kinds of revolutions that have been taking place recently. It was a relatively minor change in the social and economic status of the people of the United States. The reason for the Boston Tea Party wasn't the grinding misery of people in utter poverty.

I think because we have been so successful, we are very attached to our rather ancient system. I don't think our inclination is to overchange. You know what happens if someone suggests a change in our Constitution. It is in this sense that I have said that before and I do now.

I think the great merit of our system is that it's adaptable. This is the great merit of our system as opposed to a totalitarian system, that we can make these internal changes within the context of our Constitution, changes that completely alter our domestic scene.

We're more comparable to the Scandinavian countries. We're doing internally very many things they did.

SHAKING US UP

Question. Are you saying that we are a status quo country in relation to the world and we're not adapting ourselves or our minds sufficiently to the kind of revolutionary action that is abroad in the world?

Answer. I think that's right. And a country that's as well off as we are tends to want to rely on established law and to follow conservative principles in that connection, and we are that way, I think.

Question. What you're really trying to do, then, in all these speeches, is to shake up the American mind, is that it?

Answer. Well, I guess, being an old professor, if I perform any function at all, it is trying to make my colleagues in the country think about these matters in the hope that wiser people than myself can improve our policies.

I must say I think that in this foreign field, because of the great success of our own economy, it's very difficult for us to conceive of the conditions in another country, to conceive of the difficulties of changing the existing social and political order there. It is very difficult for Americans, I think, to

put themselves into the position of the ordinary citizens in those countries where the per capita income is \$200 or \$300 a year. It's difficult for us to realize the pressure upon these people to try to improve their lot.

I am very pleased that this country has been able to do what it has done. All I would like to see is that we show a little more appreciation of their problems and try to work with them in a more cooperative spirit rather than assuming an attitude that we know all the answers and that if they'll do as we say, things will be fine.

One example is foreign aid. I've done all I could in the last 2 or 3 years to shift this operation from a bilateral program in which we undertake to direct their activities for improvement. I know our motives are good, we'd like to help them. I think it would be much more effective if we'd do it through a cooperative venture such as the Inter-American Bank in which they play a part.

NOT ALWAYS ANTI

Question. To sum it up then, is what you are really saying that you believe in free speech for Senators, including the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and that you don't intend to be inhibited beyond some reasonable degree by the fact that you may be speaking out against administration policy in this or any other administration?

Answer. I don't always speak out against it. I approve of practically everything this administration has done. In this particular instance, all I said is that I think the judgment, not the motives, may not have been correct, and that when similar occasions arise in the future, I would hope we would be a little bit more careful in the way we intervene our power into the affairs of other countries.

Question. Would you like to be in a little more on the takeoffs as well as the crash landings?

Answer. I don't like to be in the position of begging to be in. If they don't think my views are of any value, I'm certainly not anxious to intervene. I don't think I'm infallible, but that doesn't mean I don't think I have a right to say what I think about the effect of some occurrence. I think it is my duty to do it.

[From the Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 20, 1965]

FULBRIGHT'S SPEECH DRAWS SUPPORT

TO THE EDITOR OF THE GAZETTE:

I agree with Senator FULBRIGHT on the Dominican Republic statement and shall make a few comments.

In Latin America we have a number of military oligarchies that appear to run the Government. They can be called hatchet-men, as they are paid to do the dirty work so as to maintain the status quo. For their work, they are paid a high price, and are blessed. Paid to permit the exploitation of the people and their natural resources by dynasties of the world. Blessed because they control free worship on the part of the people, in the name of God to stop communism.

The power structures are the dynasties that move into any country, and take over that something of value, by any method to attain that end. They install the military and use the church. When the people rise up, the military and church go down, but the real power structure slips away to await another day.

We must help other countries to have constitutional governments, that will protect the people from exploitation by any robber barons from any dynasties. To get rid of slums, we must name the slum landlords. To get rid of causes of trouble in Latin America, let us give family names to the dynasties, and not call them corporations. Our

boys must not die for an elite, or a Mr. Morgan, so that they may get more on top of more.

HOT SPRINGS.

UNCLE ARNOLD.

LATIN AMERICA

TO THE EDITOR OF THE GAZETTE:

A great deal is being said about Senator FULBRIGHT's recent speech in the U.S. Senate labeling U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic as a major blunder. Mr. FULBRIGHT says that our recent action there has provoked the resentment of the Latin American Republics and has in the long run helped the Communists. There is no doubt that the Communists will take advantage of any resentment to further their own objectives. They like to fish in troubled waters. Our intervention may have chilled the cordial relationships between the United States and the Latin American countries. Surely it has not helped the Alliance for Progress program so eloquently proclaimed by the late President Kennedy and later endorsed by President Johnson. Money is not enough. There must also be international goodwill and understanding.

It would have been better if the United States had worked on this thing in conjunction with the Organization of American States. It seems that the OAS was ignored. And this is not good for us. As the Senator says we should encourage them to build their own bridges to other nations. We will make a mistake if we try to do it for them. They are now grown nations with some social and political maturity and naturally will resent a paternalistic overlordship from the United States. We resented it in 1776. The American Revolution is still one of the great revolutions in world history.

Again we cannot ignore the Monroe Doctrine. Its enforcement should be multilateral and not unilateral. All the nations of the Western Hemisphere have a vital part in the enforcement of it. In fact the time is past when we can do or attempt to do it alone. The Senator may have sensed something that the masses of the people have not as yet sensed.

We still have good people who see a Communist under every bed and a Negro in every parlor or living room. Often we get scared when we should do some reflective thinking. We will recall that Hitler also fought communism with all the power at his command. Yet he killed some 6 million people in gas chambers and concentration camps.

H. W. JINSKE.

HOT SPRINGS.

[From the Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 20, 1965]

A PHYSICIST ON DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND FULBRIGHT

TO THE EDITOR OF THE GAZETTE:

Senator FULBRIGHT is to be complimented on his Senate speech concerning our policy in the Dominican Republic. Arkansas is fortunate to have in Senator FULBRIGHT a man who is able to think independently, to arrive at well-considered conclusions in a cogent manner.

As a physicist, I feel a special responsibility toward the strengthening of world understanding and the consequent preservation of world peace. As the creators of the instruments of war, scientists have a special responsibility to see that war does not occur. Senator FULBRIGHT's policy of "building bridges" between the societies of the world is the only one which can lead to a stable peace. Our present unstable peace, if one could call it peace, is analogous to the unstable equilibrium of a ball balanced on the top of a mountain. The ball is balanced now, but just be careful not to give it a push. A stable peace would be based on understanding

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and world law, rather than on the present balance of terror.

When we build factories in Eastern Europe, when we trade with Russia, when we rely on the U.N. (as in the Kashmir fighting), we are building bridges. I feel that recognition of Red China and admission of Red China to the U.N. are bridges long overdue. The Government of Red China has been viable for nearly 20 years, shows no indication of losing its grip, and is at least as legitimate as most of the governments of the world. To refuse to be on speaking terms with Red China because we do not like her seems unrealistic, to say the least.

The world has lived on the brink of destruction for the past two decades. With each passing year, as the weapons become more monstrous and the stockpiles grow and more nations acquire the capability of destroying civilization, we move closer to the edge of the precipice. No one can say how long we will survive in our present predicament. We can only say that if a solution is not found, the end will eventually come. The balance of terror cannot be maintained forever. The solution lies in the building of bridges: bridges from man to man, and bridges from nation to nation. When our country violates the OAS treaty and imposes her own will (rather than that of the U.N. or of the OAS) on the Dominican Republic, we are tearing down the bridges which mankind so badly needs in this nuclear age.

ARTHUR HOBSON.

FAYETTEVILLE.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 20, 1965]
FULBRIGHT AND OTHERS

Sir: The quick castigation of Senator Fulbright by some of his colleagues is sad, although certainly not unexpected in the light of his sharply critical speech on our Dominican actions. Senator Dodd's attempted rebuttal deserves comment, for it so perfectly reveals the implied, but rarely revealed bias at the root of too many of our foreign policy decisions.

There is fundamentally a fanatic demand for orderly, agreeable and, above all, noiseless governments, whatever the cost. The cost becomes, in practical terms, easy acceptance of very conservative regimes with often dominant military elements, repression of civil liberties and disregard or, at best, token concessions toward land reforms and other basic socioeconomic improvements.

Democracy, especially the forms it is likely to take in emergent nations, lacking a long tradition of self-government, is probably inefficient and even chaotic in comparison to the traditional rigid oligarchy. But in this regard, it is edifying to think of Senator Dodd's charge when, as a foreign observer of some years ago, he saw that upstart frontiersman Andrew Jackson and his crude followers replacing the tried-and-true old guard. Still further, we can rejoice today that no paternalistic guardian of world peace stepped in with a few thousand troops to replace that weak agrarian social reformer A. Lincoln, obviously unable to maintain order in his own country, torn by internal revolution.

One characteristic of any mature nation is the ability freely to air differences of opinion and to admit and learn from mistakes, no matter how embarrassing. We, as a Nation, must soon emerge from an over-long adolescence in matters of foreign policy. We need to hear from Senator Fulbright, and many more like him.

M. J. BRODIE.

BALTIMORE.

[From the Akron (Ohio) Beacon Journal, Sept. 26, 1965]

THE FULBRIGHT FUROR—HE CHAIRS GROUP DEEPLY DIVIDED AND LOSING PRESTIGE

(By Lee Winfrey)

WASHINGTON.—On the wall of the office of J. W. Fulbright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hang six pictures of Fulbright with the President of the United States.

One shows the Arkansas Senator sitting on a couch in the oval office of the White House, legs crossed, glasses perched down low on his nose, forehead furrowed skeptically. Before him sits Lyndon B. Johnson, who has autographed the picture and added this note: "Bill—I can see I haven't been very persuasive."

On the issue of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, JAMES WILLIAM FULBRIGHT is indeed unpersuaded. In a 9,500-word Senate speech on September 15, he called the intervention "a grievous mistake."

Several of his colleagues quickly agreed that a mistake had been made, but that the mistake was Fulbright's. Senator THOMAS J. DODD led the criticism, charging that Fulbright "suffers from an indiscriminating infatuation with revolutions of all kinds."

FULBRIGHT has been under sharp attack before, notably for a speech on March 25, 1964, entitled "Old Myths and New Realities." Now he himself faces a new reality: He is not only being criticized personally, as in the past, but for his direction of the Foreign Relations Committee as well.

In his private office, where an American flag and an unabridged dictionary share the place of honor directly behind his chair, the scholarly Fulbright defends firmly his right to criticize administration policy in Santo Domingo.

"I think he (Johnson) is a political genius but that doesn't mean he's infallible—or that he hasn't made a mistake in this instance that won't be detrimental to his own long-term foreign policy interests. I think it will be (det)imental."

"I think there are people in the administration who think it was a mistake," he adds, "but they can't speak out. A Senator can. I think it's not only a Senator's right, but his duty, to speak out in a case where a serious mistake has been made."

FULBRIGHT traces the current furor, which he admits is "a little more stridently critical" than he anticipated, back to an old enemy of his, the late Senator Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin.

"Since the days of McCarthy," he says in his soft Ozark drawl, "discussion of anything around here that involves communism has been pretty heated."

FULBRIGHT's credentials as an intellectual (Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, president of the University of Arkansas at the age of 34) are widely honored. They do not shield him, however, from current charges that the Foreign Relations Committee is suffering under his leadership.

Among the 16 standing committees of the Senate, Foreign Relations has long ranked first in prestige. HUBERT HUMPHREY and the late John F. Kennedy are among its alumni. Its current roster includes both Majority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD and Majority Whip RUSSELL LONG, the two most powerful Democrats in the Senate.

But in a viewpoint recently put into print by Syndicated Columnist William S. White: "The old congressional citadel of power and prestige in foreign policy, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has fallen upon the poorest days it has known in many decades."

White advanced one major reason: FULBRIGHT's alleged inability to keep the committee "on the track." There are, however, at least five things troubling the committee at present.

Unwieldy size—from 13 members in 1947, the committee has grown to 19 as more Senators sought the prestige that attached to a seat there. This leaves less time for each member to question witnesses and advance his views.

Chronic absenteeism. DODD, for example, attended only 1 of the 13 hearings concerning the Dominican Republic. Often FULBRIGHT and the ranking Republican, BOUVERIE B. HICKENLOOPER, are the only members at a hearing.

Six members, including FULBRIGHT and LONG, are also on the powerful Finance Committee. FULBRIGHT practically never goes to Finance. The other five regularly attend Finance and seldom come to Foreign Relations.

Ideological differences. On most issues involving communism (and most foreign policy questions do), the committee is severely split into at least three camps.

There are the "doves," led by FULBRIGHT, generally followed by Democrats JOSEPH CLARK, WAYNE MORSE, FRANK CHURCH, CLAIRBORNE PELL, and surprisingly to some, Republican KARL MUNDT, of South Dakota. LONG joined them in opposition to FULBRIGHT on Santo Domingo.

There are the "hawks"—DODD, Democrat FRANK LAUSCHE, of Ohio, and Republican KARL MUNDT, of South Dakota. LONG joined them in opposition to FULBRIGHT on Santo Domingo.

In between are the moderates, notably MANSFIELD, JOHN SPARKMAN, and STUART SYMINGTON.

FULBRIGHT's methods as chairman, which differ substantially from those of his predecessors.

The great chairmen of the last 20 years—Democrats Walter George of Georgia and Tom Connally of Texas, Republican Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan—sought a broad consensus, rounding off the corners of individual views in order to arrive at general agreement.

FULBRIGHT, since becoming chairman in 1959, has been much more inclined to advance his own views early and often. A watered-down consensus, diluting or omitting major points at issue, is not his cup of tea.

The maverick manner of two Democrats at opposite political poles, LAUSCHE and MORSE.

Both MORSE and LAUSCHE are contentious men. They will badger witnesses they do not like and do not hesitate to consume a full hour or two advancing their views. They bore or irritate several of their colleagues who walk out or prefer not to attend their diatribes.

Summing up the current situation, Columnist Marquis Childs wrote recently:

"What was once a committee assignment pursued by Senators seeking prestige and influence has fallen to such a low state that recently Senator GEORGE SMATHERS, who has a sensitive nose for where power resides, gave up a seat on Foreign Relations."

SMATHERS' departure for a seat on the Judiciary Committee was unprecedented. Diplomatically, SMATHERS gives as his reason:

"The problems (in foreign relations) are so big and all-encompassing that in the final analysis you can do nothing about them. I preferred to go to Judiciary because there the problems are specific and you can hammer at them and work out some solution."

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Ideological differences probably played a part, however. SMATHERS was the second Senator on his feet (LONG was the first) to defend the administration following FULBRIGHT's lengthy Dominican speech.

Regarding the split in his committee, FULBRIGHT admitted in his characteristically mild tone of voice that "The committee is deeply divided on any matter involving our dealings with the Communist world."

He added that he is "hopeful that the differences will be ameliorated." But his tone carried little conviction and other observers see little prospect for any great improvement.

For between FULBRIGHT and the DODD-LAUSCHE-MUNDT wing of his committee yawns an awesome gulf. Involved are two entirely different ways of looking at the contemporary world.

In the view of DODD and LAUSCHE and MUNDT, the United States at war with communism, with all kinds of communism. As a practical matter, they see little difference between the Russian, Chinese, Cuban, or Yugoslavian brands.

This is a viewpoint shared by millions of Americans, but it is not the viewpoint of FULBRIGHT. He would like to build "bridges of accommodation" to the Communist world, to "take the heat out of the cold war."

In his "myths and realities" speech, he proposed the possibility of Russia joining with the United States in building a new Panama Canal. He is encouraged by the fact that Senate opposition to selling wheat to Russia is much less than it was 2 years ago.

Behind this attitude lies another controlling idea of FULBRIGHT's. The belief that the United States is spending too much on munitions and the space race, and not enough on domestic improvements, notably on education.

Now 60, a Senator for precisely one-third of his life, FULBRIGHT has the appearance of a man several years younger. He exercises regularly, shuns the cocktail circuit, and seems to bear up well under the controversy aroused by his lengthy, closely reasoned speeches.

In an era of consensus politics, he remains the unpersuaded one.

UNFAVORABLE COMMENTS

[From the Chicago Tribune, Sept. 17, 1965]

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S WAVE OF THE FUTURE

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT was in his accustomed character when he moaned in a Senate speech that American intervention in the Dominican Republic rebellion was all wrong. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee contended that in Latin America "the movement of the future * * * is social revolution," and that if we "oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement."

Mr. FULBRIGHT went so far as to say that, we had intervened "forcibly and illegally against a revolution," which is equivalent to saying that revolutions, even those which are Communist-dominated, are legitimate, while to oppose them is illegal and illegitimate.

Senator THOMAS DODD appropriately remarked that FULBRIGHT "suffers from an indiscriminating infatuation with revolutions of all kinds, national, democratic, or Communist." DODD observed that FULBRIGHT never expressed any concern about the establishment of Castro's Communist regime in Cuba, or about the Communist campaign of terror and subversion throughout Latin America. He failed to mention that FULBRIGHT also opposes American intervention against the Communists in Vietnam.

FULBRIGHT complained that the United States decided that the Dominican rebellion "should not be allowed to succeed." He added that "any reform movement is likely to

attract Communist support," and, while conceding that "it cannot be proven that the Communists would not have taken over the revolution," said it was equally impossible to prove that they would.

In such circumstances—revolutions in which Communists figure—FULBRIGHT is perfectly willing to split the difference. For the sake of "reform" and "social revolution," he will chance a Communist takeover any old day. This is open-mindedness on the scale of a wind tunnel.

FULBRIGHT, in fact, fears the Communists much less than he fears an American association with "reactionary oligarchies." His expressed sympathies are with what he calls "the popular noncommunist left." The villains in his set piece presumably are the Latin American military, who are conservative and anti-Communist, just as the villains on the domestic scene are American military officers, who were the subjects of the celebrated "Fulbright memorandum," charging that they were too anti-Communist and thus enemies of all social welfare and "reform." Ever since this screed in 1961, American officers have been effectively gagged.

It is hardly necessary to say Senator FULBRIGHT is wrong. He is always wrong; there is no news in that. The administration was not wrong in sending troops into the Dominican Republic. It was not wrong in perceiving the threat of a Communist takeover and of another Cuba. But where it was wrong—and this FULBRIGHT never even touched upon—was that it failed to carry thru. It kept its troops under wraps and refused to dislodge and disarm the Communists, and to end the Communist threat. It left the rebels armed and intact. It appeased them. It kidnapped and hustled out of the country the strongest anti-Communist Dominican military officer, Gen. Wessin y Wessin. Now it is expelling all the military men who are close to him.

In his preoccupation with the nobility of left-wing revolutions, FULBRIGHT is blind to the real failures of administration policy, which are founded on irresolution, an exaggerated respect for "world opinion," and a distrust of the "military mind." The results are a tendency to shrink from unambiguous action resolutely carried out and to indulge, instead, in fatal pullbacks, from the Bay of Pigs to Santo Domingo.

[For an eloquent statement of the magnitude of America's default, read the tragic letter of Gen. Wessin in the Voice of the People today. This is the first time that this document has been printed anywhere in full.]

[From the Evening Star, Sept. 17, 1965]

THE TWO FULBRIGHTS

Senator FULBRIGHT's speech denouncing our intervention in the Dominican Republic last April is a remarkable exercise in second-guessing. And even some of the second guesses are wrong.

One might almost think that this speech was delivered by two men.

The first Senator FULBRIGHT engaged in a grossly irresponsible attack on the administration. True, most of this is done through the process of insinuation and suggestion. It "appears" that this was the case. If something else had been done a different result "might possibly" have emerged. That sort of thing.

FULBRIGHT seeks to excuse the President from any responsibility for what he regards as an unwarranted and illegal intervention. Mr. Johnson is made to look like a well-intentioned but bumbling dupe who was deceived by his subordinates. The integrity of W. Tapley Bennett, our ambassador in Santo Domingo, is brought directly into question. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said "there is no doubt that the threat of communism rather than danger of American lives was his (Ben-

nett's) primary or sole reason for recommending military intervention."

This, of course, does not jibe with what Bennett, crouching under his desk while bullets whistled through his office, said when he called the White House on April 28. The burden of his message was that troops were urgently needed to protect American lives, not to mention the lives of thousands of other innocent by-standers. Perhaps Senator FULBRIGHT might take a different view now had he been under the desk with the ambassador.

Finally, FULBRIGHT said "we cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy (in Latin America) and at the same time align ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies; yet that is what we seem to be trying to do."

The first half of the sentence just quoted is, of course, correct; the last half is not. All over Latin America, where progressive forces can be found, we have supported them: Frei in Chile, Betancourt in Venezuela, Figueres in Costa Rica, Belaunde in Peru—to name a few. The tragedy in the Dominican Republic is that no such democratic figures have emerged.

The second Senator FULBRIGHT concedes this on page 15 of the lengthy speech. There, he said he is "sure, as I know President Johnson and, indeed, most U.S. citizens are sure, that our country is not now and will not become the enemy of social revolution in Latin America."

But the damage had been done in the preceding 14 pages. Every two-bit Communist propaganda artist will pounce upon those sections of the speech in which the Senator cast doubt on our motives and intentions. The brief and belated disclaimer will receive little if any attention.

There is nothing to be gained by debating the question of whether, at the time of our intervention, the revolution had been taken over by the Communists or was in serious danger of being taken over. For it is obvious that the Senator, while expressing skepticism, doesn't know and doesn't pretend to know. A few things, however, are worth mentioning. He ignored the report of the five-member OAS Committee which conducted an investigation on the scene. The burden of its report was that the Communist threat was real. He mentioned the failure of the mission of John Bartlow Martin, who was sent to Santo Domingo by the President. It was left to Senator DODD to report that Martin, an admirer of Juan Bosch and our Ambassador to the Dominican Republic while Bosch was in office, left Washington believing that we had done the wrong thing. It was also left to Senator DODD to reveal that he had been told on reliable authority that Martin changed his mind 48 hours after arriving in Santo Domingo because he realized that the Communists at least exercised an exceedingly dangerous degree of control.

Senator FULBRIGHT wrung his hand because we were not enthusiastic about the possible return of Bosch to his country. But he conceded that Bosch apparently was not eager to return—"that he vacillated in the very early stages and some well-informed persons contend that he positively refused to return."

The most that Senator FULBRIGHT will grant is that we might have been morally though perhaps not legally justified in landing a few marines to take out American civilians. Beyond this, he would have let the fighting—and communism—run its course. Nothing that he said indicates the slightest concern over the danger that we might have found ourselves with a second Cuba on our hands in the Caribbean.

For our part, we think that the President was not bamboozled by his subordinates and that he was fully justified in doing what he did. American lives were in danger and the Communist threat was real. It was neces-

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sary to intervene and it was essential to use enough force to achieve our objectives. One of the most important of those objectives was to prepare the way for a return to democratic government in the Dominican Republic. It looks as though we are now in the process of attaining this objective, and even Senator FULBRIGHT concedes that this is so.

[St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Sept. 20, 1965]
FULBRIGHT'S BLIND BIAS

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, has once more attempted to divide Americans on foreign policy as he lashed out at United States intervention in Santo Domingo, calling it a "grievous" mistake.

He is, as usual, dead wrong. But he also does great harm to the Nation's cause because of his imposing title as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

FULBRIGHT contends that the President's decision to send troops into Santo Domingo was based upon exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement and from a panicky fear that the Dominican Republic was about to become another Cuba.

The fuzzy-liberal Senator conspicuously omitted reference to the May 7 Organization of American States report which said that the Communists were in control of the revolution and that the United States had taken the only course it could have taken.

He also presumes to know more than our on-the-spot representatives—who were being shot at and who gave an hourly account of their estimates that the Reds were gaining control.

His attack on U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, W. Tapley Bennett, appears a thinly disguised attempt to "get" Bennett who was instrumental in bringing about strong U.S. response to the threatened Red takeover.

FULBRIGHT does further disservice by attempting to disprove the contention that United States troops weren't sent in to protect American lives.

American lives quitted obviously were in danger. Bullets whistled through the Embassy windows in Santo Domingo as rebels and loyalists fought pitched battles in the populous city.

The Arkansas Senator seems contemptuous of our Government would be fearful of another Cuba, claiming Washington "overreacted."

It is precisely the sort of gullible FULBRIGHT frame of mind that made the Castro takeover of Cuba possible. Our State Department saw no Communists at all until it was far, far too late.

The Wellands in State, according to testimony in the Senate, had reports of Castro's affiliations with the Reds and of his ties with communism, but this information mysteriously never reached top levels of Government.

Senator THOMAS J. DONN, of Connecticut, quite rightly has called this slanted FULBRIGHT report "tendentious;" it ignored massive evidence of Communist involvement in the revolt.

And once again the GOP leadership properly backed the President against FULBRIGHT, agreeing the Chief Executive had no other course but to act as he did.

If there has been a "grievous" mistake, it was committed by Senator FULBRIGHT, not the President.

[From the Washington Daily News,
Sept. 16, 1965]

FULBRIGHT'S EXPOSTULATION

Senator FULBRIGHT, for reasons probably only he would understand, has gone out of his way at a critical moment to undermine his Government's effort—and the efforts of the Organization of American States—to produce peace and stability in the Dominican Republic.

In a gratuitous speech on the Senate floor, he practically has condemned everything the United States (and by implication the OAS) did and did not do in trying to stop the fighting and set up some type of stable administration in the island nation.

When President Johnson sent troops, the Senator, alleged, rescuing Americans in the country, was more a pretext than a reason. The real reason, he claimed, was an exaggerated estimate of Communist influence on the rebel side of the civil war.

It is obvious the Senator was not one of the hundreds of Americans in the country, many of whom believe if it had not been for our forces their lives would have been lost. And the fact is that Communist influence on the so-called "rebel" side, and Communist activity in the midst of the bloodshed, turned out to be more significant than was apparent at first.

Mr. FULBRIGHT manages to confuse Communist terrorism and agitation in Latin American countries with "reform movements" as though they all were of a package.

He accuses the Johnson administration of "timidity" at the outset of the fighting and of "over reaction" after that. By the Senator's outline, the "timidity" covered a 3-day period from April 25 to April 28, the day President Johnson sent the troops.

The Senator has had the advantage of nearly 6 months of hindsight to prepare this latest remonstrance. And he unloads this masterpiece of fuzziness right at the moment the patiently created provisional government of the Dominican Republic is painfully trying to get off the ground.

[From the Sun-Sentinel, Sept. 17, 1965]

FULBRIGHT DISCLOSES MORE ADDLED THOUGHT

Charges by Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, of Arkansas, that the United States has an exaggerated fear of Communists in foreign uprisings—and that Marines were sent into the Dominican Republic predicated on this fear rather than for saving American lives—reveals once more the addled thinking which exists at a high level.

To begin with, are not the two analogous? If the advance of communism in any sphere is not a definite threat to Americans and the lives of other freedom-seeking people, then we have allowed our thinking to travel a fantastic circuitous path in recent years.

Perhaps Senator FULBRIGHT will see fit to enlighten his colleagues, and the American people, as to which recent foreign uprisings did not have their roots, and/or support, in international communism.

And he may be able to further enlighten us as to the reason so many Americans have died in the midst of many of these uprisings.

In the Congo, for example, slaughter was rampant and there could certainly have been no doubt as to the source of aid and comfort to those perpetrating the atrocities. And does the honorable gentleman really believe that Communist encouragement in Vietnam, Pakistan, Cuba, and Korea has been passive and without danger?

It is our opinion that Senator FULBRIGHT missed a very significant effect of the Marine landings in the Dominican Republic. This is affirmed by his assertion, as reported, that "United States policy was marred by lack of candor and by misinformation." He went on to call reports of massacres and atrocities by the rebels as "wildly exaggerated."

Apparently misled by the Senator, was the wholehearted endorsement given the President's intervention action by the American public. There was certainly little doubt in anyone's mind that American lives were in danger. Had only one life been in jeopardy, the people of this land would have rejoiced to see, at long last, a firm and positive move by this great Nation which has achieved an unenviable record of ignoring its citizens abroad.

Along with the saving of lives, and this was omitted by the Senator in his remarks, was a commitment to protect American property.

The staggering economic loss to Fidel Castro of U.S. investments and developments in Cuba is not easily forgotten. Without these facilities, it is highly probable we would not have endured the embarrassment of a full-fledged Communist operation at our doorstep.

The chairman of the powerful and influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee infers that we used protection of lives as an excuse for intervention. By this inference, he does not say we should have gone in to settle matters, but under colors of our stand against communism. He rather takes a position in opposition to being there at all.

We hold that Senator FULBRIGHT would be shaken to his grassroots, if he would bother to get out and check them, by the sheer disbelief among the citizens at such weakness as his public skepticism reveals in high office.

Once American lives were relatively secure, the public inclination was to urge a clean sweep of potential subversion in the Dominican.

It was accepted fact, based on experience, that "Big Daddy" would foot the bills for whoever came out on top. The hope was obvious that every effort would be made to assure a non-Communist, non-anti-American and sufficiently stable government.

A lot of this hope went glimmering when McGeorge Bundy got into the act. The OAS came into the picture and we relinquished our chance to obtain the guarantees we sought. Where was the voice of righteous indignation at this time?

To appreciate U.S. interest properly in the Dominican Republic, it might be well to review history. In 1869, President Grant and President Baez signed a treaty for the annexation of the Republic of Santo Domingo to the United States. Dominicans approved this treaty, but it was not ratified by the U.S. Senate.

In 1905, the United States assumed management of the Dominican debt and collection of customs. In 1916, unrest and instability brought on U.S. military intervention which lasted until 1924. Since that time, most of the Dominican economy has been closely tied to American support.

We have not yet had adequate time to assess the situation surrounding Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin. Whether he is as pro-American as he is anti-Communist may be significant.

It has appeared recently that among other peculiar vacillations, the State Department accepts the premise that support of an openly pro-American personality may offend other nations to the point they will say nasty things or even object.

Our bright-eyed and bungling appeasers are engaged in some sort of underhanded flinching to control the General's status and activities in this country. We detect the inkling of fear that Castro may be irritated if he is permitted to roam free among the avid and homesick Cuban refugees in south Florida. We suggest that fear is well founded, and should be fully exploited, not assuaged.

We see at hand a golden opportunity, FULBRIGHT's, Bundy's, and indistinguishable-shadow policymakers not withstanding, to strike a blow for freedom rather than gird against antifreedom.

Peace may be bought. Freedom must be earned. We have spent enough. Let's go to work.

BUDD W. BOYER.

[From the Elkhart (Ind.) Truth, Sept. 17, 1965]

UNTIMELY CRITICISM BY FULBRIGHT

Poor judgment and poor timing were shown Wednesday by Senator WILLIAM J.

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FULBRIGHT in his criticism of the Johnson administration for intervening in the Dominican Republic last April.

FULBRIGHT put it like this:

"The issue is not whether there was Communist influence in the Dominican revolution but its degree, which is something on which reasonable men can differ.

"The burden of the proof, however, is on those who take action, and the administration has not proven its assertion of Communist control."

One Washington correspondent says that no top official in our Government's executive branch, including those responsible for intelligence, has faltered in the judgment that a Communist takeover would have resulted if the United States had not intervened in the Caribbean Island.

Senator FULBRIGHT obviously is entitled to disagree with that if he chooses. But he himself admits he now is talking from the benefit of hindsight.

When President Johnson decided to use troops, FULBRIGHT was among congressional leaders whom L.B.J. called in to explain his actions.

Senator RUSSELL LONG, Democrat, of Louisiana, says that nobody, including Senator FULBRIGHT, then raised a dissenting voice.

Senator FULBRIGHT now tries to affix the blame to the President's advisers, not to Mr. Johnson himself. But the distinction is academic, for the reasons L.B.J. gave were precisely those which FULBRIGHT attacked most vigorously.

The bitter fact is that the White House was getting some mighty bum advice about Cuba when Castro was struggling to take over there, and after the Castro takeover, too.

If the White House years ago had been enabled to see Castro in his true Marxist light, the Cuban tragedy could have been prevented.

President Johnson obviously wasn't about to repeat the Cuban mistake in the Dominican Republic. He dared not take the chance of another Communist bastion so close to our shores.

After all, it doesn't take very many Reds to seize a country that is in utter chaos.

We doubt that FULBRIGHT's criticism will alter many American views. Unfortunately, he has spoken just after the recent trip to seven Latin countries by Jack Hood Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of State, who has been trying to convince his hosts that President Johnson is deeply concerned with their well-being.

The Fulbright speech illustrates U.S. free speech. But it is hardly calculated to allay age-old suspicions by Latin people that the United States interferes unduly in their affairs.

[From the Syracuse (N.Y.) Post-Standard, Sept. 17, 1965]

FULBRIGHT OFF BASE

In a Senate speech, Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, blasts American policy in the Dominican crisis, suggesting that President Johnson acted on "faulty advice" in sending U.S. troops to prevent Communist seizure of the Government.

A small force would have been enough, and should have been promptly withdrawn later after Americans had been evacuated, says FULBRIGHT. Massive intervention promotes communism in Latin America in the long run, he adds, and the United States is guilty of overaction.

The Senator from Arkansas makes strange comments at times on U.S. policy and these views are no exception.

The Dominican action was fully justified. Communists were about to take over and latest developments indicated they may still do so. But instead of blasting recent United States and Organization of American States

maneuvers, FULBRIGHT hashes up events long past and ignores present realities.

U.S. troops went into Santo Domingo to prevent Communist-infiltrated rebels under Col. Francisco Camaño Deno from seizing power. But now, under Hector Garcia-Godoy, Dominican provisional President set up by the United States and Organization of American States, anti-Communist Gen. Wessin y Wessin has been deported to appease the rebels.

The deportation is supposed to induce the rebels to give up their arms. But indications are that Garcia-Godoy will give the rebels a free rein. He served, incidentally, under Juan Bosch, who now seeks a return to the presidency with support of a Communist-dominated front. Bosch permitted Communists to hold high positions in his government.

Garcia-Godoy is suggesting that the role of the OAS peace force be "redefined," which is a polite way of saying U.S. troops should get out.

American forces not only should have been sent in in the beginning; they should stay there until we are sure—if ever—that the Dominican Republic won't become another Cuba. The job is far from done.

[From the Garden City (N.Y.) Newsday, Sept. 17, 1965]

HOW SOUND ARE SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S CONCLUSIONS?

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a charming, erudite, former college president with a deep feeling for people as individuals that is not always matched by his understanding of international realities. This was evidenced in March 1964, when he described Fidel Castro as a nuisance instead of a danger. He has compounded this misconception in a statement attacking the policy of the United States in the continuing Dominican crisis.

More in sorrow than in anger, Senator FULBRIGHT has described our actions in the Dominican Republic as both wrong and harmful. He argues we intervened on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement; that we attempted to influence the course the revolution took; and that we overlooked or ignored "the fact that any reform movement is likely to attract Communist support."

For whom does Senator FULBRIGHT speak? Not for his committee. That body of Senators, after protracted hearings behind closed doors, was unable even to agree upon a report about the merits or demerits of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. He speaks, therefore, for himself alone, and in contradiction to President Johnson. The President based his decision to intervene upon evidence gathered by experts who justly feared a Communist takeover. Among them was a Stevenson liberal, John Bartlow Martin, former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic.

Senator FULBRIGHT has had only the most limited personal experience with Latin America and its problems, but he speaks as if his experience were limitless. His philosophy is that revolutions, in Latin America, are social matters based upon a deep desire for more liberty. In fact they are almost invariably revolutions of the empty belly, based upon the desire of the starving to enjoy a better share of worldly goods. These people become easy victims of the Communists.

Judging from his statement, Senator FULBRIGHT is willing to take the risk of Communist leadership of revolutions over that of the more moderate parties such as the one led by President Frei in Chile. That is putting one's head in the tiger's mouth.

Soft counsel by wishful thinkers led this country to accept Fidel Castro as a great liberal reformer who turned out, in the end, to be a police-state butcher. Make no mistake. In Latin America, communism is being actively encouraged from outside—by Cuba, by Russia, and by China.

It is unfortunate that a man of standing and reputation should lend himself to statements that simply encourage the trouble-makers. He has done his country a disservice.

[From the Pine Bluff (Ark.) Commercial, Sept. 26, 1965]

THE SENATOR AND STRATEGY

By this time, both the House of Representatives and Arkansas' J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT have voiced their opinions on American foreign policy in Latin America. It can be assumed that the House voiced its collective opinion—in a brief resolution—precisely because Senator FULBRIGHT had voiced his earlier—in a protracted speech. The difference between the two turns out to be so much whether the United States should intervene in Latin American affairs but on whose side.

The Representatives (or at least the 312 out of 364 who voted) went on record in favor of the United States using force to prevent Communists from seizing any nation in the Western Hemisphere. Senator FULBRIGHT argued that the United States should support social revolution in Latin America and risk the growth of Communist power rather than side with doomed dictators and assure it.

It would be a costly mistake if American foreign policy failed to differentiate between one anti-Communist and another, between a hated dictator like Rafael Trujillo late of the Dominican Republic and a popular democrat like Eduardo Frei in Chile. RUSSELL LONG illustrated the prevalence of this common failure to make distinctions when, only minutes after Senator FULBRIGHT had concluded his lengthy analysis, Senator LONG rose to explain why the United States did not prevent a military junta from overthrowing the elected government of the Dominican Republic 2 years ago: "It was a fight between one crowd of anti-Communists and another crowd. I do not believe that we would have had any right to go in there."

At the time, the Kennedy administration did not equate the two crowds the way Senator LONG does now. There was the traditional display of naval power off the Dominican coast, and the United States did not recognize the military government for 8 months, though it did not intervene in force. Under the military government, the Communists grew so powerful that an American administration felt it had to intervene in strength within 2 years. The administration's own reasons for intervention—to prevent a Communist takeover—supports Senator FULBRIGHT's thesis about the folly of entrusting anticommunism to Latin American dictators.

"The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution," Senator FULBRIGHT told his colleagues last week. And he said the United States must side with it, despite its Communist hangers-on, in order to win. Or as the Senator expressed it in his speech:

"Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

Our quarrel with this strategy is not that Senator FULBRIGHT makes distinctions between political forces in Latin America but that he does not make enough of them. The

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United States would not be making prudent distinctions if it supported just about every social revolution in Latin America. The leaders of the United States are obliged to recognize not only the Trujillos and Freis of this hemisphere, but the Castros as well. That such differences are not easy to spot does not make them any the less real—or less dangerous.

What differentiates a democratic social revolution from a totalitarian one? Primarily it is a respect for democratic procedures. Democracy is as much method as ideology. The spirit of liberty, said Learned Hand, is the spirit that is not sure it is right. So it allows free speech and free press and free elections. Those are some of the indications of a democratic social revolution.

When Fidel Castro appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as the leader of a victorious social revolution, someone asked him when he intended to have free elections. "There is no use in having elections," he replied, "because I will be elected over and over again." That should have alerted Americans to the difference between Senores Frei and Castro. In short, Fidel Castro does not have the requisite respect for democratic procedures.

Yet Senator FULBRIGHT doubts if that criterion always applies to a social revolution. Last March, he told the Senate:

"I . . . suggest that violent social revolutions are a possibility in countries where feudal oligarchies resist all meaningful change by peaceful means. We must not, in our preference for the democratic procedures . . . close our minds to the possibility that democratic procedures may fail in certain countries and that, where democracy does fall violent social convulsions may occur."

Mr. FULBRIGHT was more specific in his speech of September 15:

"I think that in the case of the Dominican Republic we did close our minds to the causes and to the essential legitimacy of revolution in a country in which democratic procedures had failed. That, I think, is the central fact concerning the participation of the United States in the Dominican revolution and, possibly as well, its major lesson for the future."

Procedure is a definitive element of democracy. To ignore it in any appraisal of a revolution's legitimacy would be an error for any country interested in promoting democracy. The administration, in judging the Dominican situation, had to take into account these considerations:

By the time American forces landed, the man Senator FULBRIGHT considered the "legitimate successor" had left the rebel forces and taken asylum in the Colombian Embassy.

Senator FULBRIGHT says the United States should have worked with the last freely elected President of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch. He criticized the administration because "the U.S. Government made no effort to contact Bosch in the initial days of the crisis." But the rebel forces, for all their talk about bringing Juan Bosch back to the Dominican Republic, in fact named their commanding general President. (The provisional government installed by the United States and the Organization of American States has been instructed to hold free elections within 9 months.)

In his speech last week, Senator FULBRIGHT treated such procedural considerations as a sort of snobbishness that affects the gringos when they confront uncouth revolutionaries:

"It is not surprising that we Americans are not drawn toward the uncouth revolutionaries of the non-Communist left. We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth."

That is a curious statement coming from a Member of the U.S. Senate during one of the most revolutionary periods in American history. One whole section of the country is undergoing a social revolution as its public schools system—one of the foundations of its society—is desegregated. And the Senate has just concluded debate on one of the most revolutionary decisions in American history: The Supreme Court ruling that from now on all representation in State legislatures must be based on population and nothing else. That these are more or less peaceful revolutions, being carried out with a general respect for law and order, does not make them any the less revolutionary or social. Those Fourth of July speeches may not be very far off base after all.

[From the Reporter, Sept. 27, 1965]

CHARITY BEGINS ABROAD

(By Max Ascoli)

The cause may well be the too-broad, bipartisan consensus that the President has assiduously cultivated for the enactment of his basic domestic reforms. As if to make him pay for it, a rash of aggravating criticisms of his major undertakings in foreign affairs has broken out from some Senators of his own party.

The latest instance has been provided once more by Senator FULBRIGHT, a high-minded man addicted to introspection and conscience-listening. He is in politics, but not quite at ease in it. To politics he mostly contributes his unhappiness—a disposition that can sometimes be beneficial if it is sparingly represented in the hierarchy of a ruling party. The latest foreign-policy pronouncements by Senator FULBRIGHT do not exempt him from the respect due him; neither do they exonerate him from criticism. Sometimes it is better when cranky opinions are formulated by a crank rather than by a thoughtful man.

In his recent attack on the administration's intervention in the Dominican crisis, he identified the cause of the mistakes and the criteria to be followed if their repetition is to be avoided. It's all exceedingly simple: we must not antagonize; indeed, we must give all our support in the hemisphere to social revolution, which seems to be the new wave of the future. "The direction of the Alliance for Progress is toward social revolution in Latin America."

If the Senator is correct, he has discovered the criterion that can allow our Government to choose among the various claimants to our support in the countries of Latin America, where, he says, "just about every reform movement is likely to attract Communist support . . ." Later on, he adds that "by supporting reform" and the Communists along with it, "we bolster the popular non-Communist left . . ." This is a truly bewildering notion which can only mean a conviction that, in the game of politics abroad, the Communists who are professorial can frequently be defeated by the dilettantes of the non-Communist left. All this is strictly for alien consumption: according to Mr. FULBRIGHT, there is no taste for revolution in this country; and the Senator from Arkansas has given evidence of this with his unresponsiveness to the social reforms of the Johnson administration, sometimes called revolutions. His charity begins abroad.

The advocacy of social revolution is in no way tempered by the knowledge that ever since their premature emergence from colonialism, the countries south of the Rio Grand have suffered a surfeit of revolutions—most of them social. In our times, if the Senator is right, our country should have rushed to defend Goulart in Brazil, or Juan Perón, who, after having debauched the working classes in Argentina, is still the beneficiary of a large popular following and

Communist sympathy. And even Fulgencio Batista tried his hand at social revolution and was not disliked by the Cuban Communists.

What is wrong with Senator FULBRIGHT, and with quite a number of American liberals, is an ingrained habit of abstract theorizing in terms of black and white, with little or no care for rounded historical reasoning. One of the most typical evidences of this trend was Senator FULBRIGHT's speech "Old Myths and New Realities." Since the old myths are centered on the incompatibility between the worldwide ambitions of communism and the supreme value of freedom, nothing remains but to go through an endless series of accommodations with Moscow, Peking, or Havana at all possible levels—a singularly lunar and truly unreal picture of what is ahead of us.

Senator FULBRIGHT is not the only eminent man who voices such peculiar views on the Democratic side of the Senate. Another, equally earnest and somber, is Senate Majority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD. He seems to have found his specialty in prescribing how bloodily divided countries can be patched together. The method is simplicity itself: hold a general election in which all the inhabitants will have their say, even those who have been long segregated and robotized by unchanging totalitarian regimes. There are no conditions other than a reciprocal amnesty and some kind of U.N. supervision; then the inhabitants will turn into citizens by casting their ballots, thus redeeming their right to freedom. A few years ago, still under the Eisenhower administration, the good Senator from Montana advanced a similar program for the unification of Germany, East and West.

Perhaps President Johnson could use an opposition that opposes, according to the good old Taft saying, in exchange for the soulful sermonizing by some of his distinguished former colleagues in the U.S. Senate. The problems he has to face abroad are awesome, and one piece of advice can be freely given him in the firm confidence that it is unneeded: our country may have different kinds of relations with the various Communist powers, but it should never sponsor or promote popular front governments—in Vietnam, Germany, or anywhere else. As to the fostering of social revolutions in Latin America, let's establish a division of labor between ourselves on the one side and the followers of Marxism on the other. Our country is for good works with and for the peoples of Latin America, but is unavailable for revolutionary promiscuity.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 17, 1965]

FULBRIGHT'S FOLLY—AN IRRESPONSIBLE SPEECH
(By William S. White)

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT's attack upon the basic honesty of this Government's intervention in the Dominican Republic against the possibility of a Communist takeover has created a poignant crisis for the orderly conduct of American foreign policy.

Not in 30 years, at least, has a chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee so bitterly ranged himself against an emergency action of his Nation abroad and against so vast a majority of his own colleagues in the Senate. Wherever Senator FULBRIGHT retains influence abroad—and this influence is substantial both among the hopefully neutralist-minded and the automatic critics of any use of military force for almost any reason—the position of the United States has been dreadfully injured.

For that world still believes, not unnaturally, that Senator FULBRIGHT, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, speaks from within the high councils of this Nation. To much of that world his embittered testimony against this Government's course

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in Latin America is turning state's evidence and assisting the prosecution of his own side.

What is even more painfully awkward, however, is the harm that has been done, for the first time irreparably, by Senator FULBRIGHT to himself as officially the chief Democratic foreign affairs spokesman in Congress.

Already, by personal proclamations of a personal foreign policy which repeatedly harassed the late President Kennedy in world crises no less than they harass President Johnson now, Senator FULBRIGHT had gravely weakened the effective consensus of collective judgment which his committee had traditionally embodied.

Now, in the deep institutional sense he has destroyed his own voice as well. He will retain his post; but in reality he can hardly speak hereafter for more than Senator FULBRIGHT, of Arkansas. He can hardly speak for the Foreign Relations Committee, for the administration, for the Democratic Party, or for anything save a tiny minority of the Senate in which he sits.

For it is not simply with President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk that FULBRIGHT has broken. He has also broken the unwritten rule of the game, a code which demands of those holding high committee chairmanships—and uniquely the chairmanship of foreign relations—a degree of self-restraint and personal responsibility not demanded of the rank and file.

It is a tragic case of a good man's private judgment carried to such extremes as to become alien to the controlling spirit and action of the most tolerant political forum in the world. Senatorial privilege reaches far. "Free speech"—any Senator's undoubted right to speak his full mind—has no formal limitation. It does, however, carry an unalterable qualification arising from the plain facts of life. A man may say what he wishes; but no man, not even a Senator, can claim special exemption for himself from the consequences of what he says.

Concretely, Senator FULBRIGHT's departure from the national and Senate consensus is easy to explain. At bottom, he admits that there was some Communist participation in the Dominican Republic but he argues that maybe it was not much and in any event nobody can say for certain that it would have been enough to set up another Castro Cuba in this hemisphere.

He honestly fears we are so preoccupied with the Communist peril that we are adopting "reactionary" attitudes against good revolutions as well as bad. The sad and self-evident truth, however, is that nobody bearing the ultimate and terrible responsibility to see to it that there shall never be another Castro Cuba can afford the splendid luxury of this ivory tower view. Such a luxury was, in fact, adopted as to Cuba when Fidel Castro was coming up. Its end was to carry the whole globe to the edge of nuclear holocaust. The frightful realities of the cold war do not submit to the perfectly honorable, relaxed detachment of collegiate debating exercise.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 20, 1965]

INSIDE REPORT—THE FULBRIGHT FUROR (By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

One month ago, when the Johnson administration was playing midwife in the birth of a new government in Santo Domingo, Senator FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, temporarily laid aside his scathing indictment of U.S. intervention in the bloody Dominican revolution.

FULBRIGHT's reason for delay: With the new government of U.S.-backed Hector García Godoy barely coming into its own, the highly critical analysis of U.S. actions during the late April uprising might set back the whole affair, FULBRIGHT, chairman of the once-pres-

tigious Senate Foreign Relations Committee, decided to postpone his condemnation of U.S. policy.

But when it came last week, the Fulbright speech was just as ill-timed as it would have been a month earlier.

This was President Johnson's appraisal. When he received a copy of the speech 24 hours before its delivery in the Senate, he scanned it briefly.

His immediate complaint: FULBRIGHT's one-sided view of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic last April would receive far more attention than it deserved (because he is Foreign Relations Committee chairman) and embarrass the future course of U.S. diplomacy in the Dominican Republic.

But in fact, remarked the President to a Senator, the Fulbright critique did not represent even a simple majority of the 19-member committee.

This raises a serious issue: In critical matters of foreign policy, how candid should a Senator of FULBRIGHT's prestige be in attacking and undermining the Government's policy in such a dangerous confrontation?

Until recently, a major controversy such as the one over U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic would have come before FULBRIGHT's committee for a long, reasoned investigation (far more thorough than the quickie probe by the Fulbright committee this summer). This, in times past, would have resulted in a committee report backed by a strong majority. But today, FULBRIGHT's 19-man committee is split into almost 19 parts, representing every shade of opinion.

As the committee has gradually increased in size to accommodate ambitious Senators (from 13 members in 1947 to 19 members today), its ability to act in unison has declined drastically.

Furthermore, FULBRIGHT is a uniquely original thinker, the antithesis of the organization man or Senate type. Under his chairmanship, the committee has succumbed to factional bickering so severe that FULBRIGHT threatened at one point to refuse to handle the foreign aid bill.

As a result, it is now every man for himself on the committee. But Chairman FULBRIGHT, as the embodiment of the Senate's unique constitutional powers in foreign affairs, still has a special responsibility to consider the results of what he says and its impact outside the United States.

In the Dominican Republic, the impact of FULBRIGHT's speech (described by Senator THOMAS E. DONN, Democrat, of Connecticut, as "a sweeping condemnation of U.S. policy") is predictable. With all Dominican politicians pointing to the next presidential election there, the Fulbright indictment is certain to lift the chances of the most anti-Yankee candidate in the field.

By dramatizing so harshly his own disillusion with the U.S. decision to intervene, the Senator gives the most extreme anti-U.S. political factions in the Dominican Republic a readymade presidential campaign text. The condemnation of Washington that will soon be ringing from the hustings in Santo Domingo will be flavored with the Senator's own ringing condemnation.

Nobody questions FULBRIGHT's unlimited right to condemn U.S. policy. What critics in the administration—and the Senate as well—question is his timing.

Finally, these critics challenge the Senator's disregard of the sudden chaos last April in Santo Domingo and the impressive evidence of deep Communist penetration of the rebel command.

When DONN made his reply on Thursday, the White House was concerned enough to give security clearance to a censored report on the full extent of Communist influence in the April revolt. The report alone is a compelling argument for the intervention.

But in the Dominican Republic, FUL-

BRIGHT's attack will be remembered long after the intelligence report is forgotten.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Sept. 20, 1965]

SCHOLAR FULBRIGHT'S STRANGE LOGIC (By David Lawrence)

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, studied as a Rhodes scholar in England and must have familiarized himself with the British parliamentary system.

If FULBRIGHT had been a member of the House of Commons and had made the same kind of speech as he delivered in the Senate the other day—saying, in effect, that the leader of the majority party had bungled in handling a grave international problem—it would have been regarded either as a call for a "vote of confidence or no confidence" by the people, or the removal of the critic himself from the councils of his party.

But political parties in the United States have no such system of discipline. FULBRIGHT will continue to hold his post as a spokesman of the Democratic Party in the Senate on foreign relations.

FULBRIGHT insists that he wasn't exactly blaming President Johnson for what he regards as a blundering policy in intervening with military force in the Dominican Republic. The Senator attributes this instead to "faulty advice" given Johnson by his advisers at the time of the crisis. The Senator doesn't say to what extent Secretary of State Dean Rusk was at fault and whether he should be removed, but the impression conveyed is that the President of the United States is either a gullible person or not as perceptive as FULBRIGHT himself would have been if he had happened to be President or Secretary of State.

FULBRIGHT is considered one of the modern "intellectuals," but his speech is a little difficult for a "nonintellectual" to understand. He says for instance:

"The question of the degree of Communist influence (in the Dominican Republic) is, therefore, crucial, but it cannot be answered with certainty. The weight of the evidence is that Communists did not participate in planning the revolution—indeed there is some indication that it took them by surprise—but that they very rapidly began to try to take advantage of it and to seize control of it. The evidence does not establish that the Communists at any time actually had control of the revolution. There is little doubt that they had influence within the revolutionary movement but the degree of that influence remains a matter of speculation. * * *

"The point I am making is not—most emphatically not—that there was no Communist participation in the Dominican crisis, but simply that the administration acted on the premise that the revolution was controlled by Communists—a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has not established since. * * *

"Intervention on the basis of Communist participation as distinguished from control of the Dominican revolution was a mistake of panic and timidity which also reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics."

FULBRIGHT evidently doesn't believe in fire hoses or fire apparatus being used when there's a smoldering fire but only when it has burst into flame and a property has already been virtually destroyed. He seems to have forgotten that the American policy in 1949, which assumed that a coalition in China with the Communists would be a recognition of a "social revolution," wound up with the loss of the mainland to the Communist Chinese. Similar vacillation and hesitancy on the part of the United States

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lost Cuba to Fidel Castro and the Communists.

FULBRIGHT concedes that a Communist-dominated government might have emerged in the Dominican Republic. He rationalizes, however, that "this might conceivably have happened, but the evidence by no means supports the conclusion that it would have happened." He declares that "we based our policy on a possibility rather than on anything approaching a likelihood."

So the Arkansas Senator feels that the judgment of President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk and the American Ambassador who was dodging bullets on the spot in Santo Domingo was, so to speak, "faulty."

FULBRIGHT thinks that the United States shouldn't have landed troops to save American lives or to save Latin America from more of such revolutions but simply should have waited on the sidelines until the Communist mission was actually accomplished. Would it have been another fiasco like the Bay of Pigs? Only FULBRIGHT knows.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 25, 1965]

THESE DAYS—FULBRIGHT'S CHANCY BET ON HISTORY

(By John Chamberlain)

I wouldn't want to be in Senator J. W. Fulbright's shoes. For, in criticizing the Johnson administration for "overreacting" in the Dominican Republic crises last April, the Senator has, in effect, tied his reputation to the assurance that the Dominican people are not in imminent danger of being taken over by Communists or Castroites.

True, history may eventually bear Senator Fulbright out. But observers who are fully as qualified as any the Senator depends upon just do not go along with the Fulbright optimism.

The Senator would probably scoff at the idea that the Dominican June 14 Movement, which is Castro-oriented, represents any continuing menace to the chances for a "strong democratic government" (FULBRIGHT'S OWN WORDS) emerging from the election 9 months from now. Nevertheless the June 14 Movement continues to recruit youths for espionage, sabotage, and terrorism, bringing them into Santo Domingo for instruction and sending them back under discipline to the countryside to become "sleepers" in the mountains and the farming regions.

At least 3,000 trainees have gone through this mill, learning how to use radio equipment and unconventional arms. Their weapons will hardly be surrendered merely because the official agreement between the factions calls for it.

That the surrender of even the most conventional arms is extremely unlikely is proved by the behavior of the rebels in the Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin contretemps.

The rebels made surrender of arms conditional on the banishment of Wessin y Wessin from his army post and, indeed, from the country. Forced by U.S. pressure to give in to the rebels' tactical move, Wessin y Wessin stepped down.

Whereupon the rebels escalated their demands; without blinking an eye, they imposed new conditions, making surrender of arms conditional upon the removal not only of Wessin, but also of a whole group of conservative army officers.

Absurdly enough, there was never any counter-demand from the so-called "right" for the expulsion of Col. Francisco Caamano Demo as a "symbol" of rebel extremism.

FULBRIGHT, a one-sided critic, has generally applied double-standard thinking to the business of keeping any balance between left and right extremists.

He will not be exposed by events as long as groups like the June 14 movement "play it legal," as they will probably do during the 9 months of Hector Garcia Godoy's Provi-

sional Presidency. As long as the legal amenities are observed, the Senator will be able to maintain that the future history of the Dominican Republic is bound to conform to his hopes.

But I am putting the Senator's blast against the Johnson administration's overreaction in my prophecy file. Let's see how things turn out 9 months hence.

Surely, the Senator has not been lucky in his projections in the past. He spoke of the "myths" of Communist menace just before the Maoists became really menacing in southeast Asia.

He has treated Castroism in Cuba as a nuisance. Well, Fidel, the operator of the Cuban nuisance, continues to build high-powered radio stations for use in the effort to create other nuisances in Guatemala, Panama, and Venezuela.

This, of course, does not guarantee that Castro's words will be sufficiently heeded to result in revolutionary overturns throughout Latin America. But when FULBRIGHT dismissed Cuba as a nuisance, he risked encouraging a complacency among Americans that could easily let the nuisance get out of hand. After all, Lenin was merely a nuisance when he was sitting around the cafe tables in Geneva. But, with the quirks of history, nuisances, like other things, can escalate into something qualitatively different.

Fortunately for our sense of wariness, Senators THOMAS J. DODD and FRANK J. LAUSCHE, both belonging to FULBRIGHT'S OWN Democratic Party, believe that it is better to over-react to Communist threats than it is to under-react.

Nine months from now, when the Dominicans choose their President, we will see whether Dodd or FULBRIGHT is closer to the mark.

[From Time magazine, Sept. 24, 1965]

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC—ERRATIC ATTACK

At the close of his July hearings on U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, announced that no formal report would be issued. Last week, in a 2-hour Senate speech, Fulbright delivered his own delayed opinion—a scalding denunciation of the intervention and its portent for U.S. policy in general. FULBRIGHT'S erratic attacks on the administration are no longer surprising. What made this one particularly curious was the fact that, on White House orders, he had access to every scrap of information in the files—but apparently based his conclusions more heavily on the same old highly colored newspaper reports.

FULBRIGHT called the intervention as grievous a mistake as the Bay of Pigs invasion of Communist Cuba. He accused the United States of intervening "not to save American lives, as was contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement" wrongly judged to be Communist-dominated. President Johnson, said FULBRIGHT, reacted to "exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement," then overreacted by sending in 20,000 troops. To make matters worse, the United States took sides with Big Gen. Antonio Imbert's loyalist junta—"a corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy." Concluded FULBRIGHT: "If we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement, making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries who wish to preserve the status quo."

REFORMERS AND REDS

In the Senate, FULBRIGHT'S colleagues, who had access to the same files as he, rose one after another to dispute his conclusions. Said Connecticut's Democratic Senator THOMAS J. DODD: intervention was an "unavoidable necessity." FULBRIGHT, he noted, "suffers from an indiscriminate infatuation

with revolutions of all kinds—national, democratic, or Communist."

Few would question the argument that the United States should support reform and social revolution in Latin America, even if it is sometimes hard to separate the genuine reformers from the Communists. And there are still, as FULBRIGHT says, Latin Americans who cry communism to resist change. But the United States has found plenty of anti-Communists to back—anti-Communists who are also reformers. It wholeheartedly supports Chile's President's Eduardo Frei, who beat a Marxist to win office. It has committed \$119 million to help Peru's Fernando Belaunde Terry wage a social revolution that will aid millions of backlands Indians.

With U.S. help, Venezuela's left-of-center Raul Leoni has built such a prosperous economy that he is considering his own Allianza-like program to help less-developed neighbors. Mexico's strongly independent President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz paid high compliments to U.S. Allianza efforts in his recent state-of-the-nation speech. The United States is pushing hard for social reform in Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay, all run by authoritarian regimes that are not necessarily throwbacks to the old-line oligarchies.

AMPLE EVIDENCE

In the Dominican Republic itself, the United States was instrumental in bringing an end to the Trujillo dictatorship. In the recent crisis, U.S. policy may well have suffered from some mistakes and misinformation. But the fact remains that the country was on the verge of a bloodbath, and that the Communists were swiftly profiting from the chaos. U.S. troops, whether 5,000 or 20,000, enforced a more or less peaceful settlement—and the United States, in the end, was far tougher with the loyalist "reactionaries" than with the Communist-infiltrated rebels.

Last week, as Provisional President Hector Garcia-Godoy completed his second week in office, 9,200 U.S. and OAS troops were still in the Dominican Republic. Garcia-Godoy needs them there. During the revolt, the three shades of communism—the Peiping-lining Dominican Popular Movement, the Moscow-oriented Dominican Communist Party, the Castroite 14th of June Movement—controlled some 2,500 armed fighters. All three groups have been smuggling arms out of Santo Domingo to stash them in other cities and in the hills.

After FULBRIGHT'S speech, President Johnson was asked how he now felt about the intervention. His reply: "I would do it all over again, only we have done it earlier and tougher."

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, Sept. 20, 1965]

SENATOR FULBRIGHT GAVE REBELS

AMMUNITION

(By Virginia Prewett)

Senator WILLIAM J. FULBRIGHT'S attack on President Johnson's Dominican policy came in a lull when things were definitely looking better in Santo Domingo.

The moderates in the rebel camp were about to prevail on the extremists to turn in a substantial number of arms. This would have been one more tiny step toward stability and a chance for free elections in the Dominican Republic.

If the extremists in the rebel camp are not fired up by the Arkansas Senator's speech, it will not be the latter's fault. Everything he said was calculated to encourage the Dominican leftist extremists.

TOO MUCH

It seems almost as if the prospect of successful peace in the Dominican Republic was too much for the Senator to bear.

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Senator FULBRIGHT's charges against President Johnson also came at a moment when it seems as if the United States may be winning ground in South Vietnam. Perhaps the Senator thinks too much success for U.S. foreign policy is bad for us.

The Senator's assault on Mr. Johnson deserves to be studied first of all for the way it was built up.

Mr. FULBRIGHT discounted a U.S. policy that President Johnson had revived—that of valuing endangered Americans' lives enough to send military assistance to protect them—simply by pretending that President Johnson entertained no such thought when he sent the Marines into the Dominican Republic.

DEFLATION

Those Americans who have felt a little better because their President did send Marines to rescue our stranded fellow countrymen in the Embajador Hotel may now feel deflated again—if they believe Senator FULBRIGHT.

Senator FULBRIGHT was quoted as saying that Latin Americans should make new arrangements with other countries, including the Communists.

The Senator owes it to the Nation to say plainly what he means by his encouragement to Latin Americans to cease cooperating with the United States.

What Senator FULBRIGHT actually appears to be espousing is tolerance of the latest Communist strategy for Latin America. This is the policy of the undeclared united front.

The situation that existed in Santo Domingo was a de facto united front between the Communists and the leaders who said they represented constitutionalism. Senator FULBRIGHT must know perfectly well what he is doing when he espouses such a combination.

What Senator FULBRIGHT is preaching is tacit U.S. agreement to allow communism's political representatives a free hand in the New World.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Sept. 15, 1965]

FULBRIGHT SEES U.S. BLUNDER IN SANTO DOMINGO—INFLATED ESTIMATES OF REDS BLAMED FOR INTERVENTION POLICY

(By Cecil Holland)

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, charged today that U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic revolt was "a grievous mistake" and was characterized by "a lack of candor."

"The danger to American lives," he said in a Senate speech, "was more the pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention . . ."

The real reason, he added, was fear of a Communist takeover of that country and that decision, he said, was based on misinformation and "on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement."

QUESTIONS U.S. PREMISE

FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the administration acted on the premise that the revolution was controlled by Communists—"a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has not established since."

He placed the blame for the failure of American police in the Dominican crisis on Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., and other American representatives who advised President Johnson on events there.

In three critical days between April 25 and April 28, FULBRIGHT said, officials sent the President exaggerated reports on the danger of a Communist takeover in Santo Domingo and, on the basis of these, recommended military intervention.

"It is not at all difficult to understand why, on the basis of such faulty advice, the President made the decisions that he made," FULBRIGHT said.

CHARGES EXAGGERATION

The Senator cited what he described as "widely exaggerated reports of massacres and atrocities" by the rebel forces. He noted that the President, in a June 14 press conference, said that "some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off."

"There is no evidence to support this statement," the Senator said.

FULBRIGHT said he was discussing this country's role in the Dominican crisis in the hope that the mistakes that were made by the United States can be corrected and that it will be possible to avoid them in the future.

"U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis," FULBRIGHT said, "was characterized initially by overtimidity and subsequently by overreaction. Throughout the whole affair, it has also been characterized by a lack of candor."

SEES NO EASY CHOICE

FULBRIGHT said he had made a painstaking review of the situation, but conceded his judgments were made with the benefit of hindsight. In fairness, he added, it must be conceded that there were no easy choices available to the United States.

"Nonetheless," he said, "it is the task of the diplomacy to make wise decisions when they need to be made and U.S. diplomacy failed to do so in the Dominican crisis."

FULBRIGHT said that the United States might not have changed the course of events there by acting differently. But, he added, it could be said with assurance that the United States did not take advantage of several opportunities in which it might have changed the course of events.

WARY OF BOSCH

"The reason appears to be," FULBRIGHT said, "that, very close to the beginning of the revolution, U.S. policymakers decided that it should not be allowed to succeed."

"This decision seems to have been based on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement and on distaste for the return to power of Juan Bosch or a government controlled by Bosch's party, the PRD (Dominican Revolutionary Party)."

FULBRIGHT said he was raising questions and not offering an answer regarding this country's policy toward Bosch and the return to power of his party. He added that the question involves what will be the administration's attitude toward reform movements in other Latin American countries.

MUST AVOID CORRUPTION

"It is of great importance that the uncertainty as to U.S. aims in Latin America be resolved," FULBRIGHT said. "We cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy and at the same time align ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies; yet that is what we seem to be trying to do."

FULBRIGHT noted that every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, and the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if pursued, "must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

"We simply cannot have it both ways," he added. "We must choose between the Alliance for Progress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the status quo in Latin America."

In some respects, FULBRIGHT said, the Dominican story "acquired some of the inevitability of a Greek tragedy."

When the revolution began, the Senator pointed out, the United States had three options: It could have supported the Reid Cabral government; it could have supported the revolutionary forces, or it could do nothing.

The administration, he said, chose to do nothing.

The next crucial point came on April 27, FULBRIGHT said, when Ambassador Bennett rejected an appeal by rebel leaders to mediate and seek a cease-fire, on grounds that this would have been intervention.

"Mediation at that point might have been accomplished quietly and peacefully," FULBRIGHT said. "Twenty-four hours later the Ambassador was pleading for the Marines, and ever since the United States has been intervening up to its eyebrows."

He blamed this mistake on the feeling of officials there on the basis of evidence which was fragmentary at best that the rebels were dominated by Communists. He pointed out that the situation rapidly deteriorated and that the head of a military junta, which had been assembled, was told that the United States would not intervene unless it was to protect American lives.

PRETEXT IS CHARGED

That was eventually done on such a pretext, FULBRIGHT said.

"In fact, no American lives were lost in Santo Domingo until the Marines began exchanging fire with the rebels after April 28; reports of widespread shooting that endangered American lives turned out to be greatly exaggerated."

FULBRIGHT said the United States would have been justified in landing a small force for the express purpose of removing U.S. citizens and other foreigners, and then withdrawing such a force when it had completed its mission.

"Intervention on the basis of Communist participation as distinguished from the control of the Dominican revolution was a mistake of panic and timidity which also reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics," FULBRIGHT said. "Communists are present in all Latin American countries, and they are going to inject themselves into almost any Latin American revolution and try to seize control of it."

HELPED BUILD JUNTA

The Senator said from the time the Reid government resigned, U.S. policy was directed toward the construction of a military junta and against the return of Bosch and the success of the rebel movement.

"One is led, therefore, to the conclusion that U.S. policymakers were unduly timid and alarmish in refusing to gamble on the forces of reform and social change," FULBRIGHT said.

"The bitter irony of such timidity is that by casting its lot with the forces of the status quo . . . the United States almost certainly helped the Communists to acquire converts whom they otherwise could not have won."

[From the Latin American Times, Sept. 16, 1965]

DOMINICAN ACTION BLASTED—FULBRIGHT SAYS INTERVENTION COMPROMISED U.S. HONOR

(By John T. Skelly, Latin American Times Washington bureau)

WASHINGTON, September 15.—Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, today in effect accused President Johnson and his advisers of compromising the "word and honor" of the United States before the eyes of Latin American countries by intervening in the Dominican Republic in April.

Senator FULBRIGHT, in an 11,000-word speech delivered on the floor of the Senate, charged that "the United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican Republic in the last week of April 1965, not to save American lives, as was then contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement which was judged to be Communist-dominated. The decision to land marines on

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April 28 was based primarily on the fear of 'another Cuba' in Santo Domingo."

Senator FULBRIGHT said that the United States violated its commitment to Latin America not to intervene in the internal affairs of their countries as provided by article 1 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.

"The Inter-American system is rooted in an implicit contract between the Latin American countries and the United States. In return for our promise not to interfere in their internal affairs, they have tacitly agreed to remain members of our 'sphere' and to support, or at least not to obstruct, our global policies.

VIOLATED BARGAIN

"In the Dominican Republic we violated our part of the bargain; it remains to be seen whether Latin Americans will now feel free to violate theirs," Senator FULBRIGHT said.

He did not absolve President Johnson from being the man responsible for the order to intervene. However, the Senator, a close friend of the President, made it clear that the President, in effect, was sold a bill of goods by his immediate advisers, primarily the U.S. Ambassador in the Dominican Republic, W. Tapley Bennett.

"Responsibility for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo lies primarily with those who advised the President * * *. It is not at all difficult to understand why, on the basis of such faulty advice, the President made the decisions that he made," Senator FULBRIGHT said.

Stating his position after long and careful study of what happened, he said that "my own feeling is that the situation in any case did not justify military intervention except for the limited purpose of evacuating U.S. citizens and other foreigners, but even if it did, we should not have undertaken it without the advance consent of our Latin American allies."

"We should not have done so because the word and honor of the United States were at stake just as much—at least as much—in the Dominican crisis as they are in Vietnam and Korea and Berlin and all the places around the globe which we have committed ourselves to defend," he said.

ENCOURAGED DISORDER

Senator FULBRIGHT pointed out that by intervening in the Dominican Republic "unilaterally—and illegally" we violated the basis of the U.S. system which is respect for law.

"When we violate the law ourselves, whatever short-term advantage may be gained, we are obviously encouraging others to violate the law; we thus encourage disorder and instability and thereby do incalculable damage to our long-term interests."

Senator FULBRIGHT expressed regret that there are still those who believe that the principle of nonintervention in Latin America is obsolete. He said:

"Most Latin Americans would argue that, far from being obsolete the principle of nonintervention was and remains the heart and core of the Inter-American system. Insofar as it is honored, it provides them with something that many in the United States find it hard to believe they could suppose they need—protection from the United States."

He said that the idea held by many North Americans that the United States can intervene in Latin America with "good intentions" when the United States thinks it convenient comes as a shock to Latin Americans.

"The trouble with this view is that it is not shared with our neighbors to the south * * *. 'good intentions' are not a very sound basis for judging the fulfillment of contractual obligations," he said. "Just about everybody, including the Communists, believes in his own 'good intentions.'"

DOMINICAN TRAGEDY

Senator FULBRIGHT said that "the tragedy of Santo Domingo is that a policy that purported to defeat communism in the short run is more likely to have the effect of promoting it in the long run.

"Intervention in the Dominican Republic has alienated—temporarily or permanently, depending on our future policies—our real friends in Latin America.

"These broadly, are the people of the democratic left—the Christian and Social Democrats in a number of countries, the APRA in Peru, the Accion Democratica Party in Venezuela, and their kindred spirits throughout the hemisphere."

Senator FULBRIGHT repeated continually throughout his speech that by "our intervention on the side of the corrupt, military oligarchy in the Dominican Republic, we have embarrassed before their own people the Democratic reformers who have counseled trust and partnership with the United States.

"We have lent credence to the idea that the United States is the enemy of social revolution in Latin America and that the only choice Latin Americans have is between communism and reaction."

MAY BE FORCED TO COMMUNISM

Referring to the choice that Latin Americans will make if they are denied the right to carry out social revolutions he said:

"If those are the available alternatives, if there is no democratic action left as a third option, then there is no doubt of the choice that honest and patriotic Latin Americans will make—they will choose communism, not because they want it but because U.S. policy will have foreclosed all other avenues of social revolution and, indeed, all other possibilities except the perpetuation of rule by military juntas and economic oligarchies."

Senator FULBRIGHT said that as a result of the Dominican Republic action "The United States has allowed itself to become associated with both reaction at home and domination from abroad.

"We have thereby offended the dignity and self-respect of young idealistic Latin Americans who must now wonder whether the United States will one day intervene against social revolutions in their own countries, whether one day they will find themselves facing U.S. marines across barricades in their own hometowns."

He expressed conviction, however, that President Johnson "and indeed, most U.S. citizens are sure, that our country is not now and will not become an enemy of social revolutions in Latin America."

"MADE A MISTAKE"

"We have made a mistake in the Dominican Republic as we did at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, but a single misjudgment does not constitute a 'doctrine' for the conduct of future policy and we remain dedicated to the goals of the Alliance for Progress."

He pointed out that "we know this ourselves" but wondered whether or not "our friends in Latin America" will understand that their social revolutions will have U.S. sympathy and support.

Senator FULBRIGHT said that if the United States follows the creative approach of the Alliance for Progress that someday "the Dominican affair will be relegated in history to the status of a single unhappy episode on the long road toward the forging of a new and creative and dignified relationship between the United States and Latin America."

SEEK OTHER RELATIONS

Senator FULBRIGHT ended his speech that took 2 hours to deliver by suggesting that it would be beneficial for Latin Americans to cut the umbilical cord by which they are tied to the United States and seek closer re-

lations with other countries, "and with Communist countries if they wish."

"The first step toward stronger ties between Latin America and the United States would be the creation of a situation in which Latin American countries would be free, and would feel free, to maintain or sever existing ties as they see fit and, perhaps more important, to establish new arrangements both among themselves and with nations outside the hemisphere, in which the United States would not participate."

He praised Chilean President Eduardo Frei for having taken the initiative by visiting European leaders in July to establish new political, economic and cultural ties.

"I think this is an intelligent and constructive step," Senator FULBRIGHT concluded.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 16, 1965]
LATIN POLICY IS CRITICIZED BY FULBRIGHT—
DOMINICAN INTERVENTION "MISTAKE"
BLAMED ON BAD ADVICE, ENVOY

(By Joseph R. L. Sterne)

WASHINGTON, September 15.—Senator FULBRIGHT, Democrat of Arkansas, said today that the U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic last April was a "grievous mistake" caused by officials who exaggerated the danger of a Communist takeover.

FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, carefully exonerated President Johnson, saying that the President was the victim of faulty advice.

But he was highly critical of Ambassador William Tapley Bennett, charging that Bennett failed to seize early opportunities to bring about a cease-fire in the hope that Dominican militarists would crush the left-wing uprising.

"DEEP" DISTRUST FOUND

FULBRIGHT warned that the intervention Bennett subsequently arranged had provoked "deep and widespread" distrust of the United States among young social reformers who will control the political future of Latin America.

While most of these reformers are non-Communists whose goals are similar to those of the Alliance for Progress, FULBRIGHT said U.S. support of the status quo and "reactionary oligarchies" could drive them to communism.

The Senator's hour-long speech drew angry retorts from Senator LONG, Democrat of Louisiana, and Senator SMATHERS, Democrat of Florida, who contended that the President's prompt action had forestalled Communist efforts to seize the Dominican Republic in the same manner that Fidel Castro seized Cuba.

WHITE HOUSE SUMMONS

FULBRIGHT's criticisms from hindsight were unfair, they suggested, since he had not objected to the impending landing of marines when he was summoned to the White House along with other congressional leaders on the night of April 28.

At the White House this afternoon it was emphasized that President Johnson still has the high regard for Ambassador Bennett that he publicly mentioned during the height of the Dominican crisis.

Bill D. Moyers, presidential press secretary, said he personally had read the Fulbright speech and then talked "to a number of Government officials, career and otherwise, who simply do not believe the Senator's conclusions were justified."

Moyers declined to say whether the President was one of the officials he had consulted and said he did not know if Mr. Johnson was pleased or displeased.

FULBRIGHT's speech was based, in part, on evidence gathered by his committee during a series of closed hearings with Bennett and

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other officials who hold high positions in U.S. policy toward Latin America.

So deeply divided was the committee at the conclusion of this investigation that the idea of publishing a report was abandoned.

SUPPORT BY MORSE

FULBRIGHT's critical view of the Dominican operation and his fear that the United States is alienating the non-Communist left in Latin America reportedly are shared by some liberal members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Among those placed in this category today by a knowledgeable source were Senators SPARKMAN, Democrat, of Alabama, MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, CLARK, Democrat, of Pennsylvania, MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon, GORE, Democrat, of Tennessee, CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho, PELL, Democrat, of Rhode Island, MCCARTHY, Democrat, of Minnesota, and AIKEN, Republican, of Vermont.

Of this group, Senator CLARK took the floor to say that he was in complete accord with FULBRIGHT's "sound and wise" speech.

Among the Foreign Relations Committee members who are said to be fully behind the President's Dominican policy are Senators LAUSCHE, Democrat, of Ohio, DODD, Democrat, of Connecticut, HICKENLOOPER, Republican, of Iowa, MUNDT, Republican, of South Dakota, and LONG.

DODD said he would reply to FULBRIGHT tomorrow, thus indicating the Senate may have a second day of the kind of give-and-take debate that has been notably absent in the set speeches on Vietnam.

FULBRIGHT launched his attack today by charging that there had been a "lack of candor" about United States actions during the entire Dominican operation.

Officials responsible, he said, were so panicky at the thought of "another Cuba" that they exaggerated both the danger to United States citizens and the extent of Communist influence in the rebel movement.

OAS PREFERENCE BACKED

As a result, the Senator continued, President Johnson was supplied with faulty and unreliable information that left him no choice but to order the intervention.

FULBRIGHT was less gentle, however, in assessing the President's role after the decision to intervene.

He faulted the administration for failing to place the matter before the Organization of American States before the landing of the Marines.

He noted that the "pretext" of sending in troops to safeguard American citizens had to be replaced by the anti-Communist argument to justify the intervention. And he said the number of troops sent in was so large that the United States found it difficult to extricate itself from a situation where it had intervened "up to its eyebrows."

FULBRIGHT said he had no doubts about the President's personal belief in the social reform goals of the Alliance for Progress, noting that Mr. Johnson had recently equated the Alliance with his own Great Society program.

But the Foreign Relations Committee chairman expressed deep concern over what he characterized as a drift to the right among United States officials who have a policymaking role in Latin America.

In the Dominican Republic itself, FULBRIGHT observed, the United States had moved from a position of supporting the social reformer, Juan Bosch, in the 1963 elections to opposing a "legitimate" revolution to restore him to the office 2 years later.

"UNCERTAINTY" DEcriED

What is more important, the Senator went on, there have been signs that the United States may be getting into a position of

repelling instead of luring the vigorous social reform movements evident throughout Latin America.

Citing a preoccupation with anticommunism among some United States diplomats and with "counterinsurgency" in the Pentagon, FULBRIGHT said:

"It is of great importance that the uncertainty as to United States aims in Latin America be resolved.

"We cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy and at the same time align ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies; yet that is what we seem to be trying to do.

SOCIAL REVOLUTION FORESEEN

"The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution. The question is whether it is to be Communist or democratic revolution, and the choice which the Latin American makes will depend in part on how the United States uses its great influence.

"It should be very clear that the choice is not between social revolution and conservative oligarchy but whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro in Cuba."

Since the intervention is a fact, FULBRIGHT said, the presence of OAS forces should be used to curb the power of Dominican militarists.

"BRIDGES" TO WORLD ASKED

In this way, he contended, the United States might begin the process of winning back the support of young reformers throughout the hemisphere.

The Senator also said the United States should begin loosening its ties with Latin American countries and encouraging them to "build bridges" with nations in Europe, Africa, Asia, and even in the Communist bloc.

Once freed from a too-close relationship with the United States, he contended, they would become less resentful and suspicious of this country.

The FULBRIGHT statements that caused the greatest immediate controversy concerned Bennett's actions during the crisis and the degree of Communist involvement in the uprising.

The Senator charged that the Ambassador was against Bosch and the left-wing rebel movement.

Hence, he said, Bennett had not seized an opportunity to end the fighting when it appeared the conservative elements would win handily.

EXAGGERATION CHARGED

When rebel fighting continued FULBRIGHT added, the Ambassador secured President Johnson's decision to intervene by exaggerating the danger to American citizens and the degree of Communist influence in the rebel movement.

FULBRIGHT insisted that the Communists had no part in the early planning of the reformers' revolution and at no time controlled it.

The irony of the situation, he said, is that the United States foreclosed all opportunity to compete with the Communists within the rebel movement and, instead, engaged in actions that produced "Communist converts" in Latin America.

CUBA TAKEOVER CITED

Senators LONG and SMATHERS took up FULBRIGHT on this point by recalling the experience in Cuba where a small number of hard-core Communists took over a rebel movement that had its origins among liberals and social democrats.

They said President Johnson was correct in preventing a repetition of the Cuban takeover by intervening quickly and massively in the Dominican Republic.

The wisdom of the President's policy, they added, lies in the fact that a coalition government free of Communist influence now exists in Santo Domingo.

During the fiery exchange between LONG, who is Democratic whip, and FULBRIGHT, the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator DIRKSEN, the Republican leader, strode in the Chamber.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 18, 1965]

FULBRIGHT, DODD CLASH IN FOREIGN-POLICY DEBATE

(By Richard L. Strout)

WASHINGTON.—The most clear-cut foreign-policy debate of this session of Congress now is underway.

The strongest voice on foreign affairs in the U.S. Senate, J. W. FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, has delivered what amounts to a scathing attack on the Johnson administration's handling of the Dominican Republic crisis.

And a formidable debater on the other side, THOMAS J. DODD, Democrat, of Connecticut, has delivered a sharp counterattack, in effect implying that Mr. FULBRIGHT is soft on communism.

Both Senators are Democrats. It is notable that the debate is being carried on by two members of President Johnson's own party.

INTERVENTION ASSESSED

Republicans overwhelmingly support President Johnson in his massive intervention in Santo Domingo. During the FULBRIGHT-DODD clash they sat hugging themselves to see the majority party sharply splintered.

The issue is of great and, perhaps, paramount importance in future U.S. relations with Latin America.

Both Messrs. FULBRIGHT and DODD deplore and loathe communism, but the first contend that the circumstances of massive U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo actually aided communism; the second contends that intervention was justified because it headed off a potential Castro-like takeover and, by inference, is the formula that should be applied in other like circumstances.

The essence of the Fulbright criticism is in two statements:

"The approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions, and, therefore, the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

And further:

"And the question inevitably arises whether this shift in the administration's attitude toward the Dominican Republic is part of a broader shift in its attitude toward other Latin American countries."

FULBRIGHT CRITICIZED

Mr. DODD, in reply, massed counterevidence to argue that Communists were taking control of Santo Domingo. He said:

"I therefore consider it all the more regrettable that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT], with the great prestige that attaches to his position, has seen fit to reopen the entire issue in this tendentious manner."

He added:

"I am certain that his speech will be picked up and played heavily by every Communist and crypto-Communist and fellow traveler and anti-American leftist who wheels a pen in the Latin American press."

STATEMENT UNEXPECTED

Chairman FULBRIGHT is somewhat of an oddity in the United States Senate. A former Rhodes scholar and college president,

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he tends to be studious in his approach and normally avoids toe-to-toe debate. He has not directly attacked President Johnson. Even in this instance he assailed Mr. Johnson's "advisers," not the Chief Executive. It is known that he feels he may have more influence in this approach.

On the other hand, Mr. Fulbright has seen his prized committee attacked for what has been called failure to explore and debate big foreign issues. In this instance he found the committee apparently unable to bring in a report on Santo Domingo after days of evidence, which convinced him of the importance of forming judgment.

So, in characteristic manner, without advance warning to the press, with little or no notice to the White House, before a handful of Senators and in a rather low voice September 15, he delivered his lengthy indictment, fully aware that it would bring the kind of attack upon his judgment and even Americanism which is actually provoked.

"U.S. policy is the Dominican crisis," he said, "was characterized initially by overtimidity, and subsequently by overreaction."

POINTS OF ACCORD

In violation of treaty obligations not to intervene, Mr. Fulbright charged, the United States did intervene. It thereby pushed what he considers to be the inevitable social revolution in Latin America toward communism as against more moderate development.

"It is the revolutionaries of the non-Communist left," he contended, "who have most of the popular support in Latin America."

Messrs. Fulbright and Dodd are alike in this: they both oppose communism; both say that communism cannot be defeated by siding with landowners, dictators, and tyrants; and they both feel that in the latter stage of the Dominican crisis, at least, some intervention was justified, as a minimum to save American lives.

ATTACK UNPARALLELED

But Senator Fulbright attacks Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Senator Dodd praises him; Mr. Fulbright minimizes Communist influence in the rebel movement, Mr. Dodd charges it was Communist-dominated; Mr. Fulbright says the rest of Latin America has recoiled from massive U.S. intervention, Mr. Dodd thinks American action has won substantial support.

Senator Dodd's personal attack on Senator Fulbright for what was called "softness" toward communism is almost unparalleled against a chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 17, 1965]

SUPPORTERS OF U.S. DOMINICAN STANCE LOWER BOOM ON FULBRIGHT'S CRITICISM

(By John M. Goshko)

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT's characterization of the Dominican Republic intervention as a "grievous mistake" came under heavy attack yesterday by Senator THOMAS J. DODD, Democrat, of Connecticut, who called the U.S. action an "unavoidable necessity."

In a lengthy Senate speech, Dodd charged that Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had ignored a mass of evidence supporting the correctness of President Johnson's dispatch of troops to Santo Domingo last April.

Dodd's speech was the principal thrust in a multipronged counterattack that pro-administration figures began mounting against Fulbright yesterday.

On Wednesday, Fulbright, Democrat, of Arkansas, charged that the U.S. intervention had resulted from a panicky overestimation of Communist strength among the Dominican rebels, had placed the United States on the side of rightwing forces and had thus damaged U.S. prestige among progressive forces in Latin America.

Most of the resultant furor that sprang up yesterday was centered on Capitol Hill—and most of it was directed against Fulbright. Among those defending the administration were Senate Republican Leader EVERETT DIRKSEN, of Illinois, House Republican Leader GERALD FORD, of Michigan, Senator RUSSELL B. LONG, Democrat, of Louisiana, Senator GEORGE A. SMATHERS, Democrat, of Florida, and Senator CLIFFORD P. CASE, Republican, of New Jersey.

Backing for Fulbright came from Senator JOSEPH S. CLARK, Democrat, of Pennsylvania, who found Fulbright's views "overdue, sound, and wise," and Senator WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon, who supported Fulbright "100 percent."

Within the administration itself, most officials took a flat "no comment" position. Privately, however, they made no secret of their anger at Fulbright and implied that Dodd's reply had the tacit blessing of the administration.

The sole exception to this "no comment" stance was Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, who described Fulbright's criticism of U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett as "an unfair attack on a very dedicated and very able Foreign Service officer."

McNamara also said there was "no question in my mind" that U.S. citizens in the Dominican Republic had been endangered by the revolution. But he did not answer Fulbright's assertion that U.S. officials had overestimated the Communist threat.

Dodd, a close friend of President Johnson, charged Fulbright with a "tolerance of communism" and said he "suffers from an indiscriminate infatuation with revolutions of all kinds, national, democratic, or Communist."

The Connecticut Senator agreed with Fulbright that the United States cannot beat communism by siding with rightist elements in Latin America and that the "best hope for the future . . . lies with the parties of the so-called democratic left."

However, he argued, the situation in the Dominican Republic, when judged by any criteria, showed a danger of a Communist takeover and required direct action.

To buttress this contention, Dodd cited State Department estimates of Communist strength within the rebel leadership, the views of John Bartlow Martin, former U.S. Ambassador in Santo Domingo, and the report of a five-member Organization of American States Commission that visited Santo Domingo shortly after the U.S. intervention.

The OAS Commission's report stated that Santo Domingo was in a state of anarchy in the days after the revolution's outbreak and that the rebel ranks included several pro-Castro figures. However, the report does not state outright that the rebel movement was Communist-controlled; and there has been considerable controversy about whether the Commission intended to imply that it was.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 16, 1965]

COMPARES IT TO BAY OF PIGS—FULBRIGHT CRITICIZES JOHNSON ON DOMINICAN INTERVENTION

(By Dom Bonafede)

WASHINGTON.—In a blistering critique on U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT yesterday charged the administration with committing an illegal, monumental blunder comparable to the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba.

During a speech delivered on the Senate floor, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee maintained that the unilateral U.S. action of last April was characterized by timidity, over reaction and a lack of candor.

He contended that the April 28 decision by President Johnson to send in the Marines purportedly to protect American lives was based on exaggerated estimates of the role

played by Communists during the Dominican crisis.

"The danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention," Senator Fulbright declared.

HARDEST

The speech by the Arkansas Democrat constituted the hardest-hitting attack against the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic by a member of the President's own party.

In all probability, the Senator's statements will be used as ammunition by Republicans in upcoming elections. On Tuesday former Vice President Richard M. Nixon said in Washington, that the Republicans are likely to make foreign policy an issue in the 1966 and 1968 campaigns.

Without saying so flatly, White House spokesmen indicated that the President was piqued by Senator Fulbright's remarks.

MOYERS

Presidential Press Secretary Bill D. Moyers told newsmen, "I talked to a number of officials in Government . . . who simply do not believe the Senator's conclusions are justified."

Asked if they included the President, Mr. Moyers simply replied, "a number of officials."

Senator Fulbright tempered his criticism of Mr. Johnson by centering his attack on U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett and unidentified U.S. policymakers.

"On the basis of the information and counsel he received, the President could hardly have acted other than he did; it is very difficult to understand, however, why so much unsound advice was given him," the Senator remarked.

He disputed claims made by the United States that it had intervened to save American lives; that U.S. troops in Santo Domingo were neutral in the struggle between rebel forces supporting former President Juan Bosch and so-called government loyalists, and that moderate elements among the rebels sought asylum in foreign embassies because Communists had seized control of their ranks.

According to Senator Fulbright, "In mid-afternoon of April 28, Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again, this time in writing, for U.S. troops on the ground that this was the only way to prevent a Communist takeover. No mention was made of the junta's inability to protect American lives."

"This request was denied in Washington, and Benoit was thereupon told that the United States would not intervene unless he said he could not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus told in effect that if he said American lives were in danger the United States would intervene. And that is precisely what happened."

On April 28, 4 days after the fall of Dominican President Donald Reid Cabral, Mr. Johnson announced on television he was ordering in the marines to protect Americans. He made no mention of pro-Communist forces being involved. The New York Herald Tribune, however, reported that the unilateral action was being taken because the administration feared a Castroite takeover.

It was not until the following Sunday that the President first publicly mentioned the supposed Communist threat.

Senator Fulbright stated rebel leaders on April 27, called at the American Embassy "seeking mediation and negotiations" but were rebuffed by Ambassador Bennett, who interpreted mediation as a form of intervention.

"Twenty-hour hours later the ambassador was pleading for the marines, and ever since the United States has been intervening up to its eyebrows," the Senator said.

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CHARTER

The Senator said the U.S. military action violated a provision of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) which prohibits unilateral intervention by members.

"The administration has argued that there was no time to consult the OAS, although there was time to 'consult'—or inform—the congressional leadership. The United States thus intervened in the Dominican Republic unilaterally—and illegally," he declared.

By such action, he said, "we thus encourage disorder and instability and thereby do incalculable damage to our own long-term interests."

The Dominican "venture," he said, alienated "real friends" of the United States in Latin America, interrupted the social democratic revolution in the hemisphere and promoted communism by revealing a policy which inherently supports military dictators and ruling oligarchies.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 17, 1965]

FULBRIGHT ASSAILS JOHNSON (By Saville R. Davis)

WASHINGTON.—The personal power of the Presidency, and the characteristically stern use of it by Lyndon B. Johnson on many occasions, are under fresh discussion here as the result of the Dominican revolution.

President Johnson has tenaciously insisted that everything was done right, and that nothing was done wrong by his administration, in the Dominican crisis. His claim has now been severely challenged.

Two separate developments in the past fortnight contradicted Mr. Johnson's position.

One was an event. The President was forced to overthrow the military leadership in Santo Domingo that his administration had favored and supported with troops and money at the start of the incident.

FULBRIGHT CRITICISM

The other was a verbal assault launched at the President's espousal of Dominican military figures from the Trujillo dictatorship. J. W. Fulbright, Democrat, of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the United States had thereby allied itself with a "corrupt and reactionary oligarchy."

Unless this was recognized as a "mistake" and not repeated, he said, the actions of the United States would increase the power of communism in the hemisphere instead of reduce it.

Unless the United States supported political moderates, Senator Fulbright continued, the choice would be between reaction and communism. The embittered forces of democratic reform in the Americas, in his judgment, would choose communism.

MEMBERS HOLD BACK

Several members of the Foreign Relations Committee at once disassociated themselves from the Fulbright statement. It was asserted that the chairman spoke for himself. The White House was officially silent, discussing a rebuttal.

It was generally agreed in Washington, openly as well as privately, that the Fulbright statement could be the most serious challenge President Johnson has yet faced.

It began with the Senator's statement that U.S. policy in this affair has been characterized "throughout" by a "lack of candor." This was taken as a direct reference to the refusal of the President to discuss the incident on other than his own terms, and to what one critic called his "high-handed beating down of any criticism."

METHODS ASSAILED

There has been a rising undercurrent of concern here at the personal domination of

discussion and maneuvering which has been the counterpart of the President's successes in establishing a "consensus" in domestic affairs and foreign policy. It affects lesser officials, the press, and politicians alike.

The President's supporters consider this a drawback in an otherwise successful presidency, and his opponents suggest that it is an abuse of power and may undo him. Both groups, however, have become more restive as the President has ridden higher.

"The President has effectively managed to smother a really useful national debate on this issue," said one critic, "and the public needs it. Few people are aware, for example, that while vehemently rejecting any criticism of his support for the Dominican military junta, Mr. Johnson has worked through the OAS [Organization of American States] to terminate its power over the democratic forces there."

It is noted here that Senator Fulbright has ended his conspicuous restraint in criticism of the President up to now. He explained to this correspondent among others that he did not wish to upset the apperant in a period of national crisis and that he felt a responsibility to support the President.

DEBATE EXPECTED

In this case he waited until the heat of the crisis subsided. But he did not deal gently with Mr. Johnson, apart from the polite device of blaming the President's advisers. He struck with what is being ranked as unparalleled force, since Mr. Johnson became President, at a policy sternly carried out and defended by the President himself.

The Fulbright document in its entirety is a root and branch condemnation of the Johnson policy in the Dominican incident. It will be hotly debated. Approval and disapproval already have begun to follow the lines of battle that long since have been established over the degree of the Communist danger in Santo Domingo and the best method of dealing with it.

But on the fact that this is a full-scale challenge directly to President Johnson himself, no dissent is expected.

Mr. Fulbright says he believes the United States could have intervened briefly, to save American lives, and then sought to help the moderates organize themselves and to keep power out of Communist hands—instead of turning against the "only available forces of democracy and social reform."

Unless corrected, the Senator said, this policy would serve notice on all reform movements in the hemisphere, which inevitably attract the Communists, that the United States was against them.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1965]
DOMINICAN ROLE OF UNITED STATES IS ASSAILED—FULBRIGHT CRITICISM REKINDLES DISPUTE OVER INTERVENTION

(By John M. Goshko)

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, yesterday attacked the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic as a "grievous mistake" characterized "initially by overtimidity and subsequently by overaction."

Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, charged that the U.S. action was the result of "faulty advice given to the President by his representatives in the Dominican Republic at the time of acute crisis."

Speaking for more than an hour on the Senate floor, Fulbright delivered the most far-reaching and scathing criticism of the Dominican intervention that has been uttered by a U.S. official to date. Because of his prestige and influence, the speech is certain to rekindle the controversy that broke out last April when President Johnson ordered 24,000 U.S. troops into the midst of the Dominican revolution.

PARALLEL DRAWN

Fulbright drew a parallel between the Dominican intervention and the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, saying:

"We are currently fighting a war in Vietnam, largely, we are told, because it would be a disaster if the United States failed to honor its word and its commitment. I do not see why it is any less a matter of vital interest to honor a clear and explicit treaty obligation in the Americas."

He was referring to the Organization of American States Charter, which explicitly forbids OAS members to intervene in the internal affairs of any American republic.

Pointing to Latin American fears that the United States is obsessed with fear of communism, he cited the Defense Department's preoccupation with counterinsurgency projects such as the controversial Project Camelot. These studies, Fulbright said, "claim to be scientific but beneath their almost unbelievably opaque language lies an unmistakable military and reactionary bias."

TESTIMONY TAKEN

Fulbright said he had reached his conclusions about the Dominican situation after listening to the testimony taken by the Foreign Relations Committee in a series of closed hearings during July.

Charging the administration with "a lack of candor," the Senator said, "The danger to American lives was more the pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention."

The real reason, he asserted, was the administration's fear of a Communist takeover—a fear based on "exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement."

These "exaggerated estimates," Fulbright said, were the fault of W. Tapley Bennett, U.S. Ambassador in Santo Domingo, and other U.S. officials on the scene. He charged that during the early days of the revolution last April, they sent Washington reports based on misjudgment of the facts, inadequate evidence, and false information.

"It is not at all difficult to understand why, on the basis of such faulty advice, the President made the decisions that he made," Fulbright said.

Because of this, he charged, the United States lost the opportunity to channel the course of the revolution toward an immediate restoration of Dominican democracy. As a result, he said, the United States both alienated mass opinion in Latin America and placed itself in the position of abetting rightwing, militaristic forces in the Dominican Republic.

"It cannot be said with assurance that the United States could have changed the course of events by acting differently," he asserted. "What can be said with assurance is that the United States did not take advantage of several opportunities in which it might have changed the course of events."

"The reason appears to be that, very close to the beginning of the revolution, U.S. policymakers decided that it should not be allowed to succeed. This decision seems to me to have been based on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement and on distaste for the return to power of Juan Bosch (former Dominican president) or a government controlled by Bosch's party, the PRD (Dominican Revolutionary Party)."

This hostility toward the rebels, he said, seemed based partly on the official U.S. view that Bosch had been an incompetent president before he was deposed by a military coup in 1963. Even more, he added, U.S. diplomats and officials appeared to be motivated by fears that they might be held responsible for "another Cuba" in Santo Domingo.

In summarizing his views on what happened in Washington and Santo Domingo

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during late April and early May, the Senator made seven specific points.

1. The United States intervened "not to save American lives, as was then contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement which was judged to be Communist-dominated."

2. Although there is no doubt that Communists joined the Dominican rebels, the evidence offered the Foreign Relations Committee by the administration does not support "the assertion that the rebels were Communist-dominated or certain to become so."

3. "The United States let pass its best opportunities to influence the course of events." These occurred on April 25, when the PRD requested United States presence, and on April 27, when the rebels, believing themselves defeated, requested U.S. mediation for a negotiated settlement.

FULBRIGHT said the first request apparently was rejected because of Johnson administration hostility toward Bosch and the PRD and the second because "Ambassador Bennett and the U.S. Government anticipated and desired a victory of the antirebel forces."

4. U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic shifted markedly to the right between September, 1963 (the date of Bosch's ouster) and April 1965. "Thus the United States turned its back on social revolution in Santo Domingo and associated itself with a corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy."

5. "U.S. policy was marred by a lack of candor and by misinformation." In this respect, FULBRIGHT recalled that Mr. Johnson asserted on June 17 that "some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off." There is, FULBRIGHT said, no evidence to support this statement.

6. "Responsibility for the failure of American policy lies primarily with those who advised the President"—who in the critical early days sent reports exaggerating the Communist danger and who then recommended military intervention.

7. The fear of "another Cuba" in the Caribbean and its "possible effects on the careers of those who might be held responsible" seems to have been "the most important single factor in distorting the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men."

After he finished speaking, FULBRIGHT was challenged sharply by the assistant Democratic leader, Senator RUSSELL B. LONG of Louisiana, and by Senator GEORGE A. SMATHERS, Democrat, of Florida.

LONG disputed FULBRIGHT's contention that the United States will jeopardize its standing in Latin America if it opposes any radical reform movement because it might have Communist support. So long as there is a hint or a possible Communist takeover, LONG asserted, the United States must move against it.

SMATHERS agreed saying: "What's wrong with trying to save a country from communism? What we ought to be doing is applauding the President as, thank God, 85 percent of the American people have done."

At the White House, Presidential Press Secretary Bill D. Moyers said he had talked to a number of officials "who simply do not believe that the Senator's views are justified." FULBRIGHT, Moyers added, seemed to be expressing his personal opinions and was not speaking for the Foreign Relations Committee.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1965]

WESSIN VOWS TO FORM ORGANIZATION OF EXILES

MIAMI, FLA., September 15.—Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin said today he would go to Puerto Rico soon to try and organize Dominican exiles there in a fight for what he termed the recovery of democracy in the Dominican Republic.

Wessin, who last night turned down the job of consul general here, did not give a date for going to Puerto Rico.

In Washington, the State Department said the ousted general was in the United States on "deferred inspection status," meaning the government will decide later whether to let him stay.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 16, 1965]

FULBRIGHT DECRIES U.S. LATIN POLICY—CRITICIZES DOMINICAN ACTION AS "FAILURE" THAT LED UNITED STATES TO BACK "CORRUPT" REGIME

(By Richard Eder)

WASHINGTON, September 15.—Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, in a scathing criticism of the administration, condemned today the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and raised serious questions about Washington's policy in Latin America.

In a long statement, most of which he delivered in a speech on the Senate floor, Mr. FULBRIGHT, who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and a major Democratic spokesman on foreign policy, analyzed the United States decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic.

The statement was published in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

He termed the intervention a "failure," and placed much of the responsibility for the failure on "faulty advice" given to President Johnson by his advisers.

Underlying what he characterized as an initial "overtimidity" and a subsequent "overreaction" by the U.S. Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, in the critical days during the outbreak of the fighting, Mr. FULBRIGHT said he discerned a wider tendency of the United States to suspect communism in any effective Latin American effort for social change.

This attitude, he said, made it impossible for the United States to establish an effective policy in Latin America where, he said, "the movement of the future . . . is social revolution."

Mr. FULBRIGHT's speech caused considerable displeasure in the administration but little public comment by it. President Johnson is understood to have read a copy of the speech this morning, but officials in the White House did not disclose what he thought of it.

The President's press secretary, Bill D. Moyers, said this afternoon:

"I talked to a number of officials in Government who simply do not believe that the Senator's conclusion are justified."

Mr. FULBRIGHT's analysis of the Dominican events withheld any judgment of what the consequences of U.S. actions would be for the Republic's future, although he cited unfavorable repercussions among progressive groups throughout Latin America.

HEARINGS WERE INCONCLUSIVE

The Foreign Relations Committee held 13 hearings over the last 2 months, with the witnesses being summoned almost exclusively from high levels of the administration. The conclusions of the committee's members, when the hearings were over, were so disparate that no report was issued.

The United States lost a valuable opportunity to influence developments in the Dominican Republic before they got out of hand, he said. The main opportunity was when the rebels met with Ambassador Bennett, before the U.S. marines landed, and asked him to negotiate a settlement.

Mr. Bennett said he had no authority to do so and that such an attempt on his part would be "intervention."

"Mediation at that point might have been accomplished quietly and peacefully," Mr. FULBRIGHT said. "Twenty-four hours later the Ambassador was pleading for the marines and ever since the United States has been intervening up to its elbows."

The United States, while maintaining that its intervention was for the purpose of saving lives actually was bent on preventing the victory of the rebels, the Senator said. The result, he added, was that for the first weeks U.S. policy was associated "with a corrupt and reactionary military" rule.

The responsibility for exaggerating the Communist danger and the extent of a breakdown of law and order in Santo Domingo lay with Mr. Johnson's advisers, Mr. FULBRIGHT asserted. "It is not at all difficult to understand why, on the basis of such faulty advice, the President made the decisions that he made," the Senator added.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 16, 1965]

WESSIN TO GO TO PUERTO RICO

MIAMI, September 15.—Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin said today that he would go to Puerto Rico soon to try and organize Dominican exiles there.

The 41-year-old officer, who was exiled from his country by the new Government, said he would lead a fight for what he termed the reestablishment of democracy in the Dominican Republic.

[From the Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 26, 1965]

LETTER WRITERS SUPPORT FULBRIGHT'S DOMINICAN REPUBLIC STAND

(By Ned Curran)

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT's main problem may be overprecision.

It is certainly an important element in the Dominican Republic storm that is swirling about his head. And it has been and probably will continue to be an element in any major FULBRIGHT utterances.

The point is that much, if not all, the criticism the Senator has reaped for his speech on U.S. intervention in the Caribbean stems from the finely shaded phrasing and logic of the speech.

This was apparent as soon as he finished delivering his 10,000-word speech that ran 16 legal-sized, single-space pages. Senators RUSSELL LONG, Democrat, of Louisiana and GEORGE SMATHERS, Democrat, of Florida, immediately jumped to their feet, berating FULBRIGHT although they had listened to the speech only briefly and did not appear to have read it. LONG and other subsequent critics did not even attend the Foreign Relations Committee hearings on which FULBRIGHT based his conclusions.

It was less apparent in the days that followed, when critics had to be given the benefit of any doubt that they had digested the speech. And yet some of the reaction betrayed the fact that it was to newspaper reports of the speech rather than to the speech itself. Some of it was reprehensible, going so far as to accuse FULBRIGHT of irresponsibility.

All of which the Senator actually brings on himself to some extent. And that leads unavoidably to the conclusion that the real problem may be J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT.

In the first place, FULBRIGHT is probably the very last Member of Congress who can be called irresponsible. He is almost totally oblivious to time, opportunism, and headline-baiting. He is jealous of the minor chores and distractions which rob him of the opportunity to worry literally about the state of the world and the true perspective of the trite "big picture."

His Dominican speech, therefore, was not hastily or opportunistically conceived. Nor was it really any departure from or innovation in the mainstream of FULBRIGHT's thinking. It was merely an extension and reiteration of the theme he has been developing in his public remarks for the past several years.

Characteristically, the speech was thoroughly thought out, carefully structured and documented and precisely honed in or-

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ganization and wording. Even a casual reading of it belies anything else.

The result was one of the truly rare examples of an exhaustive and coherent discussion of a major subject by a member of the Government, devoid of partisanship, irresponsibility, politics, demagoguery, window dressing, or ax grinding. It was, plainly, too quietly cerebral, too careful and too long.

All FULBRIGHT was really trying to say, as he has before in other contexts, was that the United States was precipitated into another action by its preoccupation with communism. It was precipitant because it was unnecessary, he reasoned, implying that it is a preoccupation because it keeps the country off balance, chronically discharging its energy and attention in rising to meet a challenge which might not be a challenge if we didn't keep rising to meet it.

His further implicit point was that then we might have the added strength to deal with more basic threats at home. He thus came close to touching the nerve of mid-century America which is the probable delusion that national high blood pressure may be the unfortunate necessity of economic health.

But because he had manufactured a complete tapestry it did not lend itself to the divisible blacks and whites of politics nor the necessary oversimplifications of newspaper reporting. It is nearly impossible to reduce a Fulbright speech to an aural attention span or the restraining space of a newspaper column.

So he was condemned almost as much to misunderstanding as he was to criticism. It is only unfortunate that the rebuttal hasn't been as carefully considered, complete and precise as the statement.

Surprisingly, despite all of this, the people seem to agree with FULBRIGHT if the mail his speech inspired is any measurement.

He had received, at this writing, 647 letters addressed to his Dominican remarks. A total of 584 support his position, only 63 opposed.

And perhaps more importantly, there were but 12 letters from Arkansas, 8 to 4 in favor of FULBRIGHT. This might indicate that Arkansans either don't care or tacitly agree with the Senator. If the latter is true, that is all that really matters to him in the summing up.

[From the Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 26, 1965]
THE JUNIOR SENATOR SPEAKS OUT ON INTERVENTION

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT's denunciation of the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic brought forth considerable editorial comment.

Editor Paul Buchanan in the Batesville Guard: "Senator FULBRIGHT's speech in the Senate last week sharply criticizing the Johnson administration about our intervention in the Dominican Republic makes sense to me. It is my candid opinion that the President is relying too much on advice from officials of the Pentagon concerning foreign affairs.

"The President is an expert at handling the Congress about domestic affairs but, when an emergency arises outside the country, he does not seem to have confidence in himself and must rely on others for guidance.

"The sudden, sharp criticism of FULBRIGHT by both Republicans and Democrats raises the thought that they are jittery of the President's capabilities in dealing with foreign affairs and resent any such criticism as being a dangerous 'rocking of the boat.'"

The Petit Jean Country Headlight: "While we suspect that Senator FULBRIGHT, this time, may be more right than wrong with regard to the extent of the Communist danger in the Dominican Republic, we can't help but be wary of Senator FULBRIGHT's assessment of the situation.

"We cannot recall a time when our junior Senator has denounced a Communist as forthrightly as he had L.B.J.'s attempt to thwart a Communist takeover.

"Nevertheless, we believe that Senator FULBRIGHT is honest in his convictions. And, once he is retired by another honest man (who is not yet on the horizon), we hope he will have the opportunity to return to his former avocation—university president. He might be welcome at Berkeley."

The Warren Eagle-Democrat: "There have been times when the assorted pronouncements of the junior Senator from Arkansas have seemed a bit 'global' for the more conservative elements in this State."

"As a matter of fact, it's always been a source of amazement to us that a man with the background of Bill FULBRIGHT was ever able to get elected in the first place back in the forties in the predominantly rural, mostly conservative State of Arkansas.

"Perhaps Arkansas realized that, beneath the Rhodes scholar sheen of Bill FULBRIGHT, there was some flint-hard honesty and singleness of purpose—a determination to do his best for his country.

"This characteristic was never more apparent than the other day when Bill FULBRIGHT got up on the floor of the Senate and proceeded to dismember the Johnson administration's Dominican Republic policies.

"We don't know enough about the subject to know whether FULBRIGHT or the administration is right—and that isn't the point of this discussion anyway.

"The point is this: You can't help but admire a man who will stand up and take the leader of his party to the cleaners if he thinks the leader needs such a little trip. And the courage and resolution of the action take on added weight when it's remembered that Lyndon Johnson and FULBRIGHT are close, personal friends.

"To Bill FULBRIGHT, both politics and friendship apparently take a second place when the interests of the United States are involved.

"That's the reason we're proud of Mr. F., be he 'one-worlder' or not."

The Crossett News-Observer: "As we have pointed out in these columns in times past, Arkansas' junior Senator, J. William FULBRIGHT, is a man of courage and much more.

"New evidence of this singular political trait was in ample view this week as the fur began to fly over the Senator's latest, well thought-out comments on the Johnson administration's handling of the Dominican Republic crisis of a few weeks back.

"Although he didn't come right out and say so, Senator FULBRIGHT accused L.B.J. of the same kind of 'hip-shooting' which was in such ill-repute this time last year when at that stage of the game it centered around a fellow named Goldwater."

The Morrilton Democrat: "The junior Senator calculates what Latin and South America need is a good revolution. The status quo, says FULBRIGHT, should be ousted forthwith. Maybe so.

"For our dough, FULBRIGHT is as much a part of Arkansas and United States 'status quo' as anything can be. He's been Senator so long we can hardly remember who he replaced in that position.

"We wonder if the junior Senator can explain how he says the Latin and South Americans need 'new blood' while he sings a different tune here at home. Here, FULBRIGHT and the rest of the 'status quo' have a well-worn phrase: 'It's experience that counts.'"

The Nashville News: Senator FULBRIGHT of Arkansas seems too enchanted with idealism, revolutionary change and the "Intellectual" approach to world troubles, he has become more of a 1965 Chamberlain than a source of a calm reason.

"His recent differences with the administration's handling of the Dominican crisis is another in a series of points to support the above conclusion.

"Had the FULBRIGHT opinions dominated in recent events, we would have more Com-mies in depth in Cuba, weakened our status in West Germany, pulled our synthetic rubber plant in Yugoslavia and continued training jet pilots for Iron Curtain countries.

"Despite all of the gains made by communism, the millions killed, captured or controlled, the Senator is determined to view this bloody plot against mankind as nothing but a social revolution, a mild Boston Tea Party.

"It isn't, and the tragedy for Senator FULBRIGHT is that his built-in glow of idealism blinds him so completely to the bloody history of communism."

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1965]

BENNETT GETS SUPPORT OF SENATOR RUSSELL

Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Democrat, of Georgia, yesterday accused critics of the administration's Dominican policies of attempting "to make a whipping boy" of Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

In a Senate speech, RUSSELL said, "I vigorously and categorically disagree" with contentions by Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, and others that President Johnson was a gullible victim of faulty advice in sending troops to Santo Domingo.

FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, voiced his criticism in a recent speech.

RUSSELL, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that since Mr. Johnson's decision the "fighting was brought to a halt and we do not have another Castroite dictatorship in the Caribbean Isles."

"It is a grievous disservice to a dedicated public servant," RUSSELL said of criticism of Bennett, a native Georgian. The Senator recalled that he had served with Bennett's grandfather in the Georgia Legislature.

RUSSELL said criticism of Bennett was coming from those he called "some of our hind-sighters."

[From the Evening Star, Sept. 22, 1965]

RUSSELL BACKS BENNETT ADVICE

Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL says critics of the administration's Dominican policies are committing a grievous disservice by attacking Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

The Georgia Democrat told the Senate Tuesday he vigorously and categorically disagrees with Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, and others who have contended that Tapley gave poor advice to President Johnson before Johnson sent U.S. Marines to Santo Domingo.

Since Johnson's decision, RUSSELL said, "fighting was brought to a halt and we do not have another Castroite dictatorship in the Caribbean Isles.

"It is a grievous disservice to a dedicated public servant," RUSSELL said of the criticism aimed at Bennett. The Senator, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, recalled that he served with Bennett's grandfather in the Georgia Legislature.

Some critics have contended that Bennett overemphasized the extent of Communist influence among the revolutionaries during the Dominican crisis.

Senator JOSEPH S. CLARK, Democrat, of Pennsylvania, who supported FULBRIGHT's recent speech attacking Bennett, said his criticism of the Ambassador was not personal but was directed at his judgment.

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[From Newsweek, Sept. 27, 1965]

MYTH AND REALITY II

For 13 closed-door sessions between April 30 and July 29, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee listened to administration testimony on U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. Chairman J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT listened hardest of all and emerged most dissatisfied of all. And last week in a nearly empty Senate Chamber the Senator from Arkansas suddenly loosed a broadside at the landing in Santo Domingo—and at U.S. Latin American policy generally.

FULBRIGHT bluntly charged that the administrations handling of the Dominican crisis "was characterized initially by overtimidity and subsequently by overreaction. . . . His criticism echoed his earlier salvo against U.S. foreign policy last year. In that widely heralded speech, he spoke of clinging to "old myths" in the face of "new realities." Last week, the new reality he stressed was the aspiration for reform in Latin America and the inevitability that Communists would attach themselves to reform movements. The old myth: the view that Communist support means Communist control.

While there were certainly some Communists on the side of the rebels in the Dominican uprising, said FULBRIGHT, the administration failed to establish that Communists controlled the revolt. And "intervention on the basis of Communist participation . . . reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics." If the United States automatically condemns any movement involving Communists, the scathing counterattack came from Senator THOMAS DODD, a close friend of L.B.J. FULBRIGHT, charged Senator DODD, "suffers from an indiscriminate infatuation with revolutions of all kinds, national, democratic, or Communist."

In the hope of forestalling another Santo Domingo, FULBRIGHT had knowingly staked out a lonely position. Amid the swirl of criticism, that was just where he found himself late last week.

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 4, 1965]
LONG SAYS FULBRIGHT TALK HURT UNITED STATES

Senator RUSSELL B. LONG, Democrat, of Louisiana, charged yesterday that Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT's recent attack on the Santo Domingo intervention could become "the key factor in the Communists winning an election . . . in the Dominican Republic."

The comments by LONG, assistant Democratic leader in the Senate, marked the latest round in the controversy sparked last month by FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Arkansas Democrat charged that the United States has been unable to substantiate the contention that the Dominican Republic was in danger of a Communist takeover.

LONG spoke on the television program, "Face the Nation" (CBS-WTOP). He said FULBRIGHT's speech "has hurt this country tremendously all over Latin America" and would be cited by Dominican leftists as proof that the U.S. action was "unjustified aggression."

LONG said he doubted that the closed hearings held by FULBRIGHT's committee were "in sufficient depth" to justify any action.

The Fulbright committee's hearings in July included testimony from most of the administration officials who played key roles in the Dominican intervention.

LONG also was asked about a resolution passed recently by the House of Representatives that has been widely interpreted as condoning unilateral intervention in any hemispheric country where there is a threat of "Communist domination."

To this, LONG merely said he could understand why the resolution was "resented in Latin America." He defended the right of the resolution's sponsor, Representative ARISTIDE I. SELDEN, Jr., Democrat, of Alabama, to offer it, but added: "I am not saying that he was right or wrong."

As the result of hearings held last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department are trying to compose a statement of United States Latin American policy aimed at counteracting the adverse reaction prompted by the Selden resolution.

Meanwhile, criticism of current U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic was voiced by Senator GEORGE MURPHY, Republican, of California, on the television program, "Issues and Answers" (ABC-WMAL). MURPHY charged that rightist Dominican Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, whom he described as a staunch anti-Communist, has been "spirited" out of his country with apparent U.S. cooperation.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1965]
DOMINICAN CHARGES BRING RASH OF FLAG WAVING—FULBRIGHT'S CRITICS SIDESTEP THE ISSUE

(By John M. Goshko)

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT's attempt to provoke a debate on the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic has called forth only a babble.

Since Wednesday, when FULBRIGHT rose on the Senate floor to characterize the intervention as a "grievous mistake," the Washington atmosphere has been filled with a great deal of heat—and almost no light.

Those most directly affected by the Arkansas Democrat's criticism, the top foreign policymakers of the Johnson administration, have retreated behind a wall of angry silence. And although their reticence has not been shared by proadministration figures in Congress, most of the retorts emanating from Capitol Hill have been distinguished primarily by their irrelevance to the charges raised by FULBRIGHT.

The sole exception has been Senator THOMAS J. DODD, Democrat, of Connecticut, whose lengthy Senate rebuttal on Thursday came directly to grips with FULBRIGHT's contention that the extent of Communist influence on the Dominican rebels had been exaggerated.

In the end, however, DODD also went the route of the others who rose in Congress to chastize FULBRIGHT. He implied that FULBRIGHT, if not exactly soft on communism, is complacent about its dangers.

But even if this charge was conceded to be 100 percent accurate, it still would not constitute a reply to some of the major questions raised by FULBRIGHT. And because of his longstanding prestige as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, they are questions that cannot be disposed of by ignoring them or by impugning the qualifications of the man who asked them.

FULBRIGHT's questions were prompted by the testimony given his committee by administration officials during closed hearings in July. In essence, what he said was this:

That the intervention had resulted from a panicky overestimation of Communist strength among the rebels, that the danger to U.S. citizens had been used as a pretext to cover the anti-Communist basis of the intervention, that it had placed the United States on the side of reactionary elements and that the effect had damaged U.S. prestige among progressive forces in Latin America.

Moreover, he added, U.S. actions had been accompanied by misinformation and a "lack of candor." In this respect, he charged that U.S. officials had sought almost from the outset of the revolution to create a Dominican military junta, that the Do-

minian military was told the United States would intervene only if they would say American lives were endangered and that no proof has ever been offered to substantiate President Johnson's charge that "some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off."

Only seconds after FULBRIGHT finished speaking, the tone of what was to come was set by Louisiana Senator RUSSELL B. LONG, the majority whip. In an arm-waving classic of old-fashioned oratory, LONG managed to invoke his "daddy," the Confederacy and General de Gaulle in defense of the administration.

On the day following FULBRIGHT's speech, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a press conference he never had any doubts that U.S. citizens in Santo Domingo had been endangered. However, McNamara was silent in regard to FULBRIGHT's assertion that the danger also was being used to cover up a move against suspected Communists.

Since then, there have been calls to rally round the President, flag-waving diatribes against the Communist conspiracy and appeals for FULBRIGHT to "get back on the team." But there has been no attempt to answer or rebut him on a point-by-point basis.

This is true even of DODD's speech. The Connecticut Senator did tackle the question of Communist influence by marshalling virtually every available fact tending to support the thesis that the Communist threat was real and pressing.

His performance on this score was impressive; and if he failed to defeat FULBRIGHT's contention that the danger was overrated, he at least established the fact that legitimate grounds for a debate do exist.

What was missing from DODD's speech was any reply to FULBRIGHT's charge that the administration engaged in duplicity. Yet this is the very point that underlies most of the criticism directed against the U.S. action.

It is also the point on which administration officials have persistently refused to answer questions. Now, in the face of FULBRIGHT's challenge, they appear determined to maintain this silence while hoping that their friends in Congress will be able to overcome the embattled Senator.

ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate House Concurrent Resolution 527, which was read as follows:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the two Houses of Congress shall adjourn on Friday, October 22, 1965, and that when they adjourn on said day, they stand adjourned sine die.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. In lines 2 and 3, it is proposed to strike out the words "Friday, October 22" and insert in lieu thereof, "Saturday, October 23," so as to make the concurrent resolution read as follows:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the two Houses of Congress shall adjourn on Saturday, October 23, 1965, and that when they adjourn on said day, they stand adjourned sine die.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Montana.

The amendment was agreed to.